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ABSTRACT
This research explores the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy since the
end of the Cold War. It investigates the discourses of Eurasianism and the way they are
interpreted by the polity and consequently implemented in the foreign policy making in
Turkey.
In this sense, this research was carried out using literature reviews and interviews in order to
respond to the following question:
Considering that Turkey has increasingly been pursuing an active and multi-
dimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, how have the
discourses of Eurasianism been influencing the contemporary Turkish foreign
policy making?
The research unpacks the dynamics of contemporary Turkish foreign policy and
responds to the debate on whether or not s international relations axis is shifting
eastwards. Having questioned if such a foreign policy shift exists, the thesis then
questions to what extent the process has been informed and channelled by Eurasianism
by focussing on three periods since the early 1990s: era (1983-1993), Cem era
(1997-2002), era (2003-2011). Finally, the research presents a set of
conclusions on how Eurasianism has been a strong influence on foreign policy making
in Turkey and what internal and external socio-economic and political factors have
played a critical role in this process.







     
 
   
  






   
 
 
   
   
     
     
   
  
 
    
   
   
     
     
     
    
   
       
    
     
   
    
   
 
 
        
   
      
        
       












1.4.Aim and Objectives .............................................................................................12
1.5.Scope and Limitations .........................................................................................13
1.6.Literature Review ................................................................................................14
1.7.Methodology........................................................................................................18
1.7.1. Case Study Research Design.........................................................................18
1.7.2. Data Collection ........................................................................................21




CHAPTER 2 Geopolitical Thinking and World Politics
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................30
2.2. The Concept of ...........................................................................33
2.2.1. Darwin and Organic State Conception ......................................33
2.2.2. Emergence of the Concept of Lebensraum..............................................34




    
          
     
     
     
         
       
       
  
 
       
   
         
   
      
      
      
       
      
         
           
  
           
     
          
     
         





2.2.4.1.Turkish Lebensraum during the early days of the Republic..............39
2.3. The ......................................................................................42
2.3.1. Turkey and Heartland ..............................................................................47
2.4. The ........................................................................................51
2.4.1. Spykman and Foreign Policy of the USA ...............................................51
2.4.2. The Emergence of the Rimland Thesis....................................................53
2.4.3. Place in the Rimland ................................................................56
2.5.Conclusion...........................................................................................................58
CHAPTER 3 Eurasianism: An Ideological Revival
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................60
3.2. Classical Eurasianism: Historical Context, Emergence and Principles..............61
3.3. Neo-Eurasianism ................................................................................................69
3.3.1. Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) ......................................................................70
3.3.2. Alexandr Panarin (1940-2003) ...............................................................74
3.3.3. Aleksandr Dugin (1962-Present) ............................................................76
3.4. Comparison of Eurasianism with Pan-Slavism...................................................81
3.4.1. An Outline of Pan-Nationalism ...............................................................82
3.4.2. Pan-Slavism: A Dream of a Slavic Union ...............................................84
3.5. From Russian Eurasianism to Turkish Eurasianism: A Diggression from the
Mainstream .........................................................................................................86
3.5.1. Relationships with Russia: An Eternal Enemy or A Neighbour
at the Door? ........................................................................................................87
3.5.2. Ideological Interaction as a Result of Rapprochement during the Post-
Cold War Era ............................................................................................................... 89





            
 
   
             
         
        
         
   
 
         
   
         
     
      
      
            
      
    
    
    
   
 
             
    
   
          
     





CHAPTER 4 General Framework of Turkish Foreign Policy since Late Ottoman
Era
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................101
4.2. New Republic's Foreign Policy: at home, peace in the .............104
4.3. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War ...................................................108
4.4.'New World Order' and Turkish Foreign Policy................................................112
4.5. A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy..............................................................117
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................125
CHAPTER 5 - Diverse Discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey
5.1. Introduction........................................................................................................127
5.2. Roots of Diversity of Eurasianism in Turkey ....................................................128
5.2.1. Neo-Ottomanism: Endless Passion ........................................................128
5.2.2. Islamism and .....................................................................133
5.2.3. Pan Turkism: Red Apple ........................................................................138
5.2.4. Pan-Turanianism: An Ideology from the Balkans to the Yellow Sea ....145
5.3. Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism ................................................................148




CHAPTER 6 Three Periods of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Scope of
Application of the Discourses
6.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................162
Era:Westernist Eurasianism by using Nationalist and Religious Appeals164
6.3.Cem Era: Westernist Eurasianism .....................................................................182
6.2. 





    
   
      
            
     
 
 
      
    


























7.2. General Summary and Conclusions...................................................................202
7.3. Realities and Recommendations for Future Foreign Policy Making in Turkey206
7.4. Future Research Suggestions .............................................................................215
APPENDIX A RESEARCH ETHICS ....................................................................217
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................218





   
 
       
    
          
          
             
          
    
     
    
  
  
      
    
    
       
            
      
         
         
      
          
  
     






Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis...............................................................................27
Figure 2.1 ..............................................................................38
Figure 2.2 The Ottoman Empire at its Greatest Extent .............................................39
Figure 2.3 Anatolia: dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1807 1924 ......................40
Figure 2.4 Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace according to the Treaty of Sevres...41
Figure 2.5 Boundaries of the Modern State of Turkey..............................................41
Figure 2.6 ....................................................44




Figure 2.10 The Rimland Concept ..............................................................................55
Figure 3.1 ..........................................................79
Figure 3.2 .........................................................................................80
Figure 5.1 The Cover of Bozkurt.............................................................................141
Figure 5.2 Turkey Turkic States Foreign Trade (US $ millions) .........................143
Figure 5.3 Alleged Turanian Lands.........................................................................147
Figure 6.1 EU-Turkish bilateral trade (US $ millions) ...........................................179
Figure 6.2 Top 20 Government Contributors of International humanitarian
Assistance, 2003 2012 (US $ billions) .................................................191
Figure 6.3 ODA from Turkey, 2000-2012 (US $ billions) .....................................191
-
2011 (US $ millions) .............................................................................192
Figure 6.4




   
 
      
       
         
            
          






Table 1.1 Research Design Strategies......................................................................19
Table 1.2 Methods of Data Collection .....................................................................22
Table 3.1 Turkey-Russian Federation Foreign Trade (million dollars ....................91
Table 4.1 Principles and Mechanisms of the new Turkish Foreign Policy............121
Table 5.1 Typology of the Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism.............................150






              
                
           
                
  
               
               
              
        
 
             
            
      
 
                 
               
 
                  
               
              
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to number of individuals and organisations, without
which this study would have proved impossible. First of all I would like to extend my
sincere thanks to Professor Alp who provided invaluable guidance throughout
the period of this research. He is the one who contributed a lot to this work.
Many thanks to the staff and doctoral researchers at the Centre for Peace, Trust and
Social Relations, whose support played a part in making my life at the Centre less
stressful. And also, I owe thanks too to Turkish National Education Ministry, without its
financial support this work could not be achieved.
Thanks to all colleagues and friends at CESRAN International, particularly to those for
their sincere friendship and kindness like Murad Duzcu, Tabak, Erman
Rahman and Kadri Kaan Renda.
I would also like to thank my parents and sisters for encouraging me to dream and work
hard. Without their kind support, this experience would not have been at all possible.
Most of all, I would like to thank my wife my other half: she is my inspiration
and the sparks that lighten my days. Thank you for your unconditional love and the





            












I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Coventry University. It has not been submitted before for any







             
                
             
            
             
            
               
             
          
               
            
            
 
              
             
             
              
              
               
          
             
               
               
              
           





This research explores the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy since the
end of the Cold War. It investigates the discourses of Eurasianism and the way they are
interpreted by the polity and consequently implemented in the foreign policy making in
Turkey. By undertaking such an examination the research unpacks the dynamics of
contemporary Turkish foreign policy and responds to the debate on whether or not
Turkey s international relations axis is shifting eastwards. Having questioned if such a
foreign policy shift exists, the thesis then questions to what extent the process has been
informed and channelled by Eurasianism by focussing on three periods since the early
1990s: zal era (1983-1993), Cem era (1997-2002), Davuto lu era (2003-onwards).
Finally, the research presents a set of conclusions on how Eurasianism has been a strong
influence on foreign policy making in Turkey and what internal and external socio-
economic and political factors have played a critical role in this process.
To explain the main parameters of this research and set its research question and
objectives, this chapter starts with a brief overview of Eurasianism with its historical
development. Exploring its political roots starting in Russia in the early 20th Century,
the chapter will also explain the way Eurasianism has entered into the political lexicon
of Turkish politics with particular reference to the post-Cold War era. Such a review
will present a number of key indicators for the way Eurasianism has always played a
significant role within Turkish politics even under strikingly different political
ideologies. To understand and explore the reasons behind such a phenomenon and how
that has informed the foreign policy making in the country, the chapter will then present
the overall research question and its main aim and objectives. As part of this overall
presentation, the scope of the research will be defined and the literature review and
research methodology will be explained. Finally, the chapter will present the





             
              
              
               
             
         
           
               
            
                
              
          
              
            
             
             
             
              
              
               
             
              
             
               
                                                          
              
       
               
   
              
        
            
   
1.2. Background
Eurasianism, as its name indicates, makes a reference to the term Eurasia which
literally means Europe plus Asia. In relation to such a meaning, the main geographical
reference point is the territory of Russia and according to N. S. Trubetskoy1, The
territory of Russia ... constitutes a separate continent ... which in contrast to Europe and
Asia can be called Eurasia ... Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically
and anthropologically. Furthermore, this separate continent was a self-contained
geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian
Empire in 1914.2 This way of thinking is called Classical Eurasianism and by the 1930s,
losing all of its ideological forefathers and eminent figures caused this Eurasianism
ideology to die down until Lev N. Gumilev led similar ideas and a new kind of
Eurasianism ideology around the 1980s. Hence, it was the milestone that gave rise to
this revised approach being named Neo-Eurasianism. Gumilev brought the Eurasianist
ideas to light and prepared an intellectual background for them. Shortly after his death,
the new and dedicated supporters of Neo-Eurasianism became Alexander S. Panarin and
Alexander G. Dugin. Alexander Panarin was a well-known theorist and the Chair of
Political Science at the Department of Philosophy in Moscow State University.3 He was
also prolific as an author as Dugin. Nevertheless, the international community has not
found an opportunity to meet with Panarin s works as they have never been translated
into English. On account of this, Dugin has remained the only well-known global figure
on the ideology of Eurasianism and its application on the foreign policy course of the
Russian Federation. Although he has had several books that have been translated into
many foreign languages, there is no doubt that his most influential book is The
Foundation of Geopolitics.4 What makes him highly popular as a Russian nationalist are
his proposals, which he puts forward in the book, regarding a new vision and a new
1 Quoted in S. Wiederkehr, a Concept: in Classical Annual Soyuz
Symposium at Princeton University, (2007), (p. 1).
2 C. J. Halperin, Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Slavic Review, 41 (1982),
477-493 (p. 481).
3 M. Laruelle, Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian
Nationalities Papers, 32 (2004), 115-136 (p. 116).





              
         
 
             
               
         
         
              
            
             
            
             
              
 
 
            
             
                
              
           
              
              
             
                
              
              
           
 
                                                          
          
           
           
          
future of Russian Foreign Policy. By means of these proposals, he tries to manage
leading the policy-makers in Russia as a policy advisor.5 
As for the differences between the Classical and Neo- Eurasianisms, the perception of
the concept of the West is a major divergence. Classical Eurasianism was an idea which
was against the West, like Neo-Eurasianism. However, Classical Eurasianists
interpreted the concept synonymously with Western Europe, whereas for Neo-
Eurasianists, the West means the United States of America (USA). All in all, both
ideologies emerged with the imminent collapsing of the Empires (Russian Empire and
Soviet Union) to save and keep them alive. Despite not reaching their goals,
Eurasianism is still a relatively influential political ideology in Russia and its
neighbouring regions. Besides, it keeps aspiring to establish a new and stronger Russia
as a superpower and attempts to unite the countries in the Eurasian continent against the
USA.
When it comes to Turkish intelligentsia s meet with Eurasianism and modelling new
conceptual interpretations of Eurasianism, the demise of the Soviet Union was a turning
point. It was also significant for the Turkic states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The
collapse has led to the emergence of six independent states among others which have
had cultural, historical, ethnic, and linguistic bonds with Turkey. Although Turkish
public opinion has been sensitive towards the Turkic people of Central Asia and the
Caucasus and has also perceived Central Asia as a fatherland , up until the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, Turkey had not developed a specific foreign policy approach
towards these regions during the Cold War years. The main reasons for such a lack of
interest to Turkic people were because Turkey played a buffer state role against the
Soviet Union and other adversaries of the Western world and also pursued a passive,
bilateral and security-oriented foreign policy course during the Cold War era.6 
5 M. Laruelle, Two Faces of Contemporary 2004.
6 R. Weitz, Insights: Multi-Vector Regional Available from
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10368/global-insights-turkeys-multi-vector-regional-
ambitions>, [Accessed on 12/04/2012]; F. Keyman, Modernity and Democracy: Turkish




            
          
           
            
            
           
              
              
             
             
               
            
          
                 
            
             
            
         
           
             
               
              
        
  
           
               
               
                                                          
             
        
                 
                 
            
              
On the other hand, the imperial historical background and customs and the
geopolitical/geostrategic stand between Asia and Europe have had a significant
influence on Turkey s domestic and foreign policies. These circumstances have given
rise to fluctuation on the decisions of policy-makers and have caused many
confrontations within society. Turkey has always had a fertile environment and circles
for the debates on secularism and Islam ; Pan-Turkism and Pan/Neo Ottomanism 
etc. These debates and confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire which
in the 18th century - initiated Western-inspired reforms to overcome its rival powers.
Furthermore, in B lent G kay s words, this westernisation process in the early times of
newly established Republic of Turkey caused cutting all links with the old , the
Ottoman .7 In this sense, as a side-effect, such initiatives contributed to the division of
the society into several factions such as Westernists (supporters of Western culture),
Anti-Westernists, Pan-Turkist (in favour of unification of Turkish origin states), Pan-
Islamists (in support of unification of Islamist states), and so on.8 In spite of the fact that
the newly established Turkish Republic s main official direction was toward the West,
these factions still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946-1960) to
Justice Party (1961-1980) line and the National Salvation Party (1972-1980) to Welfare
Party (1983-1998) line had pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches respectively,
the centre-left Republican People s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-
oriented approach from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early
2000s even though it seems that CHP (the main opposition party today) has recently lost
its enthusiasm toward the Western world and radiated mixed signals on whether it will
continue to support Turkey s Westernist foreign policy discourse.
Under these conditions, as it is abovementioned, Turkey gradually became acquainted
with Eurasianism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it is possible to claim
that while a certain group of Turkish intellectuals was gradually starting to deal with the
7 B. Western Perceptions to Turkish Self- Journal of Mediterranean Studies,
Vol. 5, No. 2, 1995, pp. 259-269 (266).
8 F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (London: Routledge, 1993); N. Berkes and F. Ahmad, The
Development of Secularism in Turkey, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998); W. Hale, Turkish Politics and the
Military, (London: Routledge, 1994); W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774 2000, (London: Routledge,




              
            
              
               
          
             
            
             
             
             
              
               
             
             
          
 
                 
              
              
              
               
              
   
 
                   
          
                                                          
               
 
    
                  
  
                     
     
            
ideology in the early 1990s along with the emergence of newly established Turkic states
in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Eurasianism became relatively more popular among
the Turkish community after the Ergenekon trial that started in June 2007. Ergenekon is
the name given to arguably the most important legal process in Turkish history in which
around 100 suspects - retired military officers, politicians, journalists, lawyers,
businessmen, academics, and known criminals - were charged with a range of crimes;
they included "attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey",
"membership in an armed terrorist group", and "inciting people to rebel against the
Republic of Turkey". In this regard, generally speaking the majority of the suspects
were accused of being Eurasianist, who want to topple the Government and change
Turkey s foreign policy course in the name of building robust relations with the Eastern
World, such as Russia, Iran, and Turkic States etc.9 This accusation was being made by
people who think that Eurasianism is merely about Turkey s eastern neighbours and it
was an alternative for Turkish foreign policy. The rationale behind this thinking was
what Turkey experienced after the demise of the Soviet Union.
The post-Cold War era, was a new epoch in which Turkey needed to find a new identity
as it faced a rather troubled environment between three major unstable zones as the
Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. The instability of these zones and Turkey s
geographical location at the nexus of them put Turkey in an important position and
paved the way for Turkey to emerge as a potential dynamic player.10 This potential was
used to generate a relatively activist foreign policy by Turgut zal11 and smail Cem12 
during the 1990s.
In this sense, it is safe to say that despite the fact that the first decade of the 2000s
witnessed a significant transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey s opening
9 E. Ergenekon'un beyin niye Daily Sabah, 23 January 2009, Available from
<http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/akoz/2009/01/23/Ergenekon_un_beyin_takimi_niye_Avrasyaci>,
[Accessed on 19/01/2010]
10 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Foreign Policy in an Age of (California: RAND,
2003).
11 Turgut was sworn in as President of Turkey on 9 November 1989. On 17 April 1993, died of
a heart attack in office.




              
              
             
             
               
             
               
               
                
               
             
             
               
               
              
                 
            
         
 
                 
               
          
            
               
               
            
            
             
                                                          
                 
              
                
    
towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely Turkic States, was launched in the zal
era (1983-1993). zal was Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1989 and then
President of Turkey between 1989 and 1993. During his era, Turkey s economy became
more globalised by his liberal policies and by his Turkism centred foreign policy;
meanwhile, the Republic of Turkey built new relations with the Turkic states in order to
make possible the economic and cultural presence of Turks in the neighbouring region.
This way of thinking was stirred by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December
1991, the dissemination of the Soviet Union gave rise to a power vacuum in Central
Asia. In fact, decision makers in Turkey wanted to fill this vacuum and play a big
brother role, knowing what was best for the region as well. For instance, the then
Turkish President Turgut zal in his opening speech of the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey (GNAT) on 1 September 1991 described the situation as a historic
opportunity for the Turks to become a regional power and urged the GNAT not to
throw away this chance which presented itself for the first time in 400 years. 13 It
seems that the Turkish decision makers were willing to undertake such a leadership as
they hoped that it would enhance the importance of Turkey. Thus, it is safe to say that
the stimulator of this new active and multi-dimensional foreign policy towards the
Turkic states was the then Turkish President Turgut zal.
As for the Cem era, it is assumed that during that time while Turkey built new relations
with the neighbouring countries, at the same time it reinforced its relations with the EU.
Regarding relations with the neighbouring countries and finding opportunities in
Eurasia, smail Cem continued zal s way of understanding. According to him, Turkey
has had a common history, language and culture with the countries in the Balkans, the
Caucasus and Central Asia. In his mind-set, this feature makes Turkey a central state in
this emerging Eurasian reality. Besides, it puts Turkey into position which links
Western Europe to Eastern horizons.14 Along with the Cem s vision, Turkish foreign
policy s acquisition was a positive atmosphere in the bilateral relations of Turkey and
13 Quoted in M. of Central Asia and The Caucasus: Continuity and Change since the
End of the Cold Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, No. XXXII, 167-216 (186).
Cem, and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical Available from





             
               
                  
            
              
                
             
            
             
                   
    
 
                
             
           
           
 
             
                
              
            
                                                          
                
   
 
              
              
           
                   
                
                
                     
                   
                
                 
             
   
  
Greece. In Papandreou s words, what we are living through today in our Greek-
Turkish relationship is simply a fairy tale. And yet it is not. Because our people
demand it! I therefore say this: it is time to dare the impossible. 15 It might be set forth
that zal s way of foreign policy understanding influenced smail Cem, and Cem s
vision has been carried on by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and Davuto lu.
It is highly believed that the AKP era foreign policy course has been, in a manner,
influenced by smail Cem, who expressed the intention to use Turkey s cultural and
historical affinities as major inputs to international relations during his tenure as
foreign minister.16 In this sense, the pro-activism in Turkish foreign policy during the
zal and Cem eras has been observed in the AKP era as it is assumed that it was based
on the previous ones.
In this sense, during the AKP era by and large three main developments have played a
crucial role in moulding the Turkish Foreign Policy course and these developments are
also significant regarding this thesis s topic: Professor Ahmet Davuto lu s posts within
the government; the Second Gulf War, and the Ergenekon trial.
Davuto lu was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at
large by the 58th Government of the Republic of Turkey. After that, he was appointed as
the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 1 May 2009. During his presence within the
government, his foreign policy slogan Zero Problem Policy with the neighbours17 has
15 G. Papandreou, Speech at the University of October 3, 1999. Available from
<http://www.hri.org/MFA/gpap/october99/Istanbul_University_speech_31099.html> [Accessed on
22.04.2014].
16 S. and S. Model, Order-Setter, or Trade- Ideational and Material
Power: The Role of Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Mediterranean Papers 13, Washington
DC: The German Marshall Fund, June 2012), pp. 10-18 (p. 12).
17 Zero Problem Policy is in favour of cultivating new friendships in the region instead of the phrase
only friend is another Prof. deduces this policy from his major academic work
Strategic Depth which was published in 2001. According to is possible to have zero
problems if the other actors respect our values. It doesn't mean that we will be silent in order to have good
relations with all a Turk, now I am European in Brussels, or Iraqi in Baghdad, Bosnian in
Sarajevo, or Samarkandi in Central Asia. And these are not conflicting identities. If you want to
contribute to regional and global peace, you have to speak from within. You should not impose. You






               
            
             
             
             
     
 
             
                
             
              
              
             
                
            
             
             
        
 
             
             
                                                          
                 
                 
             
               
          
                   
                
               
               
                
                   
               
              
               
    
been dominant. Yet, this policy has raised a new debate on the Turkish Foreign policy
course in terms of whether Turkey is forming a Neo-Ottomanist18 perspective. Although
Davuto lu has repeated several times that Turkey must become more than just a
regional power and promote close relations with not only the European countries and
the USA but also the Eastern countries, the debates on the Neo-Ottomanist foreign
policy course continue.
The Second Gulf War had significance as a confrontation emerged between Turkey and
the USA in 2003. In March 2003, the USA along with the coalition forces including the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland invaded Iraq. It might be considered as a
continuation of the 1990-1991 Gulf War as Saddam Hussein had failed to comply with
the terms of the 1990-1991 Gulf War ceasefire.19 Before starting the operation, as a
consequence of the negotiation between Turkey and the USA, GNAT voted a motion
which was to allow the USA air and ground forces to use Turkey s bases. This motion
proposed the deployment of 62,000 troops and equipment through Southern Turkey into
Northern Iraq. However, it was surprisingly rejected by GNAT.20 And this last minute
development escalated the tension between the two states and caused a number of
speculations that Turkey s foreign policy course was shifting.
As for the Ergenekon investigation, it began in June 2007, when 27 handgrenades,
explosives and detonators were found in a shanty house belonging to a retired
18 The term was first articulated by Cengiz andar, journalist and special adviser to the then Turkish
President Turgut between 1991 and 1993 in order to make Turkey rediscover its imperial legacy and
seek a new national consensus where the multiple identities of Turkey can coexist.
19 N. K. ksel, Post-Cold War US-Turkey Review of Social, Economic & Business
Studies, Vol. 7 No. 8, 2005, pp. 115-134 (p. 128).
20 March 1, 533 out of 550 Members of Parliament were present to vote on the resolution authorizing
the U.S. deployment of 62,000 troops to Turkey and the d of an unspecified number
of Turkish troops to an unspecified place (Iraq). The opposition CHP, ideologically nationalist as well as
opportunistically negative, exercised party discipline and voted as a bloc to reject the resolution. The
AKP allowed its members a without party discipline. An absolute majority of those present,
or 267 votes, was required to pass the resolution, but it got only 264 votes, failing by three. Ninety-nine
members of the AKP voted against the measure; 19 abstained. Although the cabinet had unanimously
referred the matter to parliament, three ministers voted against the C. Migdalowitz,
Turkey, the Deployment of US Forces and Related Report for Congress, 2003, Available from




           
              
            
             
              
            
             
             
              
               
               
            
          
             
                                                          
                 
   
       
               
  
 
            
   
              
  
 
                
             
                 
                
                   
               
                 
                 
             
   
       
        
               
            
           
 
noncommissioned officer in Istanbul s mraniye district.21 Also, the diaries written
late in 2003 by zden rnek, then commander of Turkey s navy22, were substantial in
terms of revealing several alleged plots to topple the government. These incidents
induced a criminal investigation into a group dubbed Ergenekon . On the one hand,
during this trial it had been alleged that Turkey s democratic future will be assured.23 
On the other hand, some Turkish intellectual circles cried out that Turkish
Eurasianism 24 is being got rid of. 25 Herein, the tie between Eurasianism and the
Ergenekon trial needs more clarification. From a holistic perspective, in the context of
the Ergenekon trial, several senior military figures some retired and some on active
duty have been brought to court regarding the charges of involvement in plots to
topple the AKP Government. This prospect led some circles to believe that there is a
reconstruction process of the Turkish Military being carried out by the AKP
Government itself in order to eliminate any anti-Western/anti-American sentiment and
their supporters such as General (ret.) Tuncer K l n .26 General K l n was a General
21 A. Bozkurt, Fact vs. Fiction - Unraveling the trial of the Zaman, 21 April
2010, Available from <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-208034-ergenekon-fact-vs-fiction-1-
unraveling-the-trial-of-the-century.html> [Accessed 11.05.2011]; G. Jenkins, Sledgehammer
and the Politics of Turkish Justice: Conspiracies and MERIA Journal, Vol. 15 No. 2,
Available from <http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/08/ergenekon-sledgehammer-and-the-politics-of-
turkish-justice-conspiracies-and-coincidences/>.
22 N. Birch, trial of the Prospect Magazine, Available from
<http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/08/turkeys-trial-of-the-century/> [Accessed 30/09/2009].
23 B. Park, deep state in the Open Democracy, Available from
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/ergenekon-turkey-s-deep-state-in-the-light> [Accessed
30/09/2009].
24 Briefly, Eurasianism as a political movement was first advanced by Russian emigre thinkers in the
1920s, such as Nikolai Trubetskoy, Petr Savitsky, and Suvchinsky. According to them, Russian
civilisation does not belong in either the European or the Asian category. As for Neo-Eurasianism, it was
popularised during the demise of the Soviet Union. It takes its inspiration from the Classical Eurasianists
and assumes that Russia is culturally closer to Asia than to the West (in this version the West symbolises
the United States of America). Lev Gumilev, Aleksandr Panarin, and Aleksandr Dugin are the main
promoters. Both Eurasianisms are mostly regarded as a method to create an area where Russia and its
neighbours can be immune to the effect of the West. For further information see Chapter III.
25 N. Akman, General Nejat Eslen: Demokrasi, meselesi Daily
Zaman, Available from http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=715457&title=emekli-general-nejat-
eslen-demokrasi-turkiyenin-oncelikli-meselesi-degil (Interview with Retired General Nejat Eslen:
Democracy is not primary issue) [Accessed 12/02/2009].
26 N. Eslen, Neyin Nesi? (What is Erge Daily Radikal, 21/01/2009; N. Eslen,
Atlantik Oturtuluyor (TAF is Oriented towards Daily Radikal, 06/03/2010; O.




             
              
             
            
            
                
         
                 
            
              
              
            
 
                
              
              
             
                  
            
            
                                                                                                                                                                          
         
     
             
                  
               
 
        
            
     
    
                
             
             
            
             
 
28 
Secretary of the National Security Council between 2001 and 2003. He is well-known
for his speech at a meeting in London organized by the Kemalist Thought Association
(ADD Kemalist D nce Derne i), at which he declared that Turkey should leave
NATO and also should protect its secular state and territorial integrity against
Western efforts to promote moderate Islam and Kurdish independence .27 It should be
noted that it would be irrational to build the whole Ergenekon trial on the elimination of
Anti-Western/Anti-American discourse. Those who allege that Eurasianists are being
got rid of by the trial, also put forward that not all Ergenekon suspects have had an
Eurasianist approach; but many Eurasianists stood accused of plotting coups against the
AKP Government in the scope of the Ergenekon trial. In this context, General (ret.)
etin Do an 28 claims that in Turkey people who have any kind of contact with
Alexander Dugin29 and his movement are suspects of the Ergenekon trial, nowadays.30 
In this regard, the Eurasian oriented camp has been regarded as a circle which sets back
Turkey because they have an inclination to shift Turkey s face towards the East -
Russia, Iran and the Turkic World. Bearing in mind these factors, supporters of the
Eurasian oriented camp have therefore embraced the idea that by the Ergenekon trial
they are being got rid of in order to protect the respectability of the USA and the EU
and prevent any criticism towards them.31 Also, these developments have created an
atmosphere in Turkey whereby Eurasianism has become a highly controversial issue to
Elimination of Anti-Americanists), Daily Posta, 27/01/2012, Available from <
http://www.posta.com.tr/siyaset/HaberDetay/_Ergenekon_ABD_karsitlarinin_tasfiyesidir_.htm?ArticleID 
=106817>, [Accessed on 18/04/2012];
27 I. Pro-Russian Turkish Daily Zaman, 31 May 2007.
is a prime suspect in the Sledgehammer case from 2010 and is accused of masterminding
an elaborate plot in 2002 and 2003 to topple the country's newly elected conservative Islamist
government.
29 One of the main promoters of Neo-Eurasianism.
30 Interview with Hedefinde Var (Eurasianists have become
Target of Available from <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=ergenekonun-hedefinde-
avrasyacilar-var-2312091200>, [Accessed on 18/04/2012].
31 For further information see. P. H. Gordon and O. , Turkey: How America, Europe,
and Turkey can Revive a Fading (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); I.
Berkan, ? (Is Eurasianism Daily Radikal, 15 February 2009; C.
ndar, lar n Tasfiyesi? (Discharge of Daily Millliyet, 24 February 2009; I.





           
 
 
            
            
           
             
            
            
              
            
                  
               
            
            
          
              
              
 
    
 
              
                
       
 
          
             
         
  
 
            
 
discuss, particularly questioning its implementation in such spheres as foreign policy
making.
While the Ergenekon trial has relatively familiarised people in Turkey with the
Eurasianism concept, it has failed to provide a proper discussion. The Classical
Eurasianism was an intellectual movement among the interwar community of migr s
from the Soviet Union and imagined a multinational Russian empire. This ideology was
developed around the uniqueness of Russia and Russian culture and the geographical
significance of the Eurasian continent. Turkish Eurasianism on the other hand, adopted
the geographical significance of the Eurasian continent and blended it with its own way
of thinking. According to Turkish Eurasianists, Turkey and Turkish culture is also
unique and it is a rightful quest for Turkey to become a global power since it has a
glorious imperial past. In this context, they claim that Turkey should, in a general sense,
focus on improving relationships with its neighbouring countries as well. From this
perspective, it is safe to say that Turkish Eurasianism aims to counterbalance Western-
dominated Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkish Eurasianism is divided into
branches according to how their relations with the Western and the Eastern world may
develop in the future. These branches will be analysed in-depth in the coming chapters.
1.3. The Research Question
To understand and investigate to what extent Eurasianism has had an impact on Turkish
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, the research question I am trying to
explore for this thesis is as follows:
Considering that Turkey has increasingly been pursuing an active and multi-
dimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, how have the
discourses of Eurasianism been influencing the contemporary Turkish foreign
policy making?




      
         
          
           
     
 
              
            
        
 
    
 
              
             
             
             
           
 
                
       
 
            
   
        
           
 
             
           
     
 
              
            
If Turkey s foreign policy making process
has been experiencing an activation since the 1990s,
has been influenced by alternative ideologies for Turkey s Westernness,
and Turkey s international relations are broadening their horizons and launching
an opening towards the East,
it can be taken into consideration that Eurasianism might be one of the leading
ideologies in Turkey for the purpose of producing more comprehensive policies to
become a middle power in the neighbouring region.
1.4. Aim and Objectives
The overall aim of this research is to understand the way Eurasianism has been
influencing Turkish foreign policy making over the last 30 years and investigate what
internal and external political factors have played a role in such a close-woven
relationship. By undertaking such an analysis the research aims to identify the main
parameters of future trajectories for foreign policy making in Turkey.
To address the aim of this research, the following objectives are set up to provide a
framework for the development of this thesis:
Objective 1 - To develop a theoretical understanding of Eurasianism through examining
the following concepts:
Classical Eurasianism in Russia around the 1920s.
Neo-Eurasianism in Russia in the 1980s and Post-Cold War era.
Objective 2 - To investigate Turkish public opinion and intellectuals awareness of the
concept of Eurasianism in Turkey and their approaches towards the Eurasianism
ideology and the East-West dichotomy.
Objective 3 - To explore the impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy making




              
            
 
 
               
           
 
    
 
             
            
              
                
  
 
            
                
             
          
 
            
           
           
              
             
           
             
                                                          
            
     
               
  
           
Objective 4 To analyse a number of internal and external socio-political and economic
factors that played a role in the emergence of Eurasianism-centred foreign policy
outcomes.
Objective 5 - To conclude by presenting a set of political trajectories for the possible
impact of Eurasianism on Turkish foreign policy making in the future.
1.5. Scope and Limitations
This research explores the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey and their impact on
Turkish foreign policy making during the Post-Cold War era. While classifying the
discourses and what impact they have had on foreign policy making, the research will
limit itself to the above mentioned specific timespan from the end of the Cold War to
2012.
The research focuses on the context of Turkish Eurasianism, excluding Eurasianism in
other countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus or Ukraine. It is in fact a difficult task to
make a distinction between the discourses as the concept of Eurasianism originated in
Russia and is highly influenced by Russian culture and literature.
Tsygankov32 and Clover33 examine the Russian Eurasianism and put forward that there
are two discourses of Russian Eurasianism: Milder and Hard-line Eurasianism. While
milder Eurasianism simply stresses Russia's uniqueness and argues that Russia need
not Westernize in order to modernize, the latter envisions the Eurasian heartland as the
geographic launch pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate
expulsion of "Atlantic" (read: "American") influence from Eurasia. 34 Contrary to this
way of presentation of the discourses, this thesis will embrace another way of
32 A. P. Tsygankov, -Line Eurasianism and Contending Geopolitical East
European Quarterly, 32 (1998), 315-334.
33 C. Clover, of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Foreign Affairs, 78
(1999), 9-13.




         
  
 
              
              
              
               
      
 
             
              
              
            
 
   
 
             
            
            
        
              
            
         
              
            
           
             
           
             
 
              
             
classification of the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Nationalist, Multiculturalist,
and Westernist.
After classifying the discourses, the thesis analyses the scope of the application of the
discourses in Turkish foreign policy making. In doing so, the three periods of Turkish
foreign policy since the late Ottoman era are taken into account, zal, Cem, and
Davuto lu. The reason for this limitation is that the activism in these periods has been
quite high compared to other periods.
Another limitation is that although this study analyses a relatively long historical period
for the purpose of presenting a historical background, it does not detail all the
developments in this period, as it is not a chronological history of Turkish foreign
policy. It only emphasises the principal events/developments since the late Ottoman era.
1.6. Literature Review
Eurasianism experienced its most dynamic and creative period during the 1920s and the
1930s. While this dynamism was lasting, Classical Eurasianism could not manage to
penetrate into Turkey. However, it should be mentioned that Classical Eurasianism had
interactions with coeval ideologies such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-
Islamism, etc. Yet, it was not successful in creating its own supporters among the
Turkish intellectuals. On the other hand, throughout the 1980s and the 1990s
circumstances changed and Turkish intellectual circles became familiar with
Eurasianism; but this time it was called Neo-Eurasianism and was led by Gumilev until
the early 1990s. Since Gumilev, Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Panarin have become
the ideologists of Neo-Eurasinism. Despite being respectively popularised as a Russian
school of thought, the academic sources not only on Neo-Eurasianism but also on
Eurasianism in Turkey or Turkish Eurasianism are limited. This limitedness derives
from the lack of interest in Turkish academic and intellectual circles on Eurasianism.
In this sense, the general tendency among the intellectual circles has been to produce




            
             
              
                 
             
              
       
 
             
             
          
            
          
           
            
          
           
             
      
 
           
          
            
            
             
             
                                                          
             
  
              
            
             
    
              
      
to speculate on their approaches to Eurasianism instead of making a collective
classification or conducting research. That is why those approaches are needed to be
classified in a way that will most likely explain the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism.
In this context, it is a fact that there are five notable academic works written about the
Eurasianism ideology in Turkey. These works give the reader a hint about what
Eurasianism is and reveal some of the discourses of Eurasianism; however, they are far
from comprehensive or up to date.
The first prolific author on Eurasianism and Turkish Eurasianism is considered to be
Marlene Laruelle. In this context, she has two works; one book Russian Eurasianism:
An Ideology of Empire (2008) 35 and one article Russo-Turkish Rapprochement
through the Idea of Eurasia (2008) 36 dealing with the reflections of Eurasianist
thoughts in Turkey. However, while Laruelle delves into Classical and Neo-
Eurasianism, her research on Turkish Eurasianism is considerably limited. Whereas her
works are restricted and do not offer a comprehensive approach towards Turkish
Eurasianism and its discourses, another researcher, Vugar Imanov s book Avrasyac l k:
Rusya n n Kimlik Aray (Eurasianism: Russia s Seeking for an Identity) 37 is not
topical. Despite being published in 2008, the author has used obsolete information to
make a classification of Turkish Eurasianism.
Another article which approaches from one particular perspective and analyses Turkish
Eurasianism s Kemalist subdivision is Emel Ak al and Mehmet Perin ek s Kemalist
Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey (2009).38 As a matter of
fact this article is a well-written source which thoroughly analyses the Kemalists 
approach towards Eurasianism. Yet, in terms of covering all discourses, it cannot be
regarded as a holistic work. Whereas this article is dealing with Kemalist intellectuals
35 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre
Press, 2008a).
36 M. Laruelle, Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander
Networks in Occasional Paper, The Jamestown Foundation, (2008), 1-13 (p. 7).
37 V. Imanov, Kimlik (Eurasianism: Seeking for an Identity),
(Istanbul: 2008).
38 E. and M. Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in




             
           
            
              
            
              
            
         
 
 
              
              
           
          
            
             
          
          
            
              
              
             
          
           
              
 
 
                                                          
              
      
               
   
            
who evaluate Eurasianism in a similar way to Alexander Dugin, ener Akt rk s article
Counter-Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: the Case of Turkish
Eurasianism (2004)39 pays attention to emerging Eurasianist thoughts in Turkey. It is
counted as the first article in English about Turkish Eurasianism. The final work of
these five main sources is Fatih Akg l s book Rusya ve T rkiye de Avrasyac l k 
(Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey) (2009).40 The author dedicates a small part of the
book to Turkish Eurasianism and analyses it under different approaches. He makes
subdivisions such as Nationalist approach, Socialist approach, and Conservative
approach.
When comparing Ak al and Perin ek s article and Fatih Akg l s book it can be said
that both of them do not make detailed analyses. With a cursory examination, Ak al 
and Perin ek recount that there are three main discourses regarding Turkish
Eurasianism. The first discourse s supporters are the right-wing, religious, and ultra-
nationalist political movements in favour of establishing closer links with the Turkic
countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The second discourse s supporters are the
centre-right and liberal political parties which approach Eurasianism to gain geo-
economic opportunities. The third and last discourse is Kemalist Eurasianism.
According to this discourse, Kemalist Eurasianists are against any type of pro-Western
policy in Eurasian space and back an alliance with Russia, China and Iran.41 Herein,
Ak al and Perin ek s main deficiency is to ignore the perception of Russia among the
Turkish society. It is obvious that there are different approaches towards Russia among
the Turkish political movements. Despite these differences within the right-wing,
religious, and ultra-nationalist political movements on whether bridges should be built
with Russia, Ak al and Perin ek neglect them and put these movements under the same
classification.
39 -Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: The Case of Turkish
Ab Imperio, 4 (2004), 207-238.
40 F. Rusya ve (Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey), (IQ Sanat
Istanbul, 2009).




              
          
           
                
            
       
 
               
             
         
               
              
                
       
 
            
           
             
            
            
          
           
           
                                                          
        
                 
        
                  
           
              
               
                   
              
      
Akg l also classifies the discourses as three different subdivisions and tries to make a
general breakdown of Eurasianism without being more specific. Furthermore, he
inspects the Eurasianism s effect on the foreign policy-making process of both
countries, Turkey and Russia. At the same time, his book, like Laruelle s, has a bias in
dealing with the conceptual background of the Eurasianism ideology instead of finding
out the practices or impacts of it.
In this context, Vugar Imanov, in his book, makes a better classification. He takes into
consideration the Russia issue and in the light of this information makes six
subdivisions of Turkish Eurasianism. 42 Despite these subdivisions being made
appropriately, the problem arises in terms of keeping the data au courant. He uses two
journals and their circles as subdivisions. One of them is the Journal of Ulusal which
was published between 1996 and 1997 and the other is the Journal of Yar n, which was
on the market between 2002 and 2006.
Unlike Vugar Imanov, Marlene Laruelle uses current data. Instead of making a
classification of Turkish Eurasianism discourses, Laruelle is an expert on Alexandr
Dugin and examines his personal networks in Turkey. Contextually, she, in both the
book and the article, analyses the historical background of Eurasianism, to contrast
Eurasianism to Pan thoughts such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, etc. and also the
process of conceptualising Eurasia and Eurasianism and emancipating it through
intellectual circles such as the modernizing Islamists around incumbent Prime Minister
of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdo an, Fethullah G len s movement43 ,
42 V. Imanov, , (Istanbul: 2008).
43 R. Muzalevsky in his article Movement in Central Asia: A Blessing or a
CACI Analyst, Available from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5167> [Accessed on 20/11/2009]
describes this movement as follows: len movement started out in the late 1960s in Turkey as an
Islamic-based and officially non-political project. The modernist Islamic thinker Bediuzzaman Said
Nursi, the founder of the Nurcu sect, influenced Fethullah The movement promotes inter-
faith dialogue and common values, with its leader adhering to Sufism, seemingly being nostalgic about
the heyday of the Ottoman Empire and eager to repay a debt to Central Asia for the contribution
to civilization in Turkey. Numbering millions of followers globally, it is represented by foundations,




          
             
 
   
 
               
             
            
            
          
   
 
     
 
            
            
             
                
               
  
 
             
             
                                                          
              
                 
           
           
     
            
               
                
       
              
    
              
Ahmed Yasawi Foundation, the Marmara Group Foundation44 , etc.45 Although she
made a conceptualisation, she had no inclination to make a classification in this case.
1.7. Methodology
In this study, I have used the Case Study Design in which I employed historical
development of the key phenomenon with the support of interviews and undertook a
discourse analysis to benefit from an extensive literature review and other secondary
sources. In this sense, this section describes the research design and research
methodology comprising the method of data collection (gathering documents and
interviewing) and analysis.
1.7.1. Case Study Research Design
Research Design aims to represent the significant methodological thrust of the study,
being the distinctive and specific approach most appropriate to answer the research
questions.46 While the selection of the research design is affected by the research
questions, the aim and the objectives of the study47, it also has the purpose of achieving
greater control of the study and improving the validity of the study when examining the
research problem.48 
There are various classifications of research designs. For instance, Yin makes a simple
list regarding research design types. According to this list, five primary research design
44 The Marmara Foundation (henceforth MF) is a Turkish benefit operating in
Istanbul since 1985. For more than two decades, MF has had the privilege of working with statesmen,
government officials, parliamentarians, academicians, chairmen and directors of chambers of commerce
and industry, along with various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) representatives throughout the
world interested in its works.
45 M. Laruelle, Turkish Rapprochement 2008, (p. 7).
46 D. Cormack, The Research Process in Nursing, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000, 4th Edition); D.
F. Polit, C. Tatano Beck, and B. P. Hungler, Essentials of Nursing Research: Methods, Appraisal, and
Utilization, (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001).
47 H. Brink, Fundamentals of Research Methodology for Health Care Professionals, (Cape Town: Juta
and Company Limited, 2006).




           
            
  
 
     
     




     
     
     
 
 
    
     
     
      
 
 
          
              
        
           
           
           
          
  
 
                  
           
                
                                                          
               
          
              
         
              
 
types are considered: experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study.49 
His detailed list displays the relationships between the types, research question forms
and events.








Experiment How, Why YES YES
Survey





Who, What, Where, How
many, How much
NO YES/NO
History How, Why NO NO
Case Study How, Why NO YES
According to Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger s classification although there are
endless ways of classifying research designs, they usually fall into one of three general
categories: experimental, quasi-experimental, and nonexperimental . 51 In contrast to
Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger, Creswell makes another classification which is built
on the separation of quantitative and qualitative approaches. According to him,
quantitative methods consist of two types, Experiments and Surveys, and qualitative
methods include four types; Ethnographies, Grounded Theory, Case studies, and
Phenomenological studies.52 
In the light of the information, what is clear is that research design is a phase to help
researchers plan their research meticulously before deciding on methods of data
collection and analysis. Having said that the design that has been applied to this thesis is
49 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (California: SAGE, 1994), (p. 6).
50 R. K. Yin, Case Study 1994, p. 6.
51 G. Marczyk, D. DeMatteo, D. Festinger, Essentials of Research Design and Methodology, (New
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), (p. 123).





            
          
               
           
              
              
 
           
           
         
             
            
           
             
              
                 
                
             
             
              
             
  
 
             
           
               
                                                          
        
                
         
             
               
    
                 
      
case study research design. The case study research design investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context; where the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.53 
Schramm points out that in case studies documents, interviews, observations, and
secondary analyses are the main data sources; and researchers are urged to make greater
use of documents, interview the right people, and make observations more objective.54 
Within a particular context, different designs have different attributes and these
attributes influence the research in different ways. In addition, case studies and
qualitative studies typically involve interviews and observations without formal
measurement and do not attempt to quantify their results through statistical summary or
analysis. 55 With regard to the discourses of Eurasianism, conducting a range of
interviews is the main way to make inferences. Regarding conducting interviews,
Bechhofer and Paterson point out that when researchers are deciding on an appropriate
research design and deciding how to collect their data, many of them immediately think
of talking to people .56 It should be expressed that it was not easy to collect data through
interviews in my case. Due to the fact that Eurasianism is perceived as part of the
Ergenekon trial57, it was therefore challenging to investigate by means of interviews. In
my study the data collection method has been mostly documents and, if necessary,
interviews. During the research, the case study design helped me to obtain the necessary
information to classify the discourses, verify my claims and support my discussions in
general.
This design s advantage is to provide more realistic responses than a statistical survey.
Unlike other designs, case studies have much more flexibility regarding finding
unexpected results. It is plausible to claim that the challenge of this design for this
53 R. K. Yin, Case Study 1994.
54 W. Schramm, on Case Studies of Instructional Media Working Paper for The Academy
for Education Development, (Washington: Stanford University, 1971), (p. 1).
55 G. Marczyk, D. DeMatteo, D. Festinger, Essentials of 2005, (p. 17).
56 F. Bechhofer and L. Paterson, Principles of Research Design in the Social Sciences, (London:
Routledge, 2000), (p. 56).
57 is the name given to arguably the most important legal process in Turkish history, which




            
             
             
               
                
               
            
             
            
     
 
   
 
                
              
          
          
           
                
               









                                                          
          
research is properly interpretation of outcomes to classify the discourses. However, my
research is application of historical development of the phenomenon in the context of
Case Study approach and I am investigating how Eurasianism has changed in the
context of Turkish polity and at the same time, how it has influenced the Turkish
foreign policy making. To do this I am looking at three distinctive eras in the post-Cold
War context in order to make an overall assessment of the role of Eurasianism in
Turkish political scene and foreign policy making. By doing so, determining and
choosing a number of indicators after in-depth analyses of zal, Cem, and Davuto lu s
speeches, mind-sets, and initiatives removed this weakness in the name of putting
together proper interpretation of discourses.
1.7.2. Data Collection
Once the research designs to be applied to the research are determined, it is necessary to
decide upon the manner in which evidence will be collected and analysed. During the
data collection process, Yin elucidates six different sources: Documentation, archival
records, interviews, direct observations, and physical artifacts.58 Regarding the process,
Ranjit Kumar makes another typology through similar methods. His detailed typology
can be found below (Table 1.2). In contrast to Kumar s typology, it is crucial to mention
that documents which are going to be collected do not have to be secondary sources;
sometimes they can be primary sources from written or visual sources.















   
   
   
  
   
   




   
 
             
            
               
              
           
          
          
             
          
             
           
         
         
           
               
                                                          
               



















Regarding the methods of data collection which have been mentioned above, the data
collection methods of my research are interviewing and gathering documents. As noted
earlier, the main aim of this thesis is to classify the discourses of the Eurasianism
ideology in Turkey and analyse their impact in foreign policy making. In doing so,
speeches, writings, conversations have been scrutinised and analysed to understand the
Turkish intellectual environment s demeanours and approaches. In this context, my
documents gathering process has been conducted through searches of bibliographic
databases as well as scanning of journals, newspapers and library searches of books.
During the process, the following databases were scanned: ScienceDirect, EBSCO,
Ingenta Select, and Jstor. In particular, the following journals were useful for finding
relevant articles: Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, Avrasya Dosyas (Eurasian File),
Political Geography, Turkish Political Quarterly, Insight Turkey, Middle Eastern
Studies, Perceptions, Geopolitics, Ab Imperio, Central Eurasian Studies Review,
T rkiye G nl (Diary of Turkey), T rk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), Teori (Theory).
The initial terms used for the search in both languages (English and Turkish) were:




   
   
       
     
   
   
   
   
          
 
            
            
            
              
            
           
           
             
           
            




               
               
                                                          
          
           
           
           
          
Eurasia (Avrasya)
Eurasianism (Avrasyac l k)
Turkish Foreign Policy (T rk D Politikas )
Turkish Eurasianism (T rk Avrasyac l )
Geopolitics (Jeopolitik)




Ottomanism (Osmanl c l k)
The search was generally limited to the period 1990s-present.
Key newspapers were also scanned. During the process, all major Turkish newspapers
were searched, such as H rriyet, Zaman, Milliyet, Today s Zaman and H rriyet Daily
News. Also, several small-size newspapers, which are known for their closeness to
particular groups and have a significant effect on the public opinion, were scanned, such
as Yeni a 60, Radikal61, Cumhuriyet62, Yeni afak63 and Ayd nl k64. Books related to the
[Turkish] Eurasianism were identified through library searches. The majority of them
consist of Turkish books written by Turkish academics. In addition, several
masterpieces were used such as The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of
World Order by Samuel P. Huntington and The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives by Zbigniew Brzezinski. All in all, I
identified over 450 references from this search strategy.
1.7.2.2. Interviewing
Interviews are a relatively common way of collecting data in research and the data they
collect and the forms they take are limited only by the requirements of the research
60 daily circulation rate is on average 50,000 copies.
61 daily circulation rate is on average 40,000 copies.
62 daily circulation rate is on average 51,000 copies.
63 daily circulation rate is on average 103,000 copies.




             
         
           
             
         
            
            
  
 
            
            
         
            
            
             
       
 
          
             
          
            
              
          
             
          
     
 
                                                          
             
         
               
 
               
   
question and the related research design.65 There are several types of interview methods.
Creswell expounds three different types: face-to-face (in-person interview), telephone
(researcher interviews by phone), and group (researcher interviews informants in a
group).66 According to Ranjit Kumar, the method of interviewing can be divided into
two main sub-categories, unstructured interviews and structured interviews. In-depth
interviews, focus group interviews, narratives, and oral histories are given as examples
for unstructured interviews; whereas the questionnaire is given as an example for
structured interviews.
In this thesis, the unstructured, in-depth interview method was adopted to understand
the distinctions between the discourses and especially to learn of participants biases
regarding how Turkish elites and intellectuals approach Eurasianism ideology.
Interviewees were chosen by judgmental sampling which is a type of non-probability
sampling technique. By this technique, interviewees were included in the research after
their writings and speeches were examined. In doing so, the convenience of the
participants for the research would be revealed.
The interviewing method has several advantages and disadvantages. Some advantages
can be listed as: appropriate for studying complex and sensitive areas, useful for
collecting in-depth information, information can be supplemented with those gained
from observation of non-verbal reactions, researcher can control the line of questioning,
can be used with almost any type of population.67 As for the disadvantages, these
include: time-consuming and expensive process, quality of the interaction and
interviewer affect the quality of data, the bias of the researcher. 68 Realising the
advantages and disadvantages of interviewing and conducting interviews ensures the
quality of the research.
65 G. Marczyk, D. DeMatteo, D. Festinger, Essentials of 2005, (p. 117).
66 J. W. Creswell, Research , 1994, (p. 150).
67 R. Kumar, Research 2005, p. 131; J. W. Creswell, Research , 1994, (p.
150).





            
           
             
               
               
              
            
                  
             
             
              
              
               
              
             
          
             
             
 
               
                 
               
           
              
          
 
              
             
            
             
               
I initially hoped that my interview participants could actually waive their confidentiality
as they are primarily public figures, politicians, academics and well-known proponents
of Eurasianism in Turkey. Besides, the mode of the research requires that the
participants should be explicit and can be used for the typology. However, in terms of
being anonymous I might use the information which I gain, without citing in the thesis,
to mould the discourses. I anticipated that most of the participants would view the
interview as an opportunity to articulate their thoughts on Turkish Eurasianism. What
made me think in that way was that I would explain the title of research and its aims
before making arrangements for the interviews. During the interviews, I planned to ask
the participants from their perspective where they think Eurasia is as a geographical
region. Furthermore, I would search the meaning of the concept of Eurasianism in terms
of the approaches under the special circumstances in Turkey. Is that concept an alternate
for Turkish Foreign Policy as some propose or is it a pipe-dream? These main research
questions were the pillars of a healthy classification. In addition to these questions, I
would let my interviewees guide the flow with open-ended questions. Prior to the
interviews, being prepared about the interviewees and having, already, adequate
information about their past and current thoughts would helped me to gain essential
knowledge in terms of their approaches towards Eurasianism.
To prevent being misled or perplexed by the interviewees, I was going to conduct my
interviews based on a guide. In so doing, I planned to control the course of the interview
and avoid digression from the topic. I assumed that these interviews, which would be an
amalgam of two types (general interview guide approach and standardised, open-ended
interview), would last on average one hour, as the participants were chosen from the
Turkish intellectual environment and have a wide range of perspectives.
However, although I had planned to conduct several interviews in Turkey in order to
classify the discourses of Eurasianism and evaluate the state of Turkish foreign policy
more thoroughly, after conducting five interviews in Turkey with three journalists and
two academics, it occurred to me that the interviewees had some reservations about




               
               
             
               
                  
              
               
            
        
 
   
 
              
                
             
           
            
             
                 
          
            
                 
               
    
 
                 
              
                                                          
             
               
        
                 
  
        
topic.69 While some of them did not want to meet despite expressing that their identity
would not be disclosed, some others consented to meet but did not reveal their opinion
or repeated their thoughts already stated in their previous speeches or articles. However,
I kept pushing to meet more people to conduct more interviews. After a number of
interviews, I found out that it was not that difficult to find interviewees as long as I had
valuable references as endorsements of my research. Yet, I had to keep their identity
confidential. In the end, during my field study, I conducted 19 interviews. In this regard,
the classification of the discourses has been arranged according to speeches, op-eds,
articles of chosen intellectuals, and interviews in Turkey.
1.7.2.3. Discourse Analysis
The concept of discourse was developed by writers such as Michel Foucault. In his
works, a discourse is characterised as a set of rules rules for determining truth and
rules for declaring the objects about which it is sensible and meaningful to speak .70 
Philips and Jorgensen indicate that the assumptions of discourse analysis methodologies
are: a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge, a link between knowledge and
social processes, and a link between knowledge and social action.71 Therefore, by and
large it can be said that discourse analysis stands as a general term for a number of
approaches in order to analyse writings, speeches, conversations, communicative events
etc. Concerning its realm, Sapsford explains discourse analysis considers the rules of
the language game, which is the form of conceptual life expressed in a text or series of
utterances or actions what counts as a valid argument and what count as meaningful
objects of discussion .72 
Bearing in mind all these issues, the main goal of this study is to classify the discourses
of Eurasianism among the Turkish elites and policy-makers and to find out the impact
69 This controversy is presented in Chapter one and five in detail.
70 R. Sapsford, in Data Collection and Analysis, eds. Roger Sapsford and Victor
Jupp, (London: SAGE, 2006), pp. 260-271, (p. 262).
71 L. J. Philips, and M. W. Jorgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, (London: SAGE, 2004),
(p. 5-6).




             
          
            
           
 
   
 
             
                





















          
                
  
         
  
    
    
   
 
  
of discourses on Turkish foreign policy making in three periods, zal, Cem, and
Davuto lu. By doing so, selected intellectuals speeches, writings and conversations
have been scrutinised and analysed to understand their demeanours and approaches by
means of the discourse analysis method, one type of qualitative research.
1.8. Structure
This thesis begins with an introduction chapter in which an historical background is
presented in order to give the reader a better idea of the importance of the Eurasianism
ideology to Turkey and the current climate of Turkish foreign policy.
1. Introduction
2. Geopolitical Thinking 3. Theoretical Thinking 4. Historical Background
5. Discourses
6. Three Periods of








              
            
              
              
               
             
 
 
           
             
          
            
          
             
                 
            
            
           
            
             
     
 
             
            
            
               
              
              
 
 
             
       
The second chapter is a review of Geopolitical thinking from the 19th century onwards.
In this context, three main geopolitical ideologies (the concept of Lebensraum; the
Heartland thesis; the Rimland thesis) are analysed in order to explore what kind of
motives inspired the founding fathers of Classical Eurasianism in the first half of the
1900s and Neo-Eurasianism in the second half of the 1900s. Further, in this chapter the
relations of these geopolitical ideologies with Turkey and its stance in world politics are
presented.
Chapter three consists of a theoretical review of Classical Eurasianism. The conditions
of Russia during the emergence of Eurasianism and its founding fathers are examined.
Then the founders of Neo-Eurasianism Lev Gumilev, Alexandr Panarin, and
Aleksandr Dugin and their lives, thoughts, and perspectives are analysed, briefly. The
chapter continues with a comparison between Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. Since
these ideologies overlap across the same region, people have a tendency to approach
both of them as if they are productions of the same frame of mind. This chapter reveals
their differences to make Eurasianism more comprehensible. The chapter ends with an
analysis of how Russian Eurasianism has been transformed into Turkish Eurasianism by
Turkish intellectual circles. First it analyses the reasons why Classical Eurasianism
could not penetrate into Turkey and then examine the embracement of Neo-Eurasianism
by some intellectual circles in Turkey. Lastly, a brief comparison of Russian and
Turkish Eurasianism concepts is revealed.
Without looking through the Turkish foreign policy since the late Ottoman era, one
cannot perceive the circumstances in Turkey. In this regard, Turkish foreign policy
making is discussed over four different periods in Chapter four: New Republic s
Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace in the world (late Ottoman era - 1945), Turkish
Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945 - 1990), New World Order and Turkish
foreign policy (1990 - 2002), A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy (2002 and
onwards).
Chapter five analyses the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey by first presenting four




               
             
               
           
           
             
              
       
 
             
               
              
             
             
          
 
           
               
             
               



















by rightist/leftist parties and activists in Turkey in order to prove that Turkey has other
alternatives in its own neighbouring area. Besides, since these four ideologies are highly
influential on the discourses of Eurasianism it is significant to analyse them as the roots
of diversity in Eurasianism in Turkey. After these alternatives for Turkey s
Westernness, the Eurasianism ideology and its different versions in the Turkish
intellectual environment are put forward. In doing so, the discourses of Eurasianism in
Turkey are classified for the first time from the author s own perspective in three
different categories: Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist Eurasianism.
Following this, Chapter six deals with three periods of Turkish foreign policy, zal,
Cem, and Davuto lu eras and the scope of application of the discourses. In this chapter,
by and large foreign policy approaches by the then Prime Minister and President Turgut
zal, the then Foreign Minister smail Cem, and the incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davuto lu are investigated for the purpose of finding out whether the discourses of
Eurasianism have been applied or performed during these three periods.
The final, concluding chapter draws together the arguments developed throughout the
thesis. It reviews the discourses which have been built through the thesis by the author s
own approach. This chapter also produces a set of recommendations regarding what the
discourses would mean for future foreign policy making in Turkey. In this regard, it is
believed that this work will make a contribution to the literature with its uniqueness.
29
 
     
  
 
            
            
             
              
            
            
           
        
     
            
           
          
              
             
               
           
             
              
                                                          
         
         
      
CHAPTER II: 
GEOPOLITICAL THINKING AND WORLD POLITICS
Lord Palmerston
2.1. Introduction
Geopolitics has been an excessively used term since Rudolph Kjellen first coined it in 
1899.73 In one sense, the term geopolitics came close to losing its credibility because
of overuse and also its association with the intellectual apparatus of Nazi expansionism
in the 1930s and 1940s.74 Nevertheless, it is still a useful term to explain, describe or
analyse specific perspectives of world affairs. Especially, along with the emergence of
Critical Geopolitics after the 1990s, the concept Geopolitics has started to get
attention. To make the concept more understandable, the following taxonomy of
Classical Geopolitics which is more state-centric and Critical Geopolitics which
focuses on space, identity, vision and statecraft is used. 
In order to make a thorough geopolitical analysis, geographical knowledge is sine qua
non. Throughout history, geography has always had a significant impact on human
affairs. Its effect on nations identities and social and economic development is obvious.
In this sense, its effects emerge from its permanency. Geography is one of the essential
factors which influence the context of world affairs as it is permanent and given. And
also geography is one of the determinants of the limits of states. While it imposes
limitations on some states regarding their relations with neighbours, the importance of 
some states is boosted by their geography. Meanwhile, geography is not the sole
component to becoming an important actor on the world stage. It is a combination of
73 J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 5. 
74 M. Kuus, in R. Denemark (ed.) The International Studies Encyclopaedia.




         
            
                 
            
        
 
              
              
            
             
              
                
              
               
            
            
               
          
 
             
              
                                                          
                
 
              
            
                  
  
                  
              
              
       
       
    
                  
               
size, geopolitical location, population, economics, technology, military power, and
leadership.75 However, geography is differentiated from these components as it is the
only one that is permanent while the others are subject to change in the course of time.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that geography s importance can change by the
effects of technological and scientific advances as well.76 
In this manner, it may be logical to correlate between geography and geopolitics and
explain geopolitics as the links between political power, space and location.77 This is a
more traditional approach to the term Geopolitics. In this traditional explanation, space
is emphasised and comprehended as an existential condition for all-politics and a factor
which affects the political process78, while location is regarded as a factor which made
the space occupied by a state.79 In classical geopolitics, location is a fact that does not
change but its significance alters with every shift in the means of communication, in
routes of communication, in the technique of war, and in the centres of world power .80 
However in the critical approach, location is assessed by perceptions and imagination.
These perceptions and imagination include the civilizational grouping of a state (are
we part of the West?); feelings of status, influence, and power relative to other states;
and perceptions of the national identity of the state .81 
Geopolitics as a perception can be identified in different times and spaces throughout
history from Athens to the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman
75 F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, (London: Transaction Publishers,
2002).
76 G. O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 2005); C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics,
(London: Routledge, 2006); F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War .
77 O. Osterud, Uses and Abuses of Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1988,
p. 191-199.
78 M. Bassin, Two Faces of Contemporary in Alexander B. Murphy et all. Is There a
Politics to Geopolitics?, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2004, p. 619-640.
79 D. Sen, Principles of Geopolitics and History: Theoretical Aspect of International
(Nagar: Concept Publishing Company, 1975). p. 188.
F. Bordonoro, Available from
<http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Bordonaro_Federico_Rediscovering_Spykman_Rimla 
nd_Geography_Peace_Foreign_Policy.html> [Accessed on 19/03/2012].
81 Quoted in J. and P. F. Talbot, in the World is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and





             
              
          
          
             
             
             
             
           
 
                
              
             
           
               
         
            
           
           
               
           
        
              
              
             
                                                          
              
        
                 
                 
               
    
              
         
         
Empire. However, it gained recognition as a science after the age of Enlightenment.82 
During this era several intellectuals who are accepted as the founding fathers such as
Kjellen, Ratzel, Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman, and Haushofer, presented their own
perspectives on geopolitics. Their insights were mostly motivated by nationalistic
ambitions and based on state power and superiority in order to rationalize foreign
policy. In the light of this knowledge Kjellen describes Geopolitics as follows: the
theory of state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space 83, while Haushofer
characterises the term a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes,
based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography .84 
More or less, for the late 19th and early 20th century thinkers Geopolitics was the study
of the impact of geographical factors on state behaviour.85 From this perspective, it is
logical to say that geopolitics was a state-centric theory. Having said that, another
definition also endorses this deduction: Geopolitics has been primarily concerned with
the geographical embodiment of political power in the form of the political state its
location, territory, resources, population and boundaries. 86 As aforementioned, this
approach belongs to the pre-1945 period. Along with the emergence of Critical
Geopolitics, the way that Geopolitics is conceptualized is different from the
understanding of Classical Geopoliticians. The main argument of Critical Geopolitics is
that states and other powerful institutions are not the key players. In this regard, Critical
Geopolitics is in favour of anti-geopolitics. Besides, critical geopolitics aims to
deconstruct [traditional] geopolitical discourses. 87 While Critical Geopolitics drifts
away from the assumptions that world affairs are state-centric and geopolitics is an arm
of foreign policy and international relations, it puts state power under scrutiny and deals
with the operation of power relations instead of power itself. In addition, critical
82 D. Cowen and N. Smith, Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to
Antipode, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2009, p. 22-48.
83 W. J. Cahnman, of American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1943, p. 57.
84 S. B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 11.
85 M. Griffiths, T. and S. C. Roach, International Relations: The Key Concepts, (London:
Routledge, 2007), p. 123.
86 M. Bassin, Emergence of Ethno-Geopolitics in Post-Soviet in Eurasian Geography and
Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2, (March-April 2009), p. 131-149.




            
             
            
          
         
 
              
            
             
              
              
             
             
  
 
     
 
        
 
                
           
           
               
               
             
            
          
 
                                                          
        
                
                 
       
geopolitics is concerned with the sources, practices and representations that let non-state
actors control territory and extract sources.88 State is still important but statecraft and
individuals are foregrounded as new key themes by critical geopolitics. Therefore, from
this modern geopolitical understanding perspective, geopolitics is the multiple practices
and multiple representations of a wide variety of territories.89 
In this chapter, I shall review the main geopolitical concepts which have mostly been
put forward by the founding fathers of geopolitical thinking; Friedrich Ratzel, Sir
Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and Nicholas J. Spykman. Obviously, I will not be
able to delve into their geopolitical understanding in any detail here. My main purpose
is simply to introduce these concepts such as Lebensraum, the Heartland thesis, and the
Rimland thesis. And then in the following chapter, I will investigate whether these
concepts inspired Classical and Neo-Eurasianism at the beginning and end of the 20th 
century, respectively.
2.2. The Concept of Lebensraum 
2.2.1. Darwin and Ratzel s Organic State Conception
In the second half of the 19th century, Darwin was one of the brilliant brains that
inspired geographers to conduct more research on the relationship between the
environment and humanity. Hereafter, a Darwinian concept of natural selection was
applied to the study of human societies by social scientists. Friedrich Ratzel was one of
them. As Ratzel started his career as a zoologist, he had an advantage in applying
Darwin s biological laws of natural selection to the study of human societies. Apart
from Darwin s concept, Herbert Spencer s study on the close resemblance of human
societies to natural organisms was a new impetus for Ratzel.
88 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, p. 16.
89 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics; M. Gilmartin and E. Kofman, Feminist in
L. A. Staeheli, E. Kofman, and L. J. Peake, (eds) Mapping Women, Making Politics, (New York and




            
                
              
           
              
            
  
 
             
                
                
           
             
             
               
        
 
        
 
               
               
            
            
            
             
             
             
                                                          
              
          
               
                
                 
     
The emphasis on space in Darwinian Theory attracted Ratzel s attention to the
importance of territory and space in the history of nations. To him, just as the plant
community needs space and resources in order to survive, nations too need space and
territory. Ratzel adapted the Darwinian concept of natural selection and environmental
adaptation and Spencer s the survival of the fittest concept as the main framework of
his Politische Geographie (1897).90 With this book, Ratzel produced the foundations of
political geography.
Ratzel s belief in space, territory, and expansionism proceeded in this book where the
emphasis is on the core of political geography. He describes the state as a fragment of
humanity on a piece of soil .91 After this explanation, he argues that the state is a
living organism and therefore cannot be contained within rigid limits-being dependent
for its form and greatness on its inhabitants, in whose movements, outwardly exhibited
especially in territorial growth or contraction, it participates. 92 From this point of view
the core of the approach was that states behave as organisms. And those states need
more acquisition of space/territory in order to survive.
2.2.2. Emergence of the Concept of Lebensraum
The term Lebensraum, which was coined by Ratzel and was used as a slogan in
Germany in the first half of the 20th century, was one of Ratzel s hypotheses. The
emergence of the hypothesis was influenced by a variation on Neo-Lamarckism which
is known as Social Darwinism. Neo-Lamarckists were of the opinion that genetic
changes of species can directly be influenced and directed by environmental factors.93 
And the influence of environmental factors led Ratzel to correlate between space and
state. This correlation owes its existence simply to Ratzel s background. He started his
career as a zoologist and then became a journalist and eventually a geographer.
90 R. Hartshorne, The Nature of Geography, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977); N. Spykman,
Strategy in World Politics, (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1942).
91 C. B. Hagan, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 479.
92 F. Ratzel, Territorial Growth of Scottish Geographical Magazine, 12 (July 1898), p. 351.
93 M. Jones, R. Jones and M. Woods, An Introduction to Political Geography Space, Place and Politics,




               
               
              
       
 
             
             
                
             
             
              
                   
      
 
              
              
               
              
              
            
 
 
              
         
                 
                                                          
                  
             
   
            
     
            
         
    
           
Reflection of his career transformation can be found in the comment of his persona, put
forward by G. J. Ashworth and L. M. Ashworth as follows: Ratzel as a political
geographer had three personas which are often not easy to disentangle, namely that of
the journalist, the activist and the theorist. 94 
On the road towards theorizing the concept Lebensraum, Darwin came into Ratzel s life
via K. von Zittel.95 And his intellectual effects merged with Ratzel s patriotism. While
Ratzel was one of the founders of political geography, he was also a German patriot and
an active member of German national-conservative movements.96 In this vein, he was a
fervent supporter of the colonisation of Africa by Germany. Besides, Ratzel was in
favour of the development of German sea-power. The reason for that is that according
to him, a state needed to develop into a sea-power in order to be a world power such as
the United Kingdom (UK) and France.
Ratzel s use of environmental determinism can be traced in the creation of his thinking.
Ratzel puts forward that expansionism into new regions is essential for people and their
states in order to exist for a long time. From this expansionism perspective, the natural
environment is quite effective in the determination of the extent of expansionism. If the
state is a living organism and expansionism is an imperative, then states cannot be
contained within rigid limits. 97 These states need more space/territory in order to
survive.
Since space has significant importance, every state in search of being a great power
should seek Lebensraum, especially Germany. From Ratzel s perspective, Germany
must join the colonialist states in order to be a great power, as the USA, China and
94 G. J. Ashworth and L. M. Ashworth, and the British Empire: Imperialism and the Illusions of
State Paper to Symposium Friedrich Ratzel 1904-2004, Leibniz Institute, University of Leipzig,
2004, p. 1.
95 H. Wanklyn, Friedrich Ratzel: A Biographical Memoir and Bibliography, (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1961), p. 11.
96 Interview with M. Bassin, Mark Bassin: Naturalistic Principles, Eurasian Civilisation, Ideological
Discourses, by Leonhardt van Efferink, February 2010, Available from
<http://exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Bassin_Mark_Naturalistic_Principles_Eurasian_Civilisation_I 
deological_Discourses_Friedrich_Ratzel.html> [Accessed on 15/11/2011].




            
           
               
               
               
         
 
     
 
              
             
              
              
            
              
        
 
                
             
           
         
              
             
            
                                                          
             
             
       
               
          
                
     
                   
               
    
Russia are Grossraum (large space) states, which are destined to become world
powers.98 According to Ratzel, Germany s Lebensraum was Africa, as Europe was
crowded and lacked territory. For him Germany had to join the scramble for Africa as
soon as possible in order to sustain its own existence. The reason for that is well-
summarised by E. C. Semple: the earlier a state fixes its frontier without allowance for
growth, the earlier comes the cessation of its development. 99 
2.2.3. Contribution of Others
The concept Lebensraum was furthered by scholars of the day such as Karl Haushofer
and Friedrich von Bernhardi. According to Bernhardi, war was a biological necessity in
order to achieve Lebensraum. He was of the belief that to Germany, Lebensraum was
Eastern Europe. And with a special emphasis on Latin and Slavic races, Without war,
inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding
elements. 100 That is why the quest for Lebensraum was a necessary means to defend
the German race against stagnation and degeneration.101 
After the First World War, in the name of a total vindication and total revival of
Germany s wealth and power, the Institute for Geopolitik was established in Munich in
1924 and General-major Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) was appointed its
chairman.102 According to Haushofer, Germany s post-war geopolitical realities dictated
her to pursue the correct policy. This policy was territorial expansion. In his belief,
populous states need living space (Lebensraum). And the growth of Germany, at the
expense of her less virile neighbours such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, should
98 F. P. Sempa, , 2002; M. Bassin, Nature, Geopolitics and Marxism: Ecological
Contestations in Weimar Germany, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series,
Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996), pp. 315-341.
99 E. C. Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, on the Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthropo-
geography, (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1911), p. 197.
100 F. von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, (Toronto: McClelland, Goodchild and Stewart Limited
Publishers, 1914), p. 20.
101 R. J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 35.
102 R. D. Dikshit, Political Geography: The Spatiality of Politics, (New Delhi: Tat McGraw-Hill, 2006),




                
           
            
 
            
                
                
            
           
               
 
   
 
           
            
               
            
               
             
           
            
          
               
                
             
     
 
 
                                                          
        
               
             
continue.103 In this regard, the need for more space on the road towards being a world
power led Haushofer to embrace Mackinder s Heartland thesis. In Haushofer s view,
only the Heartland thesis would enable Germany to acquire the necessary Lebensraum.
Haushofer emphasises two elements in his definition of Lebensraum: space and power.
Lebensraum is the right and duty of a nation to provide ample space and resources for
its people. 104 And it is the responsibility of the stronger state to expand at the expense
of the weaker. Re-conceptualisation of the term Lebensraum by Haushofer and Hitler s
implementation attempts turned the term into a racist kind of expansionism.
Furthermore, that caused the term to lose popularity during the post-World War II era.
2.2.4. Turkey s Lebensraum
Turkey s geopolitical importance derives from its land bridge location between Europe
and Asia. This geostrategic location actually puts Turkey in an advantageous position
among the neighbouring states and provides Turkey with an ability to play a role in
world politics greater than its size, population and economic strength.105 Nevertheless, it
cannot be claimed that Turkey has exploited that position very well so far. Since the
beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has shown signs of realising its own geopolitical
importance and developed its first post-Cold War strategic concept, called Active
Deterrence in 1998. After that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto lu developed a
new concept Strategic Depth , which emphasises Turkey s historical and cultural
affinities with the regional states in order to foster its regional and global influence. This
has been one of the few visionary concepts Turkey has ever applied to its own foreign
policy-making process. Besides, that visionary thinking paved the way for Turkey to get
involved in its own Lebensraum.
103 R. D. Dikshit, Political , p. 27.
104 C. S. Gray, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, (Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), p. 226.
105 Mustafa Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis, Sam Papers, 2004, p. 23
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Figure 2.1: Turkey s Lebensraum
Turkey s Lebensraum is the main factor which provides it with a distinctive
geostrategic significance. In the region where Turkey is located and wants to be 
influential there are three Grossraum states, Russia, China and India. According to its 
new strategic concept Strategic Depth , Turkey needs to create a Lebensraum in order
to get rid of its long-lasting status quo-oriented and static geostrategic stance. This
Lebensraum consists of immediate land basin, immediate continental basin and
immediate maritime basin.106 Immediate land basin represents the Balkans, Middle East
and the Caucasus while immediate continental basin shows Turkey's depth in Asia,
projection into Europe and African axis. Immediate maritime basin refers to the spheres
106 This classification has been made by Prof. Dr Ahmet in his own book A. 
Stratejik Derinlik: Konumu (Strategic Depth: International Position), 
, 2003);
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of influence within the Black, Eastern Mediterranean and Caspian seas and the Gulf of
Basra.107 
2.2.4.1. Turkish Lebensraum during the early days of the Republic 
The establishment process of the Republic of Turkey is one of the best examples of the
struggle for a Lebensraum. The Republic was a successor state of the Ottoman Empire
(1299-1923) which was one of the largest and longest lasting empires in history.
However, the stagnation of the empire began during the 17th century, followed by the
decline of the empire around the 19th century. Its defeat along with the Central Powers
by Allied Powers during the First World War brought its dissolution. After the War, the
Turkish War of Independence began in order to halt the occupation of Turkey s
territory, as the Treaty of Sevres had abolished the Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey
to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa.108 
Figure 2.2: The Ottoman Empire at its Greatest Extent
107 Interview with Prof. Dr. Ahmet which was published in Hurriyet Daily News on 14 June
2001, Available from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-power-
turkey-does-not-use-is-that--of-quotstrategic-depthquot-2001-06-14>, [Accessed on 03.04.2013]
Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Treaty of Sevres, Available from
<http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/536839/Treaty-of-Sevres>, [Accessed on 03/11/2013].
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Figure 2.3: Anatolia: dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1807 1924 
The terms of the Treaty of S vres109 were harsh and many in the Ottoman Empire were
left angered. Especially recognition of Armenia as a sovereign state and a Greek
presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control
over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles were not acceptable for most
Turks. That is why this treaty was rejected by the new regime in Turkey and after a
three year war of independence it was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. By 
this new treaty the boundaries of modern Turkey were recognised by the Allied Powers
and to some extent the struggle for a Turkish Lebensraum was turned into a great
success. In this regard, securing its boundaries and founding a new state in a
109 The treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920, and consisted of 433 clauses and 150 pages. The
Ottoman delegation consisted of Hadi Dr. Tevfik, and Halis Bey. For further
information on the Treaty of Sevres and its impact see: B. A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between
Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923, (I. B. Tauris: London, 1997); A. B. Dural, His
Story: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Revolution, (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2007); E. Goldstein, The First World
War Peace Settlements: 1919 1925, (New York: Routledge, 2013); Z. Baran, Torn Country: Turkey
Between Secularism and Islamism, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010); F. M. The
Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era,
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); N. The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits, in G. J. Mangone 
(Ed.), International Straits of the World, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
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geopolitically important location created room for the debates on Turkey s central state
identity in the Heartland thesis.
Figure 2.4: Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace according to the Treaty of Sevres




    
 
            
              
              
              
      
 
              
              
              
              
                
            
                
                
            
              
             
                
                
              
                
               
               
                 
              
                                                          
        
              
              
   
                
     
2.3. The Heartland Thesis 
Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was the theoretician of the Heartland thesis. Not
only was he a prominent educator, but also Halford Mackinder was the creator of
political geography as an academic discipline in the United Kingdom in order to catch
up with continental Europe as the most important names in the field of Geopolitics
were German during the late 1800s.
Like most of the prominent geographers, Mackinder was a patriot too. His main motive
was to generate a geopolitical thinking in order to sustain Britain s imperial power. In
his way of thinking, Germany and Russia were the two main rivals. And their
expansionist policies were posing a grave threat to the British government and its allies.
In order to make possible the survival of the British Empire, the dangers of German and
Russian expansion should be eliminated. Mackinder was surely proposing this way of
thinking for the good of world peace too. However, in the final analysis he was a
believer of the saying the sun never sets on the British Empire . This approach can be
clearly observed in his publications and lectures especially the ones which were
published and given before 1904. The first one was presented at the Royal Geographical
Society (RGS) soon after undertaking an expedition to climb Mount Kenya in 1899.
The purpose of the expedition was to focus a British scientific and imperial eye on the
region.110 The second one was a series of lectures on the Great Trade Routes which he
gave to the Institute of Bankers in 1899. In these lectures, Mackinder presented Britain
as the leading power in the system of free trade111 although later he converted from free
trade to protectionism as he realised that a free-trade Britain would not be able to
compete with the other great powers all of which had protective tariffs.112 The third and
last one was a textbook Britain and the British Sea which was published in 1902. In this
book, Mackinder foresaw the emergence of a new balance of power with five great
110 G. O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 63.
111 A. Sengupta, Heartlands of Eurasia; The Geopolitics of Political Space, (Plymouth: Lexington Books,
2009); G. Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
112 B. W. Blouet, Imperial Vision of Halford The Geographical Journal, Vol. 170, No.




              
              
    
 
              
           
            
               
            
            
          
           
                
     
 
           
             
            
         
 
           
            
           
             
           
           
    
                                                          
               
              
  
                
  
        
             
         
      
        
world states: Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the USA. In order to compete with
these states Britain had to grow economically and, with the daughter nations, create a
Navy of the Britains.113 
By means of this thinking, Mackinder left his most significant mark upon history. Over
100 years ago, Halford Mackinder delivered a provocative essay entitled The
Geographical Pivot of History 114. In this essay he examined the relationship between
politics and geography. The core of the essay was the vitality of the heartland of Euro-
Asia . Mackinder pictured Europe and Asia as one great continent Euro-Asia and
described Euro-Asia as: a continuous land, ice-girt in the north, water-girt elsewhere,
and measuring twenty-one million square miles . 115 Besides, this landmass was
significantly important to international security due to its geographic position. In
addition, states that have access to this great continent would be able to play a critical
role on the international arena.116 
Mackinder s presentation was considered a defining moment in the history of
geopolitics. He started the address by announcing that geography as a science of
discovery was over as unexplored space was not available anymore.117 Tuathail quotes
the reason why Mackinder formed such an opinion:
Of late it has been a common-place to speak of geographical
exploration as nearly over, and it is recognised that geography must be
diverted to the purpose of intensive survey and philosophic synthesis. In
four hundred years the outline of the map of the world has been
completed with approximate accuracy, and even in the Polar Regions the
voyages of Nassen and Scott have very narrowly reduced the last
possibilities of dramatic discoveries .118 
113 B. W. Blouet, Imperial p. 324; M. Polelle, Raising Cartographic Consciousness: The
Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Lexington Books,
1999).
114 H. J. Mackinder, Geographical Pivot of Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904,
pp. 421-444.
115 F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: p. 11.
116 C. Seiple, Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States-
Uzbekistan Relations 1991-2005, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, p. 2.
117 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics.
118 G. O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 20.
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In this vein, Mackinder argued that there was no land to discover and the fight was over
even for the Europeans. Due to lack of unexplored space, international politics became a
closed system . Thus, the actions of different countries were meant to affect each
other. In this closed system, the main axis of conflict was between land- and sea-
powers.119 In Mackinder s mind, the world was a battlefield in which the one who
controls the key geopolitical positions would be able to acquire global hegemony. That
is why Mackinder generated different zones which divided the world map.
In 1904, he defined the core of Eurasia as the Pivot Area and then renamed it as 
Heartland in 1919.120 Mackinder put his theory into words on three occasions: 1904,
1919, and 1943.121 Mackinder s first and foremost motive was the preservation and
promotion of the British Empire. He believed that the British Empire would have to 
keep up with its contemporaries in order to maintain its leading position in the world.
France, Germany and Russia were three rising powers of their times and the British
Empire would not compete against them without altering and renewing itself. 
Figure 2.6: Mackinder s Heartland Concept: 1904122 
119 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, p. 18. 
120 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, p. 18. 
121 C. Seiple, Revisiting the Geo-
122 S. B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System, 2003, p. 14. 
p. 3.
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In this sense, Mackinder suggested that great industrial wealth in Siberia and European
Russia and a conquest of some of the marginal regions would give the basis for a fleet
necessary to found the world empire .123 Tsarist Russia was building railways in order
to harness the Heartland s power. If it happens, the British Empire would not be strong
enough to save itself and spread its democratic values. Besides, those values were the
most distinguishing specifications of the British Empire.
For Mackinder, geographical realities lay in the advantages of centrality of place, and
efficient movement of ideas, goods, and people. In 1904, he theorised that the inner area
of Eurasia was the pivot area of world politics (figure 2.6).124 The pivot area was
balanced by the power of inner crescent states. But if Germany (one of the inner
crescent states) and Russia formed an alliance, then a world empire would be possible.
And that would denote that Britain and its allies would be at a strategic disadvantage.125 
Figure 2.7: Mackinder s Heartland Concept: 1919126 
123 C. Seiple, Revisiting the Geo- p. 46.
124 S. B. Cohen, Geopolitics of p. 13.
125 A. Sengupta, Heartlands of p.5
126 S. B. Cohen, Geopolitics of , p. 15.
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In Democratic Ideals and Realities (1919), Mackinder started to use the term
Heartland which was first coined by the English geographer James Fairgrieve127 in 
1915. Times were changing and Mackinder knew that his theory would also have to be
changed. In this new re-conceptualisation, the pivot area was wider than the previous
one with the annexation of Eastern Europe (figure 2.7). And this became the basis of his
popular dictum Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the
Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the
World . 128 Due to Germany s rising threat to international security and balance of
power, Russia must be allowed to keep the heartland for a while to make an alliance
possible with Great Britain. During these years, Mackinder was in search of an 
international unification as the stakes were now much greater than just Great Britain.129 
Figure 2.8: Mackinder s Heartland Concept: 1943 130 
Mackinder lastly reformulated its theory in an article The Round World and the
Winning of the Peace which was published in Foreign Affairs Magazine, on July 1943.
127 R. D. Dikshit, Political , p. 193.
128 H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction,
(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1942), p. 106.
129 C. Seiple, Revisiting the Geo- p. 50.




             
          
           
           
              
             
            
          
           
              
               
             
             
            
            
 
     
 
           
             
               
              
             
                
            
 
                  
             
                                                          
        
                 
               
     
In this last reformulation, he took out Eastern Europe (figure 2.8) and detached
Lenaland (central Siberia) from the Heartland. 131 Mackinder also proposed new
geographical features. One of them was Midland Ocean Basin including the
Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic, and Caribbean Seas, which is as significantly important
as the Pivot area. The rest of the features were Mantle of Vacancies extending from
the Sahara Desert eastward to Arabia, Tibet, and Mongolia to eastern Siberia; South
Atlantic Ocean Basin consisting of South America, the South Atlantic Ocean and
Africa; and Asiatic Monsoon Lands . 132 Similar to the second reformulation,
international security and balance of power were in the foreground. Mackinder,
therefore, was hoping that those lands would prosper and balance each other out. For
this reason, he was in support of the cooperation of the Heartland (Russia) and the Mid-
Ocean Basin (France, the UK and America) against the main enemy Nazi Germany .
After taking out Eastern Europe from the dictum, Central Asia became decisive for
secure international relations and a balanced world. In these conditions, the cooperation
would have to be a necessity against any breach of the peace.
2.3.1. Turkey and Heartland
Turkey s geographical stance provides it with not only advantages, but also
disadvantages. As aforementioned, Turkey has had the ability to negotiate with the great
powers thanks to its geographical location. At the same time Turkey is located at the
crossroads of Europe and Asia and has played a bridge role between oil-rich and oil-
needing markets. While that might be seen as an advantage, it causes disadvantages
from time to time as well. For instance, Turkey might be the hub of human trafficking
or targeted by some terrorist groups as it is in the foreground.
Having said that, in Turkey it is believed that the potential of Turkey to play a role in
world politics derives from its centrality. Turkey has been widely presented as a
131 C. Seiple, Revisiting the Geo- p. 51.
132H. J. Mackinder, Round World and the Winning of the in Democratic Ideals and
Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, by H. J: Mackinder (Washington: National Defense




            
          
 
             
             
     
 
           
               
              
             
           
                 
            
            
       
 
            
           
             
             





                                                          
            
                
            
              
       
            
          
                  
      
 
central state based on Halford Mackinder s Heartland concept.133 It has even been
expressed by incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an as follows:
Turkey is not a periphery state of Europe, Asia or Middle East. In
contrast, Turkey is located at the crossroads of these regions and has an
ability to influence them.134 
According to Mackinder s Heartland concept, especially the revised version of 1919,
the pivot area is wider than the previous one with the annexation of Eastern Europe.
While Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) was included in the inner crescent in the concept
of 1904, this new conceptualisation included Turkey in the Heartland. By doing that
Mackinder attached more importance to Turkey and its surrounding regions. Besides,
his way of thinking paved the way for Turkey to be perceived as one of the central
states. That is to say, Mackinder s conceptualisation emphasised Turkey s role in world
politics and influenced many politicians and academics to apply the Turkish foreign
policy-making process, particularly during the last decade.
Turkey s centrality discourse is perceived by the majority of the Turkish community.
Besides, it dominates the intellectual debates and geopolitical assumptions in Turkey,
too. Before giving some of the intellectual figures approaches, it is worth presenting
the following political cartoon to give an impression about the perception of Turkey s
geopolitical importance among the Turkish community:
133 H. Konumu ve Bundan Kaynaklanan Tehditler
geopolitical position and the external threats it causes]. , 10 (58), 1989, 9-69;
Y. Jeopolitik [Geopolitics born], Jeopolitik, 1(1), 2003; C. Okman, Jeopolitik
Kaymalar, Merkezlerine ve [Geopolitical shifts, the centres of gravity and Turkey],
19.03.2002, Zaman Daily, Available from <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/03/19/strateji/h1.htm>
[Accessed on 05/04/2013]; Tarihinin ve Jeopolitik [The
geopolitical framework of Turkish history and future], (Ankara: ASAM, 2003).
134 R. T. Politikada Ayar Devri [A time for fine tuning foreign policy], Radikal Daily,
26/02/2005, Available from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=144784>, [Accessed on
05/04/2013].
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Figure 2.9. Political cartoon by Behi AK demonstrating geopolitics as common
sense in Turkey135 
Man: Germany has harsh winters. They have to plan ahead. This has resulted
in German advance in development and planning ; The English have a small
country, they have travelled to other lands. As a result, they have advanced in 
seafaring and science ; In Israel water and land are scarce; they have
developed new irrigation techniques ; the United States is far from Europe. To 
be able to monitor from far, they have advanced in information technology. 
Boy: But then what did we develop? 
Man: Nothing. For we are a country of immense geopolitical significance. 
Following the general assumption on Turkey s centrality and geopolitical significance,
the discourses among the intellectual and political figures are not different from the
general assumption among the Turkish community. On this account, incumbent Foreign
Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davuto lu, emphasises Turkey s centrality
at every turn. In an interview conducted by Marc Grossman, Davuto lu mentions that 
What is the uniqueness of Turkey? Turkish uniqueness is just the
opposite, the geographical continuity. Not the discontinuity; Turkey is 
right at the centre of Afro-Euro-Asia, having multidimensional
135 Quoted in P. Bilgin, in S. Guzzini The Return of Geopolitics in 
Europe?: Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises, (Cambridge: Cambridge University




          
          
           
 
 
       
 
             
           
              
       
           
 
             
            
           
              
            
            
 
 
            
           
          
          
              
             
                 
             
                                                          
               
       
    
               
   
               
  
                 
    
characters of geopolitics. Turkey is a European country, an Asian
country, a Middle Eastern country, a Balkan country, a Caucasian
country, neighbour to Africa, a Black Sea country, Caspian Sea, all
these.136 
Another emphasis can be made as follows:
As a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is
a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced
to one, unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a
Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian,
Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time.137 
Identifying the discourse which puts Turkey on the focus of geopolitics dogma, another
intellectual, General (Ret.) Suat lhan gives us clues about the Turkish community s
awareness on Turkey s geopolitical significance. According to lhan, we (people who
live in the Republic of Turkey) are not aware of how significant Turkey s geographical
location is. Besides, we, Turks, ignore our values/assets, which derive from being
Turkish. However, they have huge effects on global politics, especially on geographical
location. 138 
On this account, Prof. An l e en s approach towards the significance of Turkey s
geographical location is not much different from Davuto lu s and lhan s approaches.
While e en emphasises Turkey s centrality and geopolitical significance, he also
merges his own approach with current technological developments. According to
e en, the USA has launched a programme which enables itself to open the Eurasian
continent through stanbul, which is the most populous city of Turkey. This programme
has been developed by Bill Gates and his team in order to control the world through the
internet and they called it Istanbul .139 Besides, for this programme Istanbul has been
136 Interview with A. by M. Grossman, Conversation with Ahmet Council on
Foreign Relations, 14 April 2010, Available from <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-ahmet-
davutoglu/p21916> [Accessed on 03/12/2013].
137 A. Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of Insight Turkey, 10 (2008),
77-96 (p. 77).
138 S. Roundtable Discussion Report, and Eurasianism in New World Order 27th October
2004, www.aysam.gen.tr.





             
                
                
      
 
            
               
               
          
             
              
               
              
                
        
 
    
  
        
 
             
             
             
                
               
 
               
             
            
                                                          
              
 
     
chosen as the headquarters. e en continues that the USA is having trouble controlling
the world beyond the Atlantic Ocean. That is why it is preparing to move to the
geopolitical centre of the world, and in this sense Istanbul has been chosen as the capital
of the world by the USA.140 
These quotes clearly present that Turkey s geopolitical location and its significance is
perceived as a dogma among most of the intellectuals in Turkey. Besides, this dogma is
shared by the majority of the Turkish community, to some extent. It is this dogma
which has significantly influenced the Turkish foreign policy making process,
particularly during the Davuto lu era. Also, through this dogma it is believed that
significant importance is added to Turkey s role in the international system and it is
perceived by the majority of the Turkish population that Turkey is destined to be a
powerful state in the region. Similar to the Heartland thesis, this dogma s reflections can
be found in the Rimland thesis as well. In the next section, the Rimland thesis and
Turkey s place in the Rimland will be examined.
2.4. The Rimland Thesis 
2.4.1. Spykman and Foreign Policy of the USA
The Rimland thesis is another perspective on geopolitics and was the brainchild of
Nicholas J. Spykman. Spykman was a Dutch-born American scholar and one of the
most important geopolitical thinkers. As well as Spykman being recognised by his main
work the Rimland thesis , it is an obvious fact that this thesis had a significant impact
on the USA and Western strategic thinking in the second half of the 20th century.141 
Spykman was a Professor of Yale University; like Ratzel he began his career as a
foreign correspondent. One way or another it might be claimed that Spykman s two
major geopolitical works America s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and






              
             
           
               
          
           
            
               
              
              
               
 
 
             
                
               
            
              
               
                 





                                                          
               
                
    
   
            
               
    
             
   
the Balance of Power (1942) and The Geopolitics of the Peace (1944) caused their
author to become one of the most well-known geopolitical intellectuals. In particular, a
Spykmanesque type of security discourse became hegemonic within the post-war USA
strategic discourse. That security discourse was set out on the basis of the prevention of
hegemony, meaning Spykman was against American isolationism. Conversely, the USA
should have embraced an interventionist foreign policy, especially in the Eurasian
continent. According to Spykman, if any power dominates the Eurasian continent, then
that would pose a grave threat to the security of the Western powers.142 This approach
brought a new perspective to the foreign policy course of USA. It meant that
Isolationism in foreign policy was over for the USA. Instead of passivity in foreign
affairs, it was the right time for the USA to engage with European power politics
actively.
Spykman s views were widely accepted in intellectual environments in the USA. One of
the reasons for that was his emphasis on the importance of the North Atlantic basin. In
his way of thinking, the USA had a decisive strategic and economic advantage while in
Mackinder s thinking, this advantage belonged to Russia. In addition to the USA s
power potential, the Pacific Ocean would become a key route for world trade.143 This
also was a contradiction to Mackinder s thinking. In this regard, it might be argued that
Nicholas Spykman was in search of ways to promote the interests of the USA as he was
a proponent of realism in international relations.144 
142 G. O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics; A. Petersen, The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the
Fate of the West, (California: Praeger, 2011); J. B. Foster, New Geopolitics of Monthly
Review, Available from <http://monthlyreview.org/2006/01/01/the-new-geopolitics-of-empire#en16>,
[Accessed on 27/03/2012].
143 M. P. Gerace, Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and
Comparative Strategy, 10, (1991), pp. 347-364; N. J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace, (New York:
Harcourt & Brace, 1944).





       
 
              
             
                 
              
                 
               
                
                
               
               
            
            
            
 
             
              
           
             
    
 
           
           
           
           
              
              
         
 
                                                          
        
              
   
             
         
2.4.2. The Emergence of the Rimland Thesis
The Rimland thesis was a production of a USA-centred way of thinking and was
generated as a critical response to Sir Halford Mackinder s Heartland theory. In World
War II, two big powers (the USA and the Soviet Union) were in cooperation in order to
control the Pivot area against Nazi Germany. However, it seemed that no one was
thinking what would happen in the case of a defeat for Nazi Germany and Japan. It was
obvious that the consequences of a victory for the Axis powers would be disastrous for
the USA and its allies.145 That is why, notwithstanding the main goal was to defeat the
Axis powers, yet it was not enough. Spykman was the first one who pointed out the
danger in the coming days. According to him, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan
would further increase the power of the Soviet Union. The form of the post-war world
therefore needed to be analysed regarding power balances, sphere of influence and
boundaries.146 Spykman firstly presented his concerns in his book America s Strategy in
World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power in 1942.
A while later, he reformulated his approaches to the post-war world and introduced
them as the Rimland thesis in his book The Geography of the Peace (1944) published
posthumously after his untimely death. 147 In this book, Spykman urges American
policymakers against the peril which would come true if the whole Eurasian landmass
unifies. And, Spykman continues:
The strength of power centres of the Eastern Hemisphere would then
have been overpowering. It would have been impossible for us to
preserve our independence and security. If we are to avoid the
conclusion of such encirclement in the future, our constant concern in
peacetime must be to see that no nation or alliance of nations is allowed
to emerge as a dominating power in either of the regions of the Old
World from which our security could be threatened. 148 
145 F. P. Sempa, Geopolitics: p. 76.
146 B. W. Blouet, Geopolitics and Globalization in Twentieth Century, (London: Reaktion Books Ltd.,
2001), p. 119.
147 Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943) died of cancer at the age of 49.




               
            
            
            
            
             
              
                  
      
 
              
           
             
          
          
             
             
           
 
        
      
         
 
 
                                                          
                
     
              
            
               
 
        
               
    
   
 
         
Herein, it is important to identify what the Old World is in terms of Spykman s
thinking. According to Spykman s geographical division of the world, the Old World
was consisting of the Eurasian continent, Africa and Australia. The New World
included the Americas in the western hemisphere. 149 This division was similar to
previous geopoliticians ideas. The difference was the way of approaching the division
and for the good of whom. Following the conceptualisation of the division, Spykman
kept advising that although the USA dominated the New World of the Americas, the
Old World was posing a grave danger to the USA and that is why it must also be
dominated through an active, non-isolanist foreign-policy.
To this end, Spykman identified the Rimland thesis or as some point out a
reinterpreted Mackinder s Heartland thesis.150 In this sense, Spykman argued that the
Heartland was not vital for controlling Eurasia. Instead, Eurasia could be controlled by
the Rimland or the Marginal/Inner Crescent surrounding Eurasia. 151 Contrary to
Mackinder, Spykman asserted that without the Marginal/Inner crescent (the Rimland),
Mackinder s Pivot was nothing more than a geographic area. In addition, while the
Pivot area had no independent historical role to play and its geopolitical significance
was overestimated, the Rimland was the key to world domination.152 
In this vein, Spykman s formula was as follows:
Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia,
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.153 
149 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, p. 22; B. Chapman, Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues,
(California: ABC-CLIO, 2011), p. 23.
150 Regarding Heartland reinterpretation by Spykman, see J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-war American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), p. 57 and M. P. Gerace, etween Mackinder and 1991, pp. 347-
364.
151 M. P. Gerace, Mackinder and




153 N. J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace, p.43.
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Spykman describes the Rimland as follows:
The Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate
region, the heartland and the marginal seas. It functions
as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power.
Looking in both directions, it must function amphibiously and defend itself
on land and sea.154 
Figure 2.10: The Rimland Concept155 
In his conceptualisation, the Rimland consisted of Western Europe, the Middle East,
southwest Asia, China and the Far East. The importance of the Rimland stems from its 
geographic position between the Heartland and the seas. Therefore, the Rimland could
act as both a land power and a sea power, and also a buffer zone. As the countries of 
Spykman s Rimland had greater industrial and manpower resources than the Heartland,
it strategically was more important than the Heartland.156 
154 Quoted in F. P. Sempa, Wor 
www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/semp/sempa_spykman.html, [Accessed on 25/03/2012].
155 M. Polelle, Raising Cartographic 1999, p. 118.




             
             
            
            
           
             
               
    
 
      
 
           
                   
          
              
              
         
            
    
 
             
               
             
             
              
      
 
              
              
                                                          
                
             
All in all, from Spykman s perspective, Mackinder was the one who exaggerated the
prospects of the Heartland. In addition, the Heartland was less important than the
Rimland. Spykman s assumptions were based on backwardness of the Pivot area. The
development of railway infrastructure and agriculture had not progressed in the way
Mackinder had expected in his original thesis. Besides, Mackinder underestimated the
importance of sea power. According to Spykman, the combination of land and sea
powers was crucial in order to maintain the balance of power and control the Rimland,
thereby ruling the Heartland.157 
2.4.3. Turkey s Place in the Rimland
As previously mentioned, while Turkey is included in Mackinder s Heartland concept
of 1919, he left it out of the Heartland area and put it in a new geographical zone called
Midland Ocean Basin including the Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic, and Caribbean
Seas, which is as significantly important as the Heartland (the Pivot area). Even though
Mackinder had emphasised that the new zone was as significant as the Heartland, the
perception of Turkey s geo-strategic importance had slightly deteriorated. However,
Spykman along with his conceptualisation attached great importance to the Rimland and
Turkey s location once again.
In Spykman s visionary thinking Turkey is included in the Rimland area instead of
being in the Pivot area (Heartland). However, it needs to be emphasised that in contrast
to Mackinder s Heartland theory, according to Spykman the Rimland area is the most
important geopolitical zone in order to dominate Eurasia by means of the industrialised
states of the Rimland. In this systematised world politics, Turkey s place is defined by
policy makers and academics as follows:
Turkey is a country with a close land basin, the epicentre of the Balkans,
the Middle East and the Caucasus, the centre of Eurasia in general and is
157 R. D. Dikshit, Political ; R. R. Hanks, Encyclopaedia of Geography ; C. S.




             
 
 
             
            
           
                
               
           
    
 
             
           
            
              
            
         
 
            
            
            
          
 
                
              
               
              
              
              
                                                          
             
 
              
       
            
 
       
in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the
Pacific.158 
Despite the Rimland thesis being understudied in Turkey regarding defining the place of
Turkey in this thesis, it was still another perspective justifying Turkey s enormous
geopolitical importance whether located in the Heartland or in the Rimland. Both
theses were drawing lines to control the world and Turkey was included by both of them
in the most important area. That is why it might be acknowledged that the Rimland
thesis is another motive for Turkish intellectuals to promote Turkey s geopolitical
stance and significance.
As mentioned in the previous section, these theses caused the emergence of geopolitics
dogma in Turkey as they kept emphasising Turkey s geopolitical significance in
Turkish intellectual environments. It was their effect that led incumbent Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdo an to claim that Istanbul is not only a centre combining the
159 Incontinents but also a central symbol combining and synthesizing the civilisations . 
addition, Erdo an also presents their effect on intellectual environments:
Turkey is a centre that combines Asia and Europe [b]y becoming a
member of the European Union, Turkey will not only contribute to the
economic, social and legal structure of Europe but will also become an
important centre for communication of the Asian countries with Europe.160 
On account of this, even if the Rimland thesis has remained under the shadow of the
Heartland thesis s popularity, it is widely accepted that to some extent it brings an
added value to Turkey s geopolitics as Turkey is located in the Rimland belt and also
near to the Pivot area. The theses underlying effect on Turkey s geopolitical stance has
created an environment in which people believe that Turkey is one of the regional
powers in all conditions. As will be presented in the coming chapters, this perception
158 J. W. Walker, Foreign Policy through Strategic Available from
<http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/understanding-strategic-depth-joshua-walker>,
[Accessed on 10/12/2012]; A. Murinson, strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign Middle
Eastern Studies, 42 (6), 2006, pp. 945-964.
159 C. Rumford, Spaces: Europe, Globalization, (Routledge: Oxon, 2008), p.
128.




                




            
                
             
           
             
           
             
            
             
            
             
            
 
              
               
            
              
                
             
               
               
                   
                                                          
               
         
                  
  
             
    
has been one of the main motives which make Turkey aspire to become a mediator, an
actor, and a rule-maker in the region.
2.5. Conclusion
Every century has had its own geographical perspective .161 This statement belongs to
one of the greatest minds of the time, Halford J. Mackinder. There is no harm in
completing Mackinder s statement with as every country and every nation has had
its own perspective. For instance, although the intellectuals Mackinder, Ratzel, and
Spykman put forward their own theory/thesis/concepts in the same century, all of these
intellectuals gained recognition from their own countries and nations. Friedrich Ratzel
was a staunch German and his Lebensraum concept was about spiritual and racial
expansion of Germany. Furthermore the quest for Lebensraum was a necessary means
to defend the German race against stagnation and degeneration. On the other hand,
although Halford J. Mackinder s Heartland thesis was one of the popular geopolitical
perspectives and he was an English geographer, his thesis influenced several states such
as Britain, Germany, and the USA (during the Cold War era).
As a Dutch-born American, scholar Nicholas Spykman laid out a concept for the USA
in order to keep the balance of power. Additionally, it might be said that Spykman
influenced the American policy of containment which was implemented in order to
prevent the spread of communism abroad by using numerous strategies until the end of
the Cold-War era.162 In this regard, it might be claimed that the Rimland thesis was the
more successful one compared with Mackinder s Heartland thesis, as it failed to keep
up with the realities brought about by the rapid pace of change in technology and
balance of power in the world after the post-war era.163 As for the Lebensraum concept,
to give it its due and instead of labelling it as a failed initiative, it would be right to
161 Quoted in D. W. Meining, and Rimland in Eurasian The Western Political
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 553-569 (553).
162 M. T. Owens, Defense of Classical Naval War College Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp.
59-76 (60).
163 G. E. Oldenburger, Cold War: The Geography of Available from




                
  
 
            
                
                
           
              
                
            
                
              
                
            
               
























mention that it was a generalisation and a regular behaviour of states in the seeking of
national survival.
Nevertheless, these all are remarkable geopolitical perspectives which were bona fide in
their own right and it is obvious that these perspectives interact with each other. In the
light of this knowledge, it would be wise to claim that the founding fathers of Classical
and Neo-Eurasianism were also influenced by these great intellectuals and their
opinions on the grounds of establishing a living-space for their own nation, realising the
importance of their own land, and finding out how to keep the balance of power. In
particular, Eurasianists were influenced by the Heartland thesis since it presented the
Pivot area as the core of Eurasia. Besides, the invasion of the Pivot area would enable
the invader to emerge as a world power since the region guarantees self-sufficiency in
food for the invader and its inaccessibility by sea plays a barrier role to protect the
region. This thinking was the main rationale behind the Eurasianist ideology which
urges the establishment of the Eurasian Union. In this vein, the next chapter will focus











           
            
              
            
             
           
 
                 
            
            
             
              
           
         
 
          
          
            
             
               
             
                
             
            
               
CHAPTER III:
EURASIANISM: AN IDEOLOGICAL REVIVAL
3.1 Introduction
Russia s intellectual circles have spent a significant amount of time determining
Russia s place in the world. Particularly, these investigations reached their peak during
the cataclysmic times of the Russian Revolution, World War I, the collapse of the
USSR (The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) etc. Both Classical Eurasianism and
Neo-Eurasianism came out in such times as a conclusion to seeking a historical,
geopolitical, and cultural identity along with other nationalist movements.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I will focus on the concept of
Eurasianism, and its initial version, namely Classical Eurasianism; and then its current
version Neo-Eurasianism , which evolved in a slightly different way through the Cold
War era. And then, Turkish Eurasianism will be briefly presented and compared to
Russian Eurasianism. By doing so, the section will provide a brief analysis on why
Classic Eurasianism could not find any proper ground in Turkey while Neo-
Eurasianism has had, to some extent, influence in Turkey.
Nowadays, the term Eurasianism is synonymous with the term neo-Eurasianism ,
although the latter represents different perspectives. To understand and assess
Eurasianism thought from a holistic perspective, its background should be known and
understood. For instance, under which conditions has it been developed? What was the
rationale behind it? When was it brought about by its supporters? That is why this
chapter aspires to reveal the whole background of Eurasianism, its fathers, and their
goals from the early days of the 20th century till present time for the purpose of
providing a broad review of Eurasianism as the groundwork to evaluate the discourses
of Eurasianism in contemporary Turkish politics. In the second part, the Eurasianism




                
         
 
         
 
              
            
             
             
              
               
            
                
           
              
          
 
              
               
          
             
              
              
          
             
              
                                                          
              
       
                
     
                
              
         
is confused most with the ideology of Eurasianism. By doing so it is aimed that the
commonalities and also the differences would be presented explicitly.
3.2 Classical Eurasianism: A Historical Context, Emergence and Principles
In Ancient Greece, the earth was divided into three separate pieces of land; Europe,
Asia, and Africa. The boundaries were waterways. For instance, the Mediterranean Sea
was the boundary between Africa and Europe; the Nile was the boundary between
Africa and Asia.164 While the boundaries which separate Africa from Europe and Asia
were clear, there was no certain boundary between Europe and Asia. Whereas this is
one of the geographical divisions of the world, there are other claims which divide the
world. For instance, Herodotus defines Europe in another way. According to him,
Europe has no independent existence, since it is only a part of Eurasia, which has no
real internal boundaries of its own. 165 Having several perceptions of geographical
divisions of the world led to producing many inclusions and exclusions to describe the
placement of Europe and Asia in the modern world.
Eurasianism thought is one of the conclusions of such perceptions. It makes a reference
to the term Eurasia . It literally means Europe plus Asia. As a geographical term, it
was Alexander Von Humboldt s contribution to the literature. Humboldt (1769-1859)
was a German naturalist and explorer who explored much of Central and South
America. Also, he travelled through Russia and Siberia as far east as the Altai
Mountains and south to the Caspian Sea from 12 April to 28 December 1829.166 
Whereas Humboldt s perspective was purely and simply geographical, the Russian
Eurasianists approached the term from a different angle. According to them, the most
crucial point was the territory of Russia. According to N. S. Trubetskoy, The territory
164 M. Bassin, between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical
Slavic Review, 50 (1991), 1-17, (p. 2).
165 Quoted in A. G. Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998), p. 2.
166 For further information on Alexander Von Humboldt, see N. A. Rupke, Alexander Von Humboldt: A
Metabiography, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); A. Gaines and M. Collins, Alexander Von




          
           
      
 
           
            
               
            
          
           
             
              
      
 
              
            
             
                 
                
      
 
               
           
          
          
            
                                                          
          
           
             
    
      
   
 
of Russia...constitutes a separate continent 167 Moreover, this separate continent was
a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of
the Russian Empire in 1914.168 
The reason why these Russian Eurasianists embraced this perspective was the
conditions which the Russian Empire experienced during the difficult times of the early
20th century. Herein, probing the early times of the 1900s is necessary to display some
information about the founders of Eurasianism and to learn under which conditions
Eurasianism emerged. First and foremost, in Dmitry V. Shlapentokh s words,
Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement . 169 By and large, this
movement emphasised the uniqueness of Russian culture which was composed of a mix
of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and according to them, Russia was a separate third
continent, neither Europe nor Asia.
In studying historical events, the conditions of the ages should be taken into account.
Therefore, assessing Classical Eurasianism without a holistic approach may give rise to
several misunderstandings. For instance, as a result of this way of thinking, Eurasianism
is sometimes accused of being a racial theory or a utopia. Instead, the events of the early
days of the1900s, such as World War I, the Revolution of 1905 and the Revolution of
February 1917 must be considered.
The Russian Revolution of 1905 led to the establishment of the State Duma of the
Russian Empire, multi-party system and the Russian Constitution of 1906. Throughout
this process many uprisings, assassinations and mutinies occurred. Eventually the
Russian government was transformed from an autocracy into a constitutional
monarchy.170 Nevertheless, the revolution s effects did not solve the problems. In 1917,
167 Quoted in S. Wiederkehr, a 2007a, p.1.
168 C. J. Halperin, Vernadsky, Eurasianism, 1982, p. 481.
169 D. V. Shlapentokh, Past and Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30
(1997), 129-151, (p. 129).







             
        
 
             
           
            
           
               
           
            
           
           
               
           
            
              
           
               
                
           
          
    
 
           
             
           
                                                          
               
              
              
                
             
      
the well-known October Revolution flared up and caused the collapse of the Russian
Empire, and the establishment of the USSR.
Generally speaking, this period was crucial and critical for the people of Eurasia.
Moreover, it was full of disappointments and disillusionments for the Russian
intelligentsia. Under this situation, a group of Russian intellectuals, including a number
of important ethnographers, philosophers, historians who were in exile, developed a
different kind of thought. The most eminent figures in this group were a geographer and
economist Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895 - 1968), an ethnographer and linguist
Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy (1890 - 1938), an aesthetic critic and historian Petr
Petrovich Suvchinsky (1882 - 1985), a theologian Georgii Vasilevich Florovsky, a
philosopher Lev Platonovich Karsavin (1882 - 1952), a historian Georgii Vladimirovich
Vernadsky (1887 - 1973), a religious thinker Georges V. Florovsky (1893 - 1979), and a
legal philosopher Nikolai Nikolayavich Alekseev (1879 - 1964). Over time, several
adherents joined the movement. They were a linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896
- 1982), a theologian A. V. Kartasev, a philosopher Vsevlov Nikaranovi Ivanov, a jurist
Vya eslavovich ahmatov, an Orthodox priest A. Liven, a literary critic D. Sviatopolk-
Mirskii (1880 - 1939), V. Il in, and S. Efron.171 Despite the fact that Eurasianism was
produced and promoted by all these intellectuals, it is fair to say that its principal fathers
were Savitsky, Suvchinsky and Trubetskoy. However, before long, the participants of
Eurasianism separated into factions and Classical Eurasianism faded away until
Gumilev put together Neo-Eurasianism.
Regarding the characterisation of Classical Eurasianism, four main principles can be
explored. The first was anti-Westernism. At that time, the West was perceived as
Western Europe. In this context, the creators of Eurasianism eschewed Western
171 For further information on the founding fathers of Classical Eurasianism see: R. Paradowski,
Eurasian Idea and Leo Gumilev's Scientific Canadian Slavonic Papers 41 (1999), 19-33; M.
Laruelle, Russian p. 19; B. and V. Korkmaz, Eurasianism: Model for
Iran and Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 4 (2004), 99-133, (p. 99); I. Vinkovetsky,
Foundations of Classical Eurasianism, 1921- at the American Association for the Advancement of




         
             
            
            
            
            
            
               
             
               
                
               
  
 
             
                 
             
           
              
           
           
           
            
         
          
     
 
             
            
               
                                                          
       
                 
       
civilisation and sympathised with non-European cultures. 172 As mentioned before,
Eurasia was neither Europe nor Asia. It was a separate continent; however, the
Eurasianists perceived themselves closer to Asia than Europe. On this point, Vladimir
Bilenkin points out that they described Western civilisation as a specific ethno-cultural
phenomenon and, in fact, a dangerous aberration that relentlessly imposes its imperial
domination over other ethnic groups by means of military, economic, and cultural
aggression . 173 So, the Eurasianists who lived in Prague, Paris and the Balkans
anticipated putting an end to the cultural hegemony of the West and instead uplift the
Eastern culture. Although the Eurasianists aimed to become closer to Asia, their main
goal was to establish a distinctive state that was different from both Europe and Asia.
Therefore, it would not be fair to say that it was a purely separatist movement. Contrary
to the common understanding, it was not their aim to move Russia from Europe and
toward Asia.
The second principle was the uniqueness of Russia and Russian culture. As mentioned
in the first principle, Eurasia was a separate continent and at the same time it was a
unique culture. For the Eurasianists, the specification which made it unique was the
Turanian effect. Contrary to Slavophiles, the Eurasianists advocated that Turanians had
a huge impact over the genesis of Russian culture. Paradowski points out that The
Turanian (or Ural-Altaic) nations include, according to the Eurasians, the Finno-Ugric
nations (Estonians, Karelians, Finns, Ugrians both the Hungarian and Western
Siberian ones), Samoyeds, Turks including Ottoman Turks, various Tatars, Bashkirs,
Turkmen, Kirgiz, Yakuts, Chuvash, a few extinct peoples such as Khazars, Polovtsy,
Ugurians and, finally, Mongols (in Russia-Kalmyks and Buriats, outside Russia-
Mongols proper) and Manchurians . 174 In this context, Trubetskoy asserted the
Turanian influence as follows:
...the living together of the Russians with the Turanians is a recurring motif
throughout Russian history. If the association of Eastern Slavs and Turanians is
the fundamental fact of Russian history ..., then it is perfectly obvious that for a
172 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism... p. 26;
173 V. Bilenkin, Ideology of Rulers in Monthly Review, 47 (1995), 24-37, (p. 27).




           
             
  
 
            
             
              
           
           
      
  
        
         
               
              
             
      
 
           
             
            
            
             
           
             
            
            
         
 
             
               
                 
            
               
          
                                                          
                
               
 
             
            
     
correct national self-knowledge we, Russians, have to take into account the
presence of the Turanian element in ourselves, we have to study our Turanian
brothers .175 
Albeit including various national groups, from the perspective of the Eurasianists, the
Tatars more than any other group moulded the Russian culture and state structure.
Contrary to the principal impression which is that the Tatar hegemony, in this context
Genghis Khan, had a destructive influence over Russia, the creators, especially
Trubetskoy, put forward that Russians learned many things from Tatars particularly
about the constitution of the state:
Eurasia is a geographically, ethnographically, and economically integrated
system whose political unification was historically inevitable. Genghis Khan
was the first to accomplish this unification ... In time the unity of Eurasia began
to break up. Instinctively the Russian state has striven and is striving to recreate
this broken unity; consequently, it is descendant of Genghis Khan, the heir and
successor to his historical endeavours.
...
The Legacy of Genghis Khan is inseparable from Russia. Whether Russia
wants it or not, she remains forever the guardian of this legacy...Even during
the period of the antinational monarchy [i.e. in the post-Petrine era S.
W.]...Russia was compelled by the very nature of things to continue the
historical enterprise of uniting Eurasia into one state the enterprise of Genghis
Khan. The annexations of the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Transcaspian region,
and Turkestan ... were all steps along the path toward reunification of the
scattered parts of the Eurasian ulus of Genghis Khan s empire, while the
colonisation and cultivation of the steppe ... consolidated the transfer of the
176 Eurasian state idea from the Turanians to the Russians . 
The third principle was that Eurasianism was a third way between capitalism and
socialism, liberalism and dictatorship.177 It was a theory to build a nation, so it must
have been different from the existing currents at that time. It was a product of a normal
process. Throughout history, a number of nationalists have put forward several theories
to prevent the collapse of their countries or empires. For example, during the late 1800s
and the early 1900s, some ideologies such as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-
175 Quoted in S. Wiederkehr, as a reaction to Pan- in Russia between East and
West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, ed. by D. Shlapentokh (Leiden: Brill, 2007b) Emphasis in
original.
176 S. Wiederkehr, as a , p. 54-55 Emphasis in original.
177 D. V. Shlapentokh, Foreign Policy and 01/09/2005, Available from




           
              
          
          
     
 
               
             
           
           
              
              
          
   
 
            
   
 
         
        
 
       
 
           
           
    
 
           
 
        
  
                                                          
         
                 
                
           
        
Ottomanism, and Pan-Islamism were produced by nationalists living in the Ottoman
Empire to transform it into a long-lived empire. These kinds of Pan-isms were rejected
definitely by the Eurasianists. From their perspective, Eurasianism, rather than Pan-
Slavism for Russians, Pan-Turanianism for Eurasian Turanians, or Pan-Islamism for
Eurasian Moslems, should become predominant .178 
Regarding this point, on the one hand it is important to emphasise that many specialists
believe that Eurasianism was envisaged to protect the existing state in Eurasia against
the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanianist thoughts. On the other hand, protagonists of Pan-
Turkism and Pan-Turanianism produced similar discourses in the name of promoting
what they were arguing. In this context, the similarity between Ziya G kalp s (one of
the leaders of the Pan-Turkic movement in the late Ottoman Empire and the early
Turkish Republic era), Nikolai S. Trubetskoy s and Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadsky s
statements is intriguing.
Ziya G kalp stated outspokenly his opinions about Pan-Turanianism in his poem Turan
in 1911;
For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey nor Turkestan
Fatherland is a large and eternal country Turan.179 
Nikolai S. Trubetskoy described Eurasia as follows;
The territory of Russia...constitutes a separate continent...which in contrast to
Europe and Asia can be called Eurasia...Eurasia represents an integral whole,
both geographically and anthropologically .180 
At the same time Georgii Vasilevich Vernadsky depicted it as follows;
181 Russia is neither Europe nor Asia but Eurasia . 
178 S. Wiederkehr, as a , p. 52.
179 F. A. Tansel, Ziya ve Halk Tarih Kurumu, 1989, 3. [The
Poems of Ziya and Folk Tales, Turkish Historical Society, Third Edition] Emphasis in original.
180 S. Wiederkehr, a , p.1 Emphasis in original.




             
           
          
                 
          
          
             
             
              
             
          
          
             
             
 
 
             
             
               
                
                
           
    
 
            
 
 
            
           
          
              
                                                          
       
       
In this sense, the founders totally rejected the Western culture, thoughts, traditions, and
currents to uphold Russian cultural distinctiveness. 182 Eurasianism was a kind of
nationalist idea which rejected Bolshevism, Capitalism, Liberalism, Communism etc. It
was not an aberration, but was a kind of different way of thinking. In addition, in early
stages of the movement, the theoreticians perceived themselves different from
Bolsheviks, Marxists and Communists, albeit Eurasianism had some similarities to
them. For example, being an oriental-based ideology would be counted as the first
similarity as these ideologies did not have any relationships with the West. Another
similarity is that on the one hand, Bolshevism and Eurasianism both rejected the entire
culture of the pre-revolution period in Russia. On the other hand, Communism and
Eurasianism were totally against the West. Furthermore, Laruelle clarifies these
similarities as follows: Eurasianism adopted Marxism s dialectic approach, turning the
idea of humanity evolving in stages against Communism; Russia would then go from
Capitalism as a thesis and Communism as an antithesis to Eurasianism as their
synthesis .183 
The fourth and last principle was that Eurasianism had an anti-monarchist vision. As
mentioned in the third principle, they were opposed to the monarchy which existed
before the Revolution. Due to that reason, they were interested in a kind of democracy
and a kind of totalitarian system. On the one hand, they did not accept the democracy
because of its western roots. On the other hand, they did not give support to the
totalitarian administration system because of the importance they attached to the
Eurasian people.
Paradowski draws attention to the hostility toward democracy among the Eurasianists as
follows:
In their political opinions, the Eurasians declared themselves first of all as
opponents of democracy, and, by all means, of its parliamentary-liberal variant.
They especially jeered at democratic procedures which, in their opinion,
transform society into a herd of electors and a victim of degenerate elites. In
182 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 26;




              
           
              
            
   
 
             
  
 
           
            
           
             
             
             
    
 
                
             
                
                
              
             
               
         
             
              
            





                                                          
       
            
                
   
       
order for the elites to be healthy and the state genuinely democratic , the nation
itself must be organised, not centrally, according to some rational plan 
(whether a Communist or liberal one) as the national life has an irrational
character but based on the natural process of self-organisation , on living
social groups .184 
The roots of distance to totalitarianism can be found within Shlapentokh s words. He
asserts that;
The excessive government control over the political and intellectual life of
society was one of the major reasons that early Eurasianism maintained its
opposition to the regime. Eurasianists insisted that their view on the
relationship between the individual and the state was still rooted in the orthodox
idea of soboirnost. This implied that while a person could not assert his
individualism at the expense of society, he was absolute and did not dissolve
into the society either .185 
In the light of this knowledge, it can be said that the ideologists of Eurasianism who
experienced the collapse of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires anticipated a kind
of theory in order to prevent the collapse of the Russian Empire. Even if it collapses,
this theory was to build a new nation which covers all Eurasian people under a Eurasian
state. This state would have a unique culture which reflects the characteristics of all
Turanian races. Related to this new state, Trubetskoy argued that Russia s existence as
an empire was a thing of the past. The identifiably Russian element could no longer
legitimately claim its traditional hegemonic position within the larger geographical-
political realm of Eurasia .186 In addition, this state would be, in Laruelle s words,
demotic rather than democratic .187 And, this state would be a state which took some
special features of contemporary currents, absorbed them and produced a sui generis
characteristic called the third way.
184 R. Paradowski, Eurasian idea
185 D. V. Shlapentokh, p. 131 Emphasis in original.
186 M. Bassin, Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Ab Imperio, 2 (2003), p.
257-267, (p. 3).






         
              
              
            
           
             
           
             
   
 
           
              
            
             
             
             
               
             
              
      
 
              
            
                                                          
                
               
                
    
       
                
                
                 
                     
       
3.3. Neo-Eurasianism
Neo-Eurasianism is a slightly differentiated version of Classical Eurasianism,
popularised during the demise of the Soviet Union. It takes its inspiration from the
Classical Eurasianists and assumes that Russia is culturally closer to Asia than to the
West (in this version the West symbolises the USA). However, Neo-Eurasianism comes
to prominence with its geopolitical approach rather than cultural perspective. Classical
Eurasianists do not cite any founder of Geopolitics such as Friedrich Ratzel, Halford
Mackinder and so on, although Neo-Eurasianists, especially Dugin, state a geopolitical
perspective and emulate not only the founder of geopolitics but also Samuel Huntington
and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Lev Gumilev is considered the leader and founder of Neo-Eurasianism, while,
Aleksandr Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin are two of the most important figures of this
school of thought. Neo-Eurasianism is known as one of the restorationist movements188 
in Russia. Vladimir Zhirinovsky (the Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the
Russian Federation) and Gennady Zyuganov (the Leader of the Communist party of the
Russian Federation) can be counted as two other restorationists. Apart from being one
of the restorationist movements, it has strength due to being one of the rare ideologies
which emerged during the post-Cold War and its capacity to contribute to the
intellectual milieu as it benefits from postmodern values.189 In a sense, it is Russia s
third way 190 in its own right.
In this part of the chapter, three pillars of Neo-Eurasianism will be featured: Lev
Gumilev, Aleksandr Panarin, and Aleksandr Dugin. The reason for choosing these three
188 Restorationism is briefly defined by Eduard Volodin as nation together with its social structure
possesses a certain geographical (territorial) space and this space has to be defended against outside
Quoted in P. Kolsto, 'Territorialising Diasporas; The case of the Russians in the former Soviet
republics', 28 (1999), 607-631.
189 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 83.
Third Way is something different and distinct from liberal capitalism with its unswerving belief
in the merits of the free market and democratic socialism with its demand management and obsession
with the state. The Third Way is in favour of growth, entrepreneurship, enterprise and wealth creation but
it is also in favour of greater social justice and it sees the state playing a major role in bringing this





              
           
         
 
    
 
            
            
                
           
            
               
              
               
 
             
                 
            
                
              
              
           
                                                          
             
             
        
                
                  
                 
            
                
          
      
                  
                 
                
             
intellectuals is that they are perceived as founders and the most prominent figures of
Neo-Eurasianism by many scholars. 191 Instead of making a new classification, this
common view will be applied to this part.
3.3.1. Lev Gumilev (1912-1992)
Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev was the son of Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova.
Nikolai Gumilev (1886-1921) was a very well-known poet, a traveller, an adventurer,
and an Officer of the Russian Imperial Army, who was shot by Bolsheviks in 1921. His
mother Anna Akhmatova was also a well-known poet. Gumilev, historian and
ethnologist of the Turkic nomadic world, managed to sustain his academic work,
although he spent a large part of his life (14 years) in GULags (Glavnoye Upravleniye
Lagerei - )192. He earned his fame toward the end of his
life and after his death, a university in Astana-Kazakhstan was named after him in 1996.
Following the demise of Classical Eurasianism, throughout the Soviet era there was no
active Eurasianist apart from Gumilev. It is fair to say that he is the main link between
classical Eurasianism and neo Eurasianism. Gumilev s works are more popular in Asia
than the Western World. The reason is that many of his articles were not translated into
other languages. Nonetheless, during the last two decades the demand for his works has
gathered momentum. Herein, it should be clarified that this momentum has given rise to
an acceleration of articles and books on Gumilev and his works.
191 For details see Tsygankov, A. P. Tsygankov, -Line Eurasianism and Russia Contending
Geopolitical East European Quarterly, 32 (1998), 315-334; C. Clover, of the
Eurasian 1999, pp. 9-13; Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism....
192 Gulag, the system of Soviet labour camps and accompanying detention and transit camps and prisons
that from the 1920s to the mid-1950s housed the political prisoners and criminals of the Soviet Union. At
its height the Gulag imprisoned millions of people. The name Gulag had been largely unknown in the
West until the publication of Aleksandr The Gulag Archipelago, 1918 1956 (1973),
whose title likens the labour camps scattered through the Soviet Union to an island chain. "Gulag."
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. dia Britannica Inc., 2014. Web.
Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249117/Gulag> [Accessed on 12/02/2014].
For further information on the Gulags see: E. Bacon, The Gulag at war: Stalin's forced labour system in
the light of the archives, (New York: New York University Press, 1994), P. R. Gregory, The Economics
of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), and L. Viola, The Lost




               
              
                
                
               
             
         
 
           
             
                
              
               
              
             
                 
             
            
             
      
 
              
             
             
             
             
       
                                                          
                
               
              
       
       
        
What makes Gumilev different and special is the content of his works. He did research
on the nomadic people of Central Asia and ethnos, respectively. His first book was
published in 1960, The Huns. And then The Old Turks (1967) and The Huns in China
(1974) can be taken as a trilogy. While he was dealing with the nomadic people of
Central Asia, at the same time he wrote three more books about Khazaria, Caspian and
the Mongols: The Discovery of Khazaria (1966), In Search of the Imaginary Kingdom
(1970), and One Thousand Years around the Caspian (1990).
Although Gumilev s professional training was in history and archaeology, he produced
a unique system of thought on ethnos and ethnogenesis a distinctive identity
formation process to be in the debate on the nature of ethnicity in the USSR
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.193 The quality and quantity of his studies on ethnos
increased after 1965 when his first article was published on this subject. And then from
the 1970s onward several articles were published by Gumilev on the theory of ethnicity
and ethnogenesis, although some of them remained unpublished due to being rejected. It
is fair to say that one of the reasons for these rejections was that some of Gumilev s
publications irritated important figures of his era such as Iulin Bromlei (1921-90) and
Viktor I. Kozlov (1924- ). 194 However, as mentioned before, Gumilev gained his
reputation during perestroika. Many of his books were republished and most of his
articles were published as collection books.195 
What can be said about Gumilev s ethnos concept is that it was idiosyncratic. His
perspective was that ethnos is a natural element of the biosphere 196 rather than
biological. And, landscape is rich regarding the diversity of ethnos. To emphasise the
naturality of ethnos, he claims that ethnos which changes its landscape is confronted
with re-adaptation, emigration or will perish. As an example of this confrontation, Italy
is a perfect match, according to Gumilev:
193 M. Bassin, Gumilev and Russian National Identity During and After the Soviet in
Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations, ed. by A.
S. Leoussi and S. Grosby (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 143-160, (p. 144).
194 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 53.
195 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 55.




            
        
           
           
         
 
              
                
              
              
               
           
 
           
            
             
          
            
     
 
            
             
           
               
             
                  
          
 
                                                          
        
        
             
      
       
         
All of the peoples who settled in Italy Eutruscans, Latins, Gauls,
Greeks, Syrians, Langobards, Arabs, Normans, Schwabians, and French
lost their former character (oblik) gradually, over two or three
generations and combined to form an Italian mass, a distinctive and
mosaic ethnos with specific character traits, behaviour, and structure. 197 
Although his theory argues that in the case of landscape change ethnos is confronted
with three options, Gumilev is in favour of necessity of living for all ethnos. In this
sense, he expresses There are no good reasons for advocating a policy of assimilation
and fusion...why should we try to squeeze the behaviour of an Abkhazian and a
Chukchii, a Lithuanian and a Moldavian into a single model? Why indeed seek to create
a planet Earth a single ethnos and a giant communal apartment? .198 
Apart from this ethnos approach, Gumilev developed a super-ethnos concept, according
to which through merging two or several ethnos geographically, a single super-ethnos
can be formed. In this sense, the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, together with
Mongol-Turkish people formed the Great-Russian super-ethnos199 . It is necessary to
repeat that in Gumilev s super-ethnos approach, this merge can only be geographically
without any assimilation or fusion.
Unlike Trubetskoy or Savitsky, Gumilev did not focus on Eurasianism or share
Eurasianist ideas. He even criticised them harshly and claimed that the founding fathers
lacked knowledge on the theory of ethnogenesis.200 Furthermore, unlike the founding
fathers, Gumilev s works were on the Huns and the Old Turkic Peoples not all nomadic
people of Eurasia. Nonetheless, especially in Kazakhstan, he is regarded as the last
Eurasianist . In an interview he also stated that they call me a Eurasian I do not reject
it. I accept the basic historical methodological theses of Eurasians .201 
197 Quoted in M. Bassin, p.148.
198 Quoted in M. Bassin, p.151.
199 Quoted in V. Yasmann, Religion: An Ideology of Neo-Messianic Russian
Demokratizatsiya, 1 (1993), 20-38, (p. 25).
200 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 58.




                
               
                  
             
                 
               
                   
                
                 
               
              
             
        
 
            
           
               
 
             
            
                
           
    
 
 
            
           
             
            
            
                                                          
         
       
         
                
                  
 
In fact, Gumilev cannot be blamed for not being a Eurasianist. He lived in a different
time and in different conditions and he did not need to produce an alternative state
model. He spent most of his life as a citizen of the USSR which was one of the
superpowers of the world, although the founding fathers lived in the Russian Empire
which was about the collapse. That is why they felt that they need to produce a model
which could embrace all people of Eurasia and become a leading power in the world.
Gumilev did not need to feel that way. If he had to feel that way, his only motive would
have been undemocratic conditions of the USSR, but he did not deal with this feature of
the USSR. On the other hand, with regard to his way of handling the concept of Eurasia
and Russia s identity, it is unequivocal that he is one of the supporters of Eurasianism.
According to Gumilev, Eurasia is the Great Steppe between the Yellow river and the
Arctic Ocean. 202 And like the founding fathers, he took into account that Eurasia
equates with the territory of the Soviet Union.203 
Regarding the history of Russia and its rivals, Gumilev s thoughts overlapped with
Classical Eurasianism. Like the Classical Eurasianists, Gumilev also regarded the West
as the most important enemy which Russia needs to get rid of. According to him;
The Turks and the Mongols can be genuine friends, but the English, the
French and the Germans, I am convinced, can only be cunning exploiters...
Let me tell you a secret: If Russia will be saved, then only as a Eurasian
power, and only through Eurasianism , because harm has always come to
us from the West .204 
He also thought that Mongols had special impacts on Russian statehood. Genghis
Khan s principles were embraced to build a successful state structure. What
distinguishes Gumilev from the founding fathers is his approach to religion. He thought
that Orthodox Christianity was one of the determinants which moulded the Russian
identity. And when the Golden Horde205 adopted Islam, Mongols lost their impact.
202 Quoted in M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 70.
203 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 70.
204 Quoted in M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 73.
205 Golden Horde, also called Kipchak Khanate, Russian designation for the Ulus Juchi, the western part




    
 
            
                
                 
             
            
   
 
              
            
           
             
           
                 
                  
      
 
             
           
                  
                
                                                                                                                                                                          
                 
                 
                
                 
         
       
    
                
             
               
              
         
       
3.3.2. Aleksandr Panarin (1940-2003)
Aleksandr Panarin was a Professor of Philosophy at Moscow State University until
2003 when he passed away. He was a prolific academic. In particular, during the last 10
years of his life, a myriad of books and articles were written by Panarin but none of
them were translated into English. That is why although Aleksandr Panarin is a well-
known Neo-Eurasianist thinker his reputation did not extend far beyond the boundaries
of Russia.
In contrast to Gumilev and Dugin, Panarin was a more liberal and centrist Eurasianist
and he had more respect for democracy and human rights.206 Furthermore, Laruelle
claims that many Russian scholars consider Panarin intellectually superior to Dugin.207 
Having embraced liberalist and democratic features, Panarin was still in favour of the
anti-globalisation movement. According to Panarin, the West was the exploiter of
human rights and a source of oppression. He was a believer that the USA is a potential
risk not only for Russia, but also for the rest of the world. The plans for a unipolar
world, therefore, must be prevented.
One of his main arguments was the condemnation of ethnic nationalism. He regarded
ethnicity as a production of Europe s pagan sentiment. Furthermore, Panarin considers
that ethnic separatism is a means to pave the way for a unipolar world which will be led
by the USA. For all of these reasons, he was in contradiction with Gumilev and his
people of the Golden Horde were a mixture of Turks and Mongols, with the latter generally constituting
the aristocracy. At its peak the Golden territory included most of European Russia from the Urals
to the Carpathian Mountains, extending east deep into Siberia. On the south the lands bordered
on the Black Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, and the Iranian territories of the Mongol dynasty known as
the Il-Khans. "Golden Horde." Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.
Britannica Inc., 2014. Web. Available from
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/237647/Golden-Horde> [12/02/2014]. For further
information about the Golden Horde and its Islamisation see: C. J. Halperin, Russia and The Golden
Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)
and D. DeeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba and Conversion
to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1994).
206 A. P. Tsygankov, -Line p. 331.




            
  
 
          
          
          
            
             
 
                
              
              
          
             
                 
               
                
  
 
               
            
             
              
                
                 
                
             
            
            
               
                                                          
         
                
          
       
ethnicism and in favour of pluralism. His work featured Eurasian pluralism and
indicated:
Europe upholds pluralism for individuals, but has a unitarian and
hegemonic approach to relations between nations. Eurasia is the exact
opposite of the European model; the absence of Western-type political
democracy s tantamount to the recognition of a right to autonomy for the
empire s regions and nations, a cult of the diversity of ways of life. 208 
Yet, he was a supporter of the Russian Empire. The reason why he espoused the Empire
approach is that from a Panarin perspective the Russian Empire could be an alternative
to globalisation. Besides, according to Panarin, being an empire is a natural right of
Russia. All in all, Panarin was relatively pro-democracy, pro-liberalism, pro-equality,
and pro-modernity, although he was an anti-globalist and anti-western. In his view, the
West has some good values but uses them for the benefit of itself not for humanity. For
example, according to him Modernity is not, in itself, a bad thing; but a sustained
attack on the value system of one s own civilisation can lead the way to horrors down
the road .209 
As for the Eurasianist views of Panarin, there is a differentiation between his views and
the founding fathers of Classical and Neo Eurasianism. Similar to the Classical
Eurasianists, Panarin argues that the true Russia was a combination of Orthodoxy and
Mongol statehood. He accepted, as do all Eurasianists, that the Turkic world is a
significant part of Russia. However, he accepted that view as long as the Turkic world is
an element of Russian identity, not for its own sake.210 That is why he claimed that there
are two Eurasianist projects; a northern one led by Russia and a southern one led by
Turkey. In this sense, he believed that another power s domination of Eurasia would
mean the death of Russia. Therefore, he was against the pan-Turkic ideologies.
According to Panarin, the Eurasian continent breathes like a single organism, and
preserves in its deep cultural memory the archetype of original unity. It is for this
208 Quoted in M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 97.
209 F. Matern, discourse of Civilization in the Works of New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev
and Alexander (Research Paper, York University, 2007), p. 28.




            
           
 
 
    
 
             
                 
          
           
             
          
             
              
           
        
 
 
                                                          
         
               
           
      
 
             
                 
             
                 
                    
                  
                
                
             
                
                 
              
  
precise reason that the southern, pan-Turkic project more and more actively conflicts
with the northern Eurasianist project, which is weakened by Russia s civilizational self-
denial .211 
3.3.3. Aleksandr Dugin (1962-Present)
Aleksandr Gel evich Dugin has been the leading figure of Eurasianist thought in Russia
over the last two decades. He was born in 1962 in Moscow. His family is known for
their closeness to Russian Military Services. His father, grandfather, and great-
grandfather worked for GRU (Russian Military Intelligence).212 In 1979, Dugin entered
the Moscow Aviation Institute, and then became an archivist in the secret KGB
(Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)213 archives. After that, he was a journalist
until becoming involved in politics. Dugin is probably the most prolific politologist on
Eurasianism. He has published over a dozen books and several articles. In addition to
these publications, he has also edited several journals: Elementy (1992-1998), Milyi
Angel (1991-1999), Evraziiskoe Vtorzhenie (2000), and Evraziiskoe Obozrenie (2001-
2004).
211 Quoted in M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 102-103.
212 J. Dunlop, Foundations of Working Paper Series on Russia and the
Former Soviet States, Lichtenstein Institute of Self-Determination at Princeton University, (2003).
Available from <http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/wp_russiaseries.html> [Accessed on
12/09/2009].
213 KGB, Russian in full Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, English Committee for State Security,
was the foreign intelligence and domestic security agency of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet era the
responsibilities included the protection of the political leadership, the supervision of
border troops, and the general surveillance of the population. Established in 1954, the KGB was the most
durable of a series of security agencies. The KGB was created in 1954 to serve as the and shield
of the Communist Party. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the KGB came under the
control of Russia. The government of Russian President Boris Yeltsin supervised the division of the KGB
into several major services responsible for internal security and foreign intelligence. At its peak the KGB
was the largest secret-police and foreign-intelligence organization in the world. Researchers with access
to Communist Party archives put the number of KGB personnel at more than 480,000, including 200,000
soldiers in the Border Guards. Estimates of the number of informers in the Soviet Union are incomplete





               
           
          
            
               
             
              
                  
          
 
              
           
             
               
           
 
              
            
              
            
            
        
           
 
               
          
             
           
            
                                                          
      
       
Aleksandr Dugin s life is full of controversies. In the early stage of his career Dugin
joined Pamiat. Pamiat was an anti-Semitic Russian nationalist organisation, headed by
photographer Dmitrii Vasil ev. 214 However, even Dugin himself could not bear
Pamiat s anti-Semitism and conservatism and after spending almost a year within this
organisation, he left it and strived to found his own institution. While he was dealing
with these institutions he got closer to the Communist Party. Moreover, the new
National Bolshevik Party (NBP) became a centrifugal power for Dugin. He even ran in
the Duma elections with the NBP in 1995. The result was a failure for him and it paved
the way for Dugin s departure from the NBP in 1998.
This became a landmark in Dugin s life. Between 1998 and 2000, he took up
chairmanship in the geopolitical section of Duma s Advisory Council on National
Security. Following Putin s election as President on 21 April 2001, Dugin initiated the
Evraziia movement and transformed it into a political party on 30 May 2001. Then it
was formalised as the International Eurasianist Movement on 20 November 2003.
With this party, Dugin himself has been transformed and become a patriotic liberal who
has embraced his traditionalist, national Bolshevik, and esoteric ideas under the same
rubric. His main aim has been to formulate and promote the national idea among
Russian elites and young Russians.215 Since the emergence of Classical Eurasianism, no
one embracing and theorising Eurasianism thought has achieved such a widespread and
influential movement. Currently, the International Eurasianist Movement has
participants from many countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Belarus etc.
With the help of this movement, Dugin is trying to reach countries that play an
important role in his Geopolitical Theories. Before explaining what Dugin s
geopolitical theories are, something needs to be mentioned here. With his most popular
book being The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia s Geopolitical Future (1997) Dugin
is influenced by the great geopoliticians such as Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Karl
214 J. Dunlop, p.2.




         
  
 
            
            
             
             
            
           
  
        
           
          
        
      
 
               
            
           
              
         
             
              
           
   
 
             
              
           
                 
                                                          
       
         
    
     
Haushofer (1869-1946), Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), and Sir Halford Mackinder
(1861-1947).216 
In this sense, Dugin divides the world into four civilizational zones/poles: the Anglo-
American zone, the Euro-African zone, the Pan-Eurasian zone, and the Pacific-Far East
zone. According to Dugin, these zones counterbalance each other. In fact, the reason
why Dugin proposes such a division is to prevent the globalisation process and
widespread Atlanticism as he perceives that the most important enemy of the nation-
states of the world is the USA. He describes globalisation as;
A one-dimensional, one-vector phenomenon that tries to universalise
the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best
manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and
violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic, religious,
217 and national structures into one system . 
With regard to the zones, the globalisation and the hegemony of Atlanticism can only be
halted and controlled by these zones. In the Anglo-American zone, the USA s
hegemony is unequivocal. And according to Dugin, both American continents will
form one common space oriented and controlled by the USA within the framework of
the Monroe Doctrine . 218 The Euro-African zone integrates North, Trans-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East, while the Pan-Eurasian zone consists of Russia, several
countries of the CIS, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Last but not least,
the Pacific-Far East zone includes China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines,
and Australia.
Once these zones are determined, Dugin claims that Russia should lead the Eurasianism
thought and establish several axes to deepen its relationships on the basis of preventing
globalisation and Atlanticism. In this regard, Dugin names the relationships between
Moscow and the countries which are located in Eurasia as axes. First of all, he is in
216 V. Yasmann, p. 22.
A. Dugin, Eurasian 2004, Available from




              
             
              
          
       
    
             
         
             
            
           
          
                                                          
    
     
favour of establishing a Moscow-Tehran axis which is in his mind able to create its own
organisational strategic model of the region. The second one is the Moscow-Delhi axis
which is important due to the diversity of Indian society and her economic potential.
Dugin regards the Moscow-Ankara axis as another significant relationship between
Russia and Turkey to complete the integration of Central Asia.
Figure 3.1: Dugin s Civilisational Zones/Poles219 
What forms the basis of Dugin s zones is his ethnopluralist approach. Whilst Dugin
dismisses ethnonationalism, he extols ethnopluralism. From Dugin s perspective, the
Russian nationalists are divided into two different groups. The first group consists of
Pan-Slavists and Monarchists which are regarded by Dugin himself as outdated. The
second group includes Eurasianists, Communists, and Prostatists who are the genuine
nationalists that care about the future.220 From this ethnopluralist perspective, Dugin
219 A. Dugin, Eurasian
220 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 128.
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makes a separation between different Jewish groups. According to this separation,
Jewish people who prefer to live in Russia are bad221, while the ones who migrate to 
Russia are good. That is why Dugin seeks an opportunity to develop relationships with
the state of Israel to enable all Jews to live in Israel.
Figure 3.2: Dugin s Spaces222 
On the one hand, after sorting out the Jewish problem, Dugin upholds embodying a
Eurasian Union in the Russian Federation. And recentralisation of the Federation is the
only way to prevent any nationalist separation.223 On the other hand, Dugin does not
221 M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism..., p. 136. texts, the distinction is different. The
Jews are the citizens of Israel, as well as those who choose to leave for Israel, because this act signals
their awareness of their irreducible Jewish specificity. The Jews are those who continue to live in 
the diaspora and try to be assimilated by the surrounding cultures, be it in the Atlanticist or the post-
Soviet
222 A. Dugin, Eurasian
223 M. Laruelle, Dugin: A View on Chechnya and the North North
Caucasus Weekly, 8:6 (2007), Available from




            
               
         
 
                
            
                
               
          
              
 
 
      
 
               
              
                
               
            
              
     
 
              
          
            
             
             
               
                                                          
          
             
      
       
believe in the likelihood of any clash between civilisations. While Brzezinski supports
the idea that civilisations are in a state of conflict, Dugin thinks that a Russia-led
Eurasia and the USA-led West are destined to clash.224 
What Dugin has left unanswered is that whilst he is building the pillars of a potential
Eurasian Union, he does not propose any economic perspective which enables this
union to be long-lived. It is obvious that he has been influenced by the European Union
model, but in return, he has not produced or promoted any economic motives for this
proposed Union. He only approaches this Union from the cultural-geopolitical
perspective. This is one of the drawbacks of the proposed Union and harms its
credibility.
3.4. Comparison of Eurasianism with Pan-Slavism
Eurasia is the largest continent in the world. It therefore attracts the attention of states
who want to dominate the globe. According to Brzezinski about 75 percent of the
world s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world s physical wealth is there as well,
both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of
the world s GNP and about three-fourths of the world s known energy resources .225 
That is why Brzezinski follows that the USA is destined to control the Eurasian
continent for its global hegemony.226 
This is one of the reasons why a myriad of Pan-nationalist movements have emerged
across the continent. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism are some of
them. Fundamentally, Eurasianism is also a kind of pan-nationalist movement and in
terms of its sphere of influence, this school of thought overlaps with Pan-Slavism.
Although the main objectives put forward by the forefathers of Pan-Slavism are sui
generis, Eurasianism and Pan-Slavism have a lot in common. In this part of the chapter,
224 D. V. Shlapentokh, Foreign Policy and 2005.
225 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New
York: The Perseus Books Group, 1998).




           
              
         
     
 
     
 
               
             
             
                 
               
             
           
           
             
              
          
       
 
              
  
 
          
           
          
         
            
            
 
 
               
           
                                                          
         
in the name of comprehending these commonalities and also differences, Eurasianism
will be briefly compared with Pan-Slavism. In doing so, four variables will be used:
theoretical approach, open-closed nationalism dichotomy, characterisation of a potential
union, and philosophy of territory.
3.4.1. An Outline of Pan-Nationalism
The roots of the concept of Nationalism date back to the 16th century. However, the
contemporary concept was not refined during the emergence of the modern state until
the 18th century. Nationalism was shaped throughout the second part of the 18th 
century. That is why in Europe, the 19th century is called the age of nationalism. In this
sense, the French Revolution is a landmark in terms of being produced and being the
spread of nationalistic ideas. From that time onwards, the concept of Nationalism has
been developed and been separated into several branches. Ethnic nationalism, Civic
nationalism, Cultural nationalism, and Pan-nationalism are some of them. Explaining all
branches within this chapter s framework is not possible. Instead, this chapter will focus
on Pan-nationalism and in the same vein Pan-movements. But, before doing that, for a
better clarification and understanding of Pan-nationalism, the meaning of Nationalism
and its resonances will be elucidated.
First of all, the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines the concept of nationalism as
follows:
Sentiment, aspiration, and consciousness are all terms applied to what
constitutes nationalism, or the valuation of the nation-state above all else.
However, it also entails certain assumptions about the will to self-
determination, the existence and indeed desirability of diversity, the
superiority of the sovereign state over other forms of rule, and the
centrality of national loyalty to political power as a basic form of
legitimation .227 
In this respect the concept of nationalism resonates the attitudes and the actions of a
nation when they are being self-aware of their identities and fulfilling self-




             
             
               
                 
               
        
 
            
           
             
              
             
            
             
 
                
             
             
           
             
      
 
             
              
            
            
                                                          
               
               
           
    
             
                 
         
determination. On the grounds of nationalism there is the sentiment of belonging. When
several components which are settled in a country realise that they have distinctive
specifications from the rest of the components, the likelihood is that the traces of an
uproar will emerge. If a government of a state does not sooth this unrest, these kinds of
troubles may be transformed into secession. In one sense, this is the natural process and
there is no way to avoid it.
Generally speaking, humans have an inclination to being independent; they want to
control their own resources, govern themselves, instead of being governed by
exogenous factors. They want to decide their own destiny, have their own homeland,
culture, and tradition. They are disposed to transfer their own specifications to the next
generations. To succeed in that they need to survive without being assimilated otherwise
all these desires become meaningless.228 The sentiment of nationalism exactly at this
point comes out and is ramified. Pan-nationalism is one of these ramifications.
In this sense, it is worth mentioning that pan-nationalism is a wide type of a present-day
nationalism. The idea of pan-nationalism is that national groups may participate in or
even be subsumed under, a higher unity based upon ethnic, religious, geographical, or
other common features .229 Briefly, pan-nationalism can be perceived as an expansion
of local nationalism on the one hand; and it can be comprehended as diaspora
nationalism on the other.
From the etymological perspective, the word pan meant the whole of something in
ancient Greece, which aims to unite all the people who share the same geography,
language, race, or religion.230 In this respect, pan-nationalism transcends the concepts of
nation and nationality . In addition, Hans Kohn who divided nationalism into eastern
228 J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, Nationalism, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); A.
D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism,
(London: Routledge, 1998); U. Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical
Engagement, (London: Palgrave, 2005).
229 I. Adams, Political Ideology Today, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 94.
230 F. Kazemzadeh, in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XI, ed. by David L.




             
      
            
        
 
        
 
             
           
              
              
            
       
 
            
             
            
             
           
 
 
                
              
               
              
                
             
              
            
                                                          
                 
   
               
           
                  
      
      
type and western type asserts that pan-nationalism is an eastern type of nationalism.231 
Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and
Pan-Turanianism are some of the eminent samples of pan-nationalist movements. In this
essay, one of them, Pan-Slavism will be analysed.
3.4.2. Pan-Slavism: A Dream of a Slavic Union
Pan-Slavism was one of the oldest movements, growing in Europe especially within the
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. It emerged after the Crimean War (1853-1856)
and had two forms. The first form arose among the Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats,
Bulgars, Poles, and Ukrainians. However it failed as they could not find any common
ground.232 Kazemzadeh s argument to explain why the first form was unsuccessful is
the geopolitical conjuncture of the international relations:
Austrian Slavs tended to be loyal to the Hapsburg multinational state, to
fear both the Germans and the Russians, and to have but little concern
for the liberation of Ottoman Slavs. The Poles saw their principal enemy
in Russia and sought support against the tsar, while the Serbs and the
Bulgars looked to St. Petersburg for help in overthrowing the Turkish
233 yoke . 
As for the second form, the main impetus was to unite all Slavic people under the
umbrella of Russia. In this form, Russia was the dominant power and Pan-Slavism was
used for the benefit of it. Chronologically, as a nationalist idea, the movement came out
at the 1848 Prague Congress in which many Slav envoys were represented. The year
1856 was a turning point in terms of European Slav leadership. The defeat of Russia in
the Crimean War altered the approach to pan-Slavism among the Russian scholars. This
alteration of Russian politicians and intellectuals gave rise to a conference in Moscow in
1867. Henceforward, the Russians, who thought that by means of strengthening the
231 H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background, (New York: MacMillan
Company, 1944), p.
232 R. Robertson, Nationalism, globalization, and orthodoxy: the social origins of ethnic conflict in the
Balkans, (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), pp. 77-81; J. Milojkovic-Djuric, Panslavism
and national identity in Russia and in the Balkans, 1830-1880: images of the self and others, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 54-95.




               
             
             
         
 
            
           
         
        
          
         
         
         
         
           
 
           
            
           
           
               
                 
                
               
               
        
 
                                                          
                  
           
     
                
                
                
           
Slavic identity they could seize all the lands on which the Slavs live, including the
Aegean Sea and Constantinople (Istanbul), started to lead the movement.234 That is why
it turned into Russian nationalism and substantially lost its effect on Slavs. Although
Pan-Slavism experienced this evolution, it was still a failure.
From different countries, many scholars moulded the movement; among the Czechs and
Slovaks, a Slovak Protestant minister Jan Kollar (1793-1852), Pavel Josef Safarik
(1795-1861), Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876), Ludevit Stur (1815-1856); among the
Poles, Stanislav Statiscg (1773-1866), Bronislav Tretowski (1808-1869), Adam
Mackiewich (1789-1866); among the Illyrian Slavs, Stanko Vras (1810-1851), Valentin
Vodnik (1758-1819), Ljudant Gaj (1809-1872); among the Ukrainians, Ivan
Kontyerevski (1769-1838), Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861); among the Russians, Peter
J. Cadayev (1794-1856), Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin (1800-1875), Fyodor Ivanovich
Tyuchev (1803-1875), Nikolai Danilevskii (1822-1885).235 All these people believed
that they had a common cultural heritage.
All in all, Pan-Slavism had three main aims; self-determination and independence,
sustaining superiority of Slavic people over non-Slavic people, and establishing a Slavic
Union. By and large, the self-determination and independence of Slavs were
accomplished after the demise of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Nevertheless,
Pan-Slavism never achieved the rest of the aims as Slavs had been deprived of a
common ground. It is fair to say that pan-Slavism was not a down to earth idea, like
most of the other Pan movements. On the one hand, in order to materialise the unity,
pan-Slavists must have grappled with the states in which Slav people were settled and it
was not even close to the reality. On the other hand, it was a movement which
stimulated the Slav nationalism and influenced other pan-isms.
234 I. Adams, Political Ideology...; C. W. Crawley and J. P. T. Bury, The New Cambridge Modern History
1793-1830, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); A. S. Leoussi, Encyclopaedia of
Nationalism, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2001).
235 S. Kostya, Pan-Slavism, (Astor: Danuian Press, 1981), p. 5; M. Laruelle, Orient in Russian
Thought at the Turn of the in Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on
Eurasianism, ed. by Dmitry Shlapentokh, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 9 37; C. C. Hodge, Encyclopaedia




              
           
           
        
              
             
              
             
             
             
               
     
 
          
            
              
           
           
          
             
        
 
           
 
 
               
             
             
            
                                                          
                  
       
In this sense, Eurasianism has several commonalities with Pan-Slavism. It is true to say
that Pan-Slavism was also inspirational for early Eurasianists, albeit showing some
divergences; such as territory and characterisation. Both schools have a slightly
different philosophy on territory. Eurasianists, fundamentally, embrace what Pan-
Slavists put forward regarding the territory of a Slavic Union and broaden the borders
toward the regions of Mongols and Turks. Another divergence is the characterisation of
a Eurasian Union. Pan-Slavists were strict with the ethnic roots. According to them, a
Slavic Union must consist of only people who have Slavic roots. However, the
characterisation issue has been moved to the next stage by Eurasianists and now
includes Mongols and Turks. Thus, the importance of Mongols and Turks is emphasised
and it is pointed out that without their contribution the Russian Empire and the Soviet
Union would not exist.
Last but not least, another important divergence is open-closed nationalism 
dichotomy. From the perspective of the open-closed nationalism dichotomy, it is fair
to say that unlike Pan-Slavism, Eurasianism is an open nationalism. In the name of
clarifying the open nationalism, Whitman s analysis must be applied. According to
this analysis, open nationalism represents the more modern form, while closed 
nationalism stresses the nation s autochthonous character, the common origins (race,
blood) and rootedness in the ancestral soil.236 That is why Eurasianism is unequivocally
an open nationalism although Pan-Slavism is closed nationalism.
3.5. From Russian Eurasianism to Turkish Eurasianism: A Digression from the
Mainstream?
As it is noted earlier, when Classical Eurasianism was put together in the beginning of
20th century, it did not have any influence among Turkish intelligentsia. first
meet with the Eurasianism ideology was around the 1990s when the USSR collapsed
and new Turkic states emerged. To understand why Classical Eurasianism could not
236 H. Kohn, in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XI, ed. by David L. Shills, (New




               
      
 
          
     
 
              
            
              
            
            
              
                
              
              
              
          
        
 
              
            
             
               
             
             
                 
     
 
                  
            
                                                          
       
    
penetrate into Turkey, it is needed to have a close look at the relationships between
Turkey and Russia since the beginning.
3.5.1. Relationships with Russia: An Eternal Enemy or A
Neighbour at the Door?
The relations between the two Empires Ottoman and Russian , which had European
and Asian characteristics, date back to 1492.237 Those relations were mostly strained
and even antagonistic due to power struggle between both empires. The reason for the
struggle is the inclination of broadening their borders to include European territories.
And this inclination eventually caused several clashes between the two Empires since
late 1500s. In course of time, the relations transformed as the two Empires transformed,
as well. Toward the end of the 19th century when the Czar Nicholas I of Russia
described the Ottoman Empire as sick man of the power of Ottoman
Empire started to decline, significantly and in 1923, the Republic of Turkey emerged as
the successor state. On the other hand, the Russian Empire also transformed into the
Russian Provisional Government (1917-1922), then The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (1922-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991-present), respectively.
As for the rapprochement, the recognition of the Republic of Turkey by the Soviet
Union during the Turkish War of Liberation was the first attempt. Another
rapprochement between the sides was the Soviet gold and armaments supply to
Turkey during the same war. However, the following days did not cause to improve the
relations between the two states due to the Soviet unacceptable desires on
Turkey such as to control both Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits. Besides, the relations,
from time to time, got strained further due to the emergence of the Cold War until the
demise of the Soviet Union.
In this climate, it is logical to claim that there are two main reasons for Turkey not to
embrace Classical Eurasianism. First one is that Classical Eurasianism was a rejection
Political Relations with Russian http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-





           
               
             
               
           
 
                
              
          
             
             
                  
           
            
         
 
           
           
            
             
             
      
 
              
            
          
               
                
            
 
                                                          
                
         
         
of Western-oriented ideologies and an acknowledgement of the superiority of Russian
history and culture against the West. In this sense, for Classical Eurasianists, it was a
panacea for the decline of Russian Empire. The second reason was that Classical
Eurasianism was produced to save the Russian Empire or in other words to build a new
motherland to encompass diverse peoples who dwell on the Eurasian landmass.
Based on two reasons, it is safe to say that there was a perception among Turkish
intellectuals towards the ideology that had no good for Turkey as both states were
seeing each other as rivals despite the aforementioned rapprochements. The
establishment of Turkish Communist Party would be a proper example to explain the
circumstances in Turkey during the early days of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal At 
was the one who instructed to set up a communist party on 18 October 1920 in order to
secure Bolshevik help against the Western Allies. However, the rationale behind
Mustafa communist party move was tactical. That tactical approach would be
clearly seen in a telegram to Ali Fuat Pasha:
... that this movement [communism] was being diffused in our country
from internal and external sources and aiming at various goals, and
unless necessary measures were taken, the peace and unity of the Turkish
people would be put in jeopardy. Thus it was concluded that the wisest
step would be to get some reasonable friends to form a communist party
under the guidance of the government.238 
Besides, the murder of the founder of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), Mustafa
Subhi and 14 leading Turkish communists was another indicator to explain the
perception in Turkey towards Russia-oriented ideologies. Although Mustafa Subhi and
his friends were invited to Turkey by Mustafa Kemal himself, they were forced to return
to the Soviet Union and then were murdered off the coast of Trabzon.239 By and large,
the conditions had not changed until the collapse of Soviet Union.
238 Quoted in B. Turkish Communist Party: The Fate of the Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 29 No. 2 (1993), pp. 220-235 (223).




          
   
 
             
               
              
             
           
             
                 
                
             
          
 
               
            
              
               
               
               
          
          
               
                                                          
                  
             
  
       
    
             
             
           
           
    
                  
        
3.5.2. Ideological Interaction as a Result of Rapprochement during the
Post-Cold War Era
The dissolution of the Soviet Union caused a thorough transformation of the relations.
From that time on, the mutual perception has changed from enemy state to rival regional
power in spite of conflicts of interests in the mutually shared areas of their near-
abroad.240 After the Cold War, the Russian Federation has, to some extent, embraced
several Western values such as democracy, market economy and etc. This
transformation has led to a mutual trust and good neighbourliness between two states.
As a consequence of this mutual trust, the first visit was paid by the then Prime Minister
of Turkey Mr S leyman Demirel in 1992 in order to sign "Treaty on the Principles of
Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation".241 This treaty is
the one which grounded the mutual respects between both sides.
The 1990s were an era when the relations were strained in terms of security issues,
while economic relations were improving.242 The concern was the former Soviet States
on which both sides had influence. In terms of this concern, approach was
based on ethnical, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and the
Caucasus. In this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to develop a
discourse Great Turkish World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of
Along with this discourse, Turkey envisioned expansive road, energy and
communication links with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. 243 Whereas
Russia was in favour of the status quo in Central Asia, Turkey was supporting a deep-
240 J. W. Walker, Grand Strategy in a "New Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, 28
February 2007.
241 Political Relations with Russian http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-
relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa, [Accessed on 20.12.2014].
242 B. D. Sezer, The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic
Part Rubin, Barry and i, Kemal (der.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging
Multiregional Power, (London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2001); B. D. Sezer, -Russian
Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Turkish
Studies, 1 (1), 59-82.
243 J. Finn et al., in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties, 1993-




                
            
           
               
           
  
            
              
             
            
         
              
             
             
          
             
       
 
            
               
            
             
              
              
              
    
 
               
            
                                                          
              
     
               
      
rooted change in the former Soviet States by the help of the United States of America.
And this confrontation was the principal issue caused tension between both sides.
However, after 1992 when Turkey recognised the Russian Federation, reciprocal high
level visits started and ease the tension between two states. In this respect, another Joint
Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism was issued in 1999.
The aforementioned visits continued and yielded new perspectives on the relations. On
November, 2001 the then Foreign Minister of Turkey Mr smail Cem and the then
Foreign Minister of Russia Mr Igor Ivanov signed the Action Plan for
Cooperation in . 244 With this Joint Action Plan, Turkey and the Russian
Federation upgraded their relations from bilateral relations to Multidimensional
Partnership. This plan was signed in the 9/11 environment. Both states was eager to
emphasise the importance of cooperation in Eurasia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Centre in New York, which also highlighted willingness to
form an international cooperation against international terrorism. By implementing this
plan, from now onward the two states added other dimensions to their economic-based
relations, such as security and politics.
The atmosphere between Moscow and Ankara was improved by this new level
partnership. And it had also an effect on economic relations. Since 2002, there is an
improving momentum in the bilateral economic partnership (see table 3.1). And by
2004, Russia had become second largest trade partner after Germany.245 As a
matter of fact, the personal relations between the then Prime Minister of Russia Mr
Vladimir Putin and the then Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan have been
effective in terms of deepening the bilateral relations. In this context, Putin recalls their
first meeting as follow:
He was not Prime Minister yet. He came to Moscow and told me about the
politics he will follow. He talked about his views regarding the outlawed
244 O. Aksoy, Turkish-Russian cooperation in Foreign Policy, the Foreign Policy Institute, Vol.
34 (3-4), pp. 162-165 (163).
245 S. and Russia: Partnership by Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.




            
               
             
           
             
         
 
          
 
                
               
           
             
 
             
            
            
         
                                                          
              
      
        
 
   
              
               
  
Kurdistan Party (PKK). I explained to him what the Chechen terrorists
do and asked for his support. He said Turkey will not give support to Chechen
terrorists. First, I could not believe it, because his former party (Refah) was
supporting the Chechens, even collecting and sending money here. However, it
surprisingly dawned a while later that Turkey indeed did not allow terrorists. For
this reason, I have a great confidence in Turkey246 .









1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey's Import Turkey's Export 
Although, this statement was made by Putin in 2007 in Sochi, Putin paid a visit to
Turkey on December 5-6, 2004. This was the first Presidential visit in the history of
Turkish-Russian relations since nominal head of state Nikolai Podgorny visited in
1972.248 The visit was the beginning of another era regarding the relationships.
During the visit in 2004, the Joint Declaration on the Intensification of
Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership was signed by the two states. With this
joint declaration, the relations of Turkey and the Russian Federation have gained
another dimension Multidimensional Besides the two states
246 Quoted in S. J. Flanagan, Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for US-Turkey
CSIS Report, March 2009, p. 64.
Statistics of the Undersecretary of Foreign Trade,
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detayrk&yayinID=1116&icerikID=1225&dil=TR,
[Accessed on 10.04.2011].
248 S. and V. Morkva Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Southeast European and





            
              
  
           
             
              
            
           
            
            
                
     
 
            
             
             
          
           
                 
             
 
               
              
              
             
                  
                 
                                                          
         
           
        
                
           
         
emphasised the trust and importance of deepening the relations between these two
Eurasian powers which are in favour of peace and stability in their neighbouring areas.
Subsequently, the reciprocal visits continued. Even Mr. K coined the year
2005 as annus mirabilis.249 During 2005, Putin and Erdogan met four times (December
2004, 10-13 January 2005, 17 July 2005, and 17 November 2005).250 All these visits
have reinforced the relations, which were mainly economic, and have gradually turned
them into multidimensional. In this sense, economic relations have been complemented
by political and security relations. For instance, Turkey has abandoned its expansionist
policies in favour of closer relations with Russia. In addition, military cooperation
between both states has been increased in order to sustain the peace and stability in the
Caucasus and Black Sea Area.251 
As c expressed that rivalry between Russia and Turkey in their
immediate regions seems to be a geopolitical fait accompli 252. However, the two actors
have managed to reconcile the geopolitical rivalry so far. It seems that this
reconciliation environment will last as long as new multi-dimensional
perspective and openness remain exist. The abandonment of visa regime
between Turkey and Russia as of April 16, 2011 is a solid evidence of that the two
states are in favour of improving the relations as much as they can.
Unlike the conditions of pre-war and cold war eras, the Post-Cold War era let both
states to build closer relationships. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union created an
ideological vacuum in the region. For some intellectuals it was the victory of Western
liberal democracy. For instance, Francis Fukuyama in his article The End of History
argues that What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is,
249 S. , and Russia: Partner p. 3.
250 M. elikpala, G rk-Rus Ili (Turkish-Russian Relations since 1990s),
Avrasya 13 (1), 267-298, (p. 286).
251 S. , -Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992- Turkish Studies, 7 (3), p. 345.
252 H. Geopolitics and Turkish Foreign Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe




            
             
             
         
 
             
           
          
            
           
          
           
      
  
               
             
            
                
            
          
              
             
           
 
           
             
 
 
            
           
           
                                                          
                 
              
  
  
           
the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government".253 Another argument for the
Post-Cold War era came from Samuel Huntington who proposed that the age of
ideology was over. Samuel argument was as follows:
is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will
be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world
affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations
will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be
the battle lines of the future.254 
These kinds of propositions were to fill in the ideological vacuum which the collapse of
the Soviet Union created. Besides, there were other counter propositions from the East.
Neo-Eurasianism has been one of them. This ideological understanding has been spread
over the neighbouring areas of the Soviet Union after the collapse. Yet, at first place it
was not welcomed by Turkish intelligentsia because of one of the progenitors,
Alexander Dugin s statements towards Turkey. During the 1990s, Dugin s approach
towards Turkey was hostile as he was arguing that Turkey was among the allied
countries of the Atlanticist bloc, led by the USA.255 However, this approach changed
around the 2000s and Dugin started to talk about Moscow-Ankara axis.
This rhetoric has triggered the embracement of Neo-Eurasianism in Turkey. Dugin
himself explains how some intellectual circles have gotten attracted to the ideology as
follows:
The idea of Eurasianism in Turkey took root first in the left-wing
environment The Workers Party of Turkey under the leadership of Mr.
Do u Perin ek, its organ the journal Ayd nl k and other institutions close
253 F. Fukuyama "The End of History?" The National Interest Vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18 (4)..
254 S. Huntington, Clash of Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, Available from <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations>, [Accessed
on 24.12.2014].




         
          
         
        
          
         
         
 
          
              
              
           
               
           
             
                 
           
 
            
             
             
            
             
              
                                                          
              
             
   
 
             
             
        
         
        
    
    
               
    
              
     
to them, accepted Eurasianism But also right-wing nationalists,
centrists, some religious circles, some military leaders of Turkish army,
intellectual foundations like the Ahmed Yesevi Foundation and ASAM
(Eurasian Strategic Research Centre), the Dialog Eurasia Platform 
movement, which tries to bring members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States and Turkish intellectuals closer together, and other
institutions or movements showed interest to this Eurasia concept. 256 
Herein, the embracement of Neo-Eurasianism needs further clarification. As Dugin
mentions that the new concept has found a space among some intellectual circles, the
rest of them have an inclination to identify Eurasianism with the East and its
underdeveloped institutions are despised by opponents.257 The West is associated with
democracy and development in the minds of many people in Turkey, while the East is
associated with backwardness and underdevelopment. From this point of view, this
same circles have tendency to consider Eurasianism as a shift from the traditional
Turkish foreign policy.258 In this sense, it is the same circles who allege that in any kind
of Eurasianist dream Turkey would stay in the shadow of Russia.
Having said that, this discriminatory approach is embraced by Turkish public opinion.
For instance, some of the intellectuals allege that Eurasianist mind-sets are being gotten
rid of through the Ergenekon259 trial to eliminate any Russian influence in intellectual
circles and to consolidate pro-American elements in Turkey.260 This tendency has been
concluded by means of examining the opinions of the Ergenekon trial defendants. For
example, some of those defendants are Tuncer K l n , a former General Secretary of the
256 Quoted in N. Devlet, Russian Eurasianism Meets Turkish On Turkey, The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, (2012), pp. 1-4 (2), Available from
<http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/devlet_eurasia_mar12.pdf>, [Accessed on
24.12.2014].
257 A. Bilici, Hayale Rus (Russian Sabotage the Ergenekonist Fantasy), Daily
Zaman, 24 September 2008; I. Strategies for Turkey: Eurasianism or
CACI Analyst, Available from <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/177> [Accessed on 20/05/2009].
258 S. lu, -Ottoman Project Syndicate, Available from <http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/kiniklioglu2/English>, [Accessed on 04/04/2011]; S. return
of Available from <http://www.suatkiniklioglu.org/en/my-today-s-zaman-column/the-
return-of-ottomanism.html>, [Accessed on 04/04/2011].
259 Ergenekon is a far-reaching investigation into the activities which was launched by
Turkish prosecutors in 2007.
260 I. Berkan, m 2009; C. D ndar, lar n Tasfiy 2009; I. ,




            
           
              
              
             
               
                
         
             
              
              
               
     
 
        
 
            
            
                
            
     
 
             
             
             
   
                                                          
              
              
     
National Security Council; retired General ener Eruygur, the former commander of the
Turkish Gendarmerie and current head of the Atat rk D nce Derne i (Association
for Atat rkist Thought or ADD), the largest NGO in the country with 448 branches
nationwide and a leading force behind the organization of mass public protests in spring
2007 against the AKP s plans to appoint Abdullah G l to the presidency; retired
General Hur it Tolon, who had served as commander first of the Third Army and then
the First Army of the Turkish Land Forces and all are very well known for their Anti-
American and Anti-AKP opinions.261 Furthermore, the discriminatory approach toward
Eurasianism thought has been experienced by the author of this thesis during the
preparation of this work too. For instance, while most of the interviewees were sceptical
and reluctant to be interviewed on the subject of Eurasianism as explained in the
methodology section, some of them rejected to get interviewed as they stated that it is
not worth talking about Eurasianism.
3.5.3. Comparison of Russian Eurasianism with Turkish Eurasianism
Although in some intellectual circles of Turkey the Eurasianism concept has been
welcomed, its new interpretations have been produced instead of accepting the ideology
as it was in Russia, as well. Without delving into the details as Turkish Eurasianism and
its discourses will be examined in Chapter V, Turkish Eurasianism s distinctive features
will be presented here, shortly:
Both Turkey and the Russian Federation are post-imperial states. In this sense,
while Russian Eurasianists claim back, at least, all the territories of the Soviet
Union, Turkish Eurasianists do not have any demand over all the territories of
the Ottoman Empire.
261 G. H. Jenkins, Fact and Fantasy: Ergenekon Silk Road Paper,
August 2009; H. A. - and the Ergenekon The Middle East




           
         
  
          
              
          
             
        
             
           
    
           
          
           
             




                
              
             
          
             
             
    
                                                          
                  
            
           
         
           
               
               
     
While Russian Eurasianists are the combination of communists and the ultra-
nationalists,262 Turkish Eurasianists consisted of the left-wing environment and
right-wing nationalists.
While Russian Eurasianists advocate balanced foreign policy understanding with
equal emphasis on Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East,263 one of the
discourses of Turkish Eurasianism (Nationalist Eurasianism264) is in favour of
turning Turkey s face to the East and making alliances with countries such as
Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and so on.
Turkish Eurasianism is far less politicised than Russian Eurasianism as it lacks
deep historical and theoretical roots comparing to other ideologies such as
Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism.265 
Although Russian Eurasianism has Alexander Dugin as its progenitor, Turkish
Eurasianism does not anyone like Dugin. That makes Turkish Eurasianism
vulnerable. As it is mentioned above, Classical Eurasianism died down because
of losing all of its ideological forefathers and eminent figures. In this regard,
Turkish Eurasianism would struggle with the same fate.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, first I tried to explain Classical Eurasianism by dividing it into four main
principles to make the theory understandable. In spite of all the endeavours, it remains
intangible. As Mark Bassin emphasises various incarnations were and are crafted to fit
highly differing political contexts and advance fundamentally different political and
ideological agendas, for which reason it is simply impossible to reduce Eurasianism in
any meaningful way to a common set of doctrinal denominators, however limited and
rudimentary .266 
262 O. and Russia in in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. By Lenore
G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (London: The MIT Press, 2004), p. 132.
263 O. and Russia in (2004), p. 132.
264 For further information please see section
265 M. Laruelle, Turkish Rapprochement 2008, (p. 9).
266 M. Bassin, and The Lines of in Beyond the Empire:
Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, ed. by M. Tetsuo, (Sapporo: Hokkaido University




           
              
             
            
           
             
              
 
           
                 
               
                
         
 
              
              
             
               
             
          
 
           
          
          
             
             
                                                          
              
     
      
            
   
Then, Neo-Eurasianism has been discussed from the perspective of its supporters.
Although it is complicated, the differences and similarities have been shown to give a
holistic approach. Both Classical and Neo Eurasianism describe the West as an imperial
hegemon which endlessly dominates over other ethnic groups by means of military,
economic and cultural enforcement. Whilst Classical Eurasianists aspired to carry out
the Eurasian unity which was lost during the demise of the Russian Empire, Neo-
Eurasianists aimed at almost the same unity during the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
According to Neo-Eurasianists, by means of globalisation, the Western civilisation has
launched a new world order which is against Russia. In this order Russia is no longer a
global player let alone a superpower. That is why Russia has felt humiliated by Western
civilisation. The only way for Russia to save itself from this trap is to reposition its
place within a Eurasian Union led by Russia itself.
This approach is embodied by Andrei Klimov s words: We have twice tried to take
western theories and apply them in Russia: Marxism and Liberalism. We must rely on
our own thinking and values now .267 Another example for this approach comes from
Sergei Guriev, head of the New Economic School in Moscow: There is a sense that
Gorbachev and Yeltsin integrated with the West and failed. Putin was anti-western and
worked well. By being anti-western, it seems, you live better .268 
Neo-Eurasianists pursue a Eurasian Union on the basis of cultural traditionalism,
statism, and modernisation. But this modernisation must be without westernisation.269 
That is a multinational and multiconfessional union which includes inhabitants of
Siberia, the Far East, Volga, and the Northern Caucasus. These people accept Russian
hegemony in exchange for respect of their national traditions and the maintenance of
267 J. Thornhill, Russia United by Anti- Financial Times, 3 February 2009, Available
from <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1dc2a2e8-f213-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac.html> [Accessed on 14/02/2009].
268 J. Thornhill, Russia





              
           
 
               
               
           
 
 
             
              
                 
            
           
               
               
          
            
               
       
 
           
            
          
               
           
           
           
              
                                                          
      
       
        
interethnic peace.270 As for the economy, it should be dominated by super cartels to
ensure that they will complement rather than compete with one another.271 
In the second part of the chapter, I compared the Eurasianism thought with a similar
school of thought, Pan-Slavism so that the reader can easily figure out what kind of
features Eurasianism tries to expose and the differences between Eurasianism and Pan-
Slavism.
In this sense, one of the main differences of Eurasianism from the aforementioned Pan-
Slavism is, in contrast to John Stuart Mill s criticism toward the idea of nationalism,
that by and large it gives an undertaking to national groups that race and religion are not
determinants on this thought. Having made a criticism toward nationalism, John Stuart
Mill paves the way for comprehending Eurasianism s diversifying trait. Mill advocates
that nationalism makes men indifferent to the rights and interests of any portion of the
human species save that which is called by the same name, and speaks the same
language, as themselves . 272 Conversely, from the perspective of supporters of
Eurasianism, this thought is against any assimilation process. Every national group has
the right to save their religions, cultures, traditions, and so on. Any obstacle to prevent
them from continuing should be suppressed.
Another difference is regarding interpretation. Eurasianism is more able to be
interpreted in different ways by intellectuals and scholars than Pan-Slavism. By and
large, Pan-Slavism delineates their borders, although the protagonists of Eurasianism
are not agreed on several issues such as religion and borders. While some of them
approach Eurasianism thought on a religious basis and promote an anti-Catholic
perspective, some intellectuals choose to ignore that perspective. Therefore, it seems
paradoxical. However, Pan-Slavism explicitly points out its choice of religion by
dreaming an Orthodox Slavic Union. As for the borders of Eurasia or the Eurasian
270 M. Laruelle, - p.1.
271 V. Bilenkin, Ideology of




               
           
 
             
           
               
            
               
     
 
                
             
           
     
              
           
 
         
            
             
           
             
              
              
             
          
     
 
            
              
             
            
Union, this issue has not been made clear so far. Even Dugin himself was inconsistent
regarding Turkey s place in the Eurasian Union until recently.
It is worth saying that pan-Slavism may be a destabilising and destructive doctrine.
Nevertheless, it should not be perceived from one angle. Pan-Slavism is multi-
dimensional and it has a pure and honest impetus in its background despite its own
ambitions. For instance, pan-Slavists anticipated that Slav peoples would live in peace
under the auspices of Russia and of course for the reason that the Russian state would
be a super power.
To sum up, human beings have motives of welfare and power. In this respect, by means
of an organisation, institution or establishment, they have tried to reach these aims
through the concepts of ethnicity, nation, nation-state, nationalism etc. Many examples,
Pan-Americanism, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-
Turkism, and so on can be given. However, the majority of these movements have
failed; indeed, Pan-Europeanism might be regarded as the most successful example.
Lastly, Turkish Eurasianism has been briefly analysed and Russian Eurasianism s
influence in Turkey has been examined. The first version of Russian Eurasianism,
called Classic Eurasianism had no influence in Turkey during the 1920s as relations
between Russia and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) were mostly strained and even
antagonistic due to power struggle between both parties. first meet with the
Eurasianism ideology was around the 1990s when new Turkic states emerged as a result
of the collapse of the USSR and the rapprochement in Turkish-Russian relations in the
late 1990s. Since then, Neo-Eurasianism has found a proper environment to flourish in
Turkey, in particular firstly among left-wing environment and then right-wing
nationalists, centrists, some religious circles.
While Neo-Eurasianism has influenced these circles, they did not embrace the ideology
as it is in Russia. It has been transformed into Turkish Eurasianism with various
discourses which will be detailed in Chapter V. Yet, this chapter compared Russian




            
































which both concepts differ from each other such as geopolitical approach, leadership,
foreign policy understanding, historical and theoretical roots, and supporters.
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
SINCE THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA
T. Judt273 
4.1. Introduction
Turkey is a successor state to the Ottoman Empire, one of the largest and longest
Empires in history.274 Yet, the Empire was never accepted as equal to the Western
powers even though it was part of the Concert of Europe. From cultural and political
perspectives, the Ottoman Empire was perceived by some of the European powers as a
danger to the community of Europe and was not sharing certain values and norms such
as Christianity and Europeanness. It might be said that present-day Turkey has also
been experiencing similar identity problems. This is one of the main impetuses which
273 Quoted in T. Judt, Post-war: A History of Europe since , (London: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 
830. 
274 Ottoman Empire was created by Turkish tribes in Anatolia. One of the most powerful states in the 
world during the 15th and 16th centuries, it spanned more than 600 years and came to an end only in 
1922, when it was replaced by the Turkish Republic and various successor states in southeastern 
Europe and the Middle East. At its height the empire included most of southeastern Europe to the gates of 
Vienna, including modern Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Romania, Greece, and Ukraine; Iraq, Syria, Israel 
and Egypt; North Africa as far west as Algeria; and most of the Arabian Peninsula. The term Ottoman is a 
dynastic appellation derived from Osman, the nomadic Turkmen chief who founded both the dynasty and 
the empire. For more on the Ottoman Empire see Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]. B. 
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); H. The 
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); S. J. Shaw 
and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, 2 Volumes, (Cambridge: Cambridge 




                 
             
              
             
                
                  
     
 
                 
              
            
               
                
              
                 
             
          
             
              
               
            
             
              
                                                          
                  
                   
                 
              
                  
                  
                
                
      
                 
                
               
 
leads Turkey to strive to become one of the regional powers in order to cope with those
problems and to become an indispensable ally to the Western countries, especially the
United States of America (USA). Although Turkey stands at the crossroads of Asia and
Europe and this geographical positioning highlights its desire to become one of the
regional powers, since the late Ottoman era Turkey has not been able to turn into a
genuine world power. It is put forward that one of the reasons is that Turkey has not had
an independent Grand Strategy.
Since the late Ottoman Era, Turkey has turned its face toward the West275 as it has been
perceived as the source of modernity. Over time, a number of fundamental and strategic
changes within the international political system necessitated this turn, such as Italian
fascism, Nazism, Cold War, etc. However, in the words of the founder of the Republic
of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atat rk, the principal aim for this turn was to catch up with
the modernity of the West. Even though to some extent, Turkey has managed to
modernise itself and caught up with the West, it remained a small power until the end of
the 1990s. In 1999, Turkey s accession to the G-20, whose membership consists of
systematically important advanced and emerging economies representing all regions of
the globe, was a significant development to being among the top twenty important
states. Along with the AKP s active Foreign Policy Course after 2002, it might be
alleged that Turkey has become considered one of the middle powers. There once was a
barrier around Turkey with Soviet Communism and then it became a bridge 
between Europe and the Middle East, even Central Asia.276 Recently, Turkey has been
often cited as an exemplary model for Muslim countries. 277 In this context, it is
275 From perception, it is safe to say that the West was Western Europe, mainly Great Britain
and France, until World War II and after that it stands for the United States rather than Western Europe.
276 For further information on the rhetorics of bridge or barrier roles please see: Z.
and Post-Soviet States: Potential And Limits of Regional Power Middle East Review
of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Summer 2001), pp. 66-74; I. O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey
and the West after the Cold War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); G. E. Fuller, The New Turkish
Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, (Washington, DC, United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2008); A. l, Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Third World Quarterly, Vol.
30, No. 4, 2009, pp. 795-811.
277 A. M. Rabasa and F. S. Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, (California: RAND
Corporation, 2008), p. 83: S. Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds, (New York, Farrar,




            
           
          
        
 
             
             
            
              
          
              
           
               
             
              
              
                 
             
             
                                                                                                                                                                          
                
                 
         
               
              
                
              
             
            
    
              
      
     
           
     
            
        
   
unequivocal that Turkish Foreign Policy has experienced a major change since 2002.
While some scholars have welcomed this process and called it Multi-Dimensional
Foreign Policy 278 ; others have criticised and labelled it Neo-Ottomanist Foreign
Policy the revival of Turkey s Ottoman grandeur.279 
From the Turkish Foreign Policy perspective, the year 2002 is a milestone. Although
Former Foreign Minister smail Cem made great efforts to improve the relations with
the neighbouring countries such as Greece, Turkey was largely isolated in its
neighbourhood and had highly limited power nor a role to play before 2002. However,
after 2002, Turkey s Foreign Policy understanding and implementation have gradually
changed with the then Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large
Professor Ahmet Davuto lu s zero problems with neighbours policy. Since that time,
Turkey has, time to time, shown some eagerness to play a significant role to mediate
conflicts in the neighbourhood as well. What is more, the Turkish Foreign Policy
horizon has been broadened by plans to open 15 new embassies in Africa, almost
doubling its diplomatic presence in the continent, and two in Latin America. It would
not be wrong to claim that Turkey has to a large extent, realised its potential since 2002.
Even though the zero problems with neighbours policy has not met with much
concrete success in the name of developing good relations with all the neighbouring
Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold Geopolitics, Vol. 14,
No. 3, p. 531-549 (544); F. S. Larrabee, Troubled Partnership : U.S. Turkish Relations in an Era of
Global Geopolitical Change, (California: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 45
278 A. Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Turkish Studies,
Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 103-123; E. F. Keyman, Globalization and Democratization in
Turkey: The AKP Experience and its Constellations, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 312 327; S. A.
D zgit and N. Tocci, Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for Regional Leadership and
Europeanisation, CEPS Commentaries, 12 November 2009. [Policy Paper]; B. Aras, Era in
Turkish Foreign SETA Policy Brief, No. 32, May 2009, Available from
<http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/7710.pdf> [Accessed on 20/11/2011].
279 Onar, N. F. Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign , EDAM Discussion
Paper Series, October 2009, Available from
<http://209.200.80.89//doc/Discussion%20Paper%20Series_Fisher.pdf> [Accessed on 20/11/2011];
Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, Carnegie Paper,
September 2008, Available from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf>
[Accessed on 20/11/2011]; M. Rubin, Sides? The Problems of Neo- , National





               
            
             
            
    
 
               
            
              
               
              
              
                
               
    
 
            
 
            
             
                 
             
             
                 
               
                                                          
                
              
       
 
                
            
 
countries, it might be claimed that Turkey has aimed to transform into a state which
contributes to stability and peace and takes initiatives to mediate long-standing conflicts
in its neighbouring area. Turkey s endeavours to set up a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform (CSCP) after the Russo-Georgian Conflict might be given as an
example for its transformation.280 
In this chapter, Turkey s foreign policy course will be analysed in the light of the
historical background. In this regard, the Turkish Foreign Policy course and changes
will be examined over three different time periods. In the first period, Turkish foreign
policy during the first decades of the Turkish Republic will be handled. While in the
second period the Cold War era s effects on Turkish foreign policy are presented; the
third period will first discuss New World Order and the tenets of Turkish foreign
policy during the post-Cold War era. And then, it will analyse the AKP era after 2002
and investigate whether it really has a Neo-Ottomanist way of thinking or just pursues a
pro-activist foreign policy course.
4.2. New Republic's Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace in the world
The great European powers France, Britain, Russia, Germany, and Austria
dominated the 19th century. These powers were unrivalled in building a hegemonic 
position across the World. Yet, their own hegemonic position depended on the balance
of power among them. Any action from one of the powers would lead to an act of
retaliation. Towards 1914, the rivalry and the relationship between the great powers got
worse. Besides, this rivalry created the emergence of alliances among the powers and
paved the way for World War I in 1914. The cataclysm gave rise to the destruction of
the balance of power system and the development of a bipolar system. Along with the
280 For further information on CSCP and some examples of contributions to peace and stability
please see. G. Winrow, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and Diverging Briefing
Paper, Chatham House, November 2009, Available from
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Europe/bp1109turkey.pdf,
[Accessed on 24.12.2014]; R. Bayer & E. F. Keyman, An Emerging Hub of Globalization and





            
             
            
 
            
              
                
             
              
               
            
             
            
             
              
         
       
 
           
          
             
            
             
            
             
       
             
           
                                                          
             
               
        
     
          
rise of Nazi Germany the international political system transformed into a quasi-bipolar
system, similar to that of 1890 1914.281 A while later the international system was
reshaped by another cataclysm, World War II, which cost millions of lives.
While the international system was experiencing such turmoil, Turkey emerged as a
successor state to the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. Despite the Ottoman Empire
being divided when it was defeated in World War I, Turkey managed to win its national
liberation war and was established on 29 October 1923. The founder, Mustafa Kemal
Atat rk, and his colleagues struggled to establish a nation-state on the ruins of the
Ottoman Empire as they learnt from the experiences of the former Sultans and rulers of
the Empire. These experiences and ideological prejudices led Atat rk to separate the
New Republic from Middle Eastern affairs and focus on European affairs. According to
Atat rk, it was compelling to do so because of Turkey s unique inter-continental
geography between East and West. In his mind, while the West represented modernity,
the East was identified with backwardness. In this sense, three tenets of the new
Republic s foreign policy can be identified; Non-alignment/Non-involvement, Peace at
Home, Peace in the World, and Westernisation/Modernization.
During the Atat rk era, Turkey s foreign policy course was based on non-
alignment/non-involvement. Atat rk believed that Turkey was a war-torn country which
was in need of building territorial integrity and political independence.282 That is why
Atat rk avoided any interference with the neighbouring countries. A good example of
this was the new Republic s approach toward the upheavals in Morocco between 1924
and 1925, during which Turkey ignored the Moroccan independence movement in order
to sustain good relations with France and Spain, although there were some resemblances
with Turkey s own independence movement. 283 Indeed, this non-alignment/non-
involvement can be considered as status quo-ism. On this basis, the newly founded
Republic aimed to maintain national borders and structural values (progressivism and
281 W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 3.
282 B. Crisis, Foreign Policy toward the Middle Middle East Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1997, Available from <http://www.gloria-center.org/1997/01/criss-and-bilgin-
1997-01-03/>, [Accessed on 07/08/2013].




             
            
            
             
               
           
                  
 
 
               
              
             
              
            
                
             
              
               
            
                                                          
             
             
         
              
        
        
             
             
                  
                
              
        
                   
              
                 
                
        
secularism). In this regard, this foreign policy understanding was in need of another
rhetoric, the internal and external threat construction. The stereotypes derived from this
construction, for instance, generated a belief that Turkey was encircled by enemies
(Greece, Syria, Bulgaria, and Russia -USSR-) willing to break the country apart. This
alleged menace was perhaps due to internal disunity and clashes mainly in terms of the
ethnicity and religion/secularism. Keeping relations with the Muslim countries to a
minimum level was in line with this as well and aimed not to let Islamism sneak into the
country.284 
Another tenet of Turkish foreign policy in the Atat rk era was the principle Peace at
Home, Peace in the World. Atat rk was entirely attached to this principle by following
a peaceful foreign policy during his Presidency. He strived to create a fertile
environment to establish Peace at Home by initiating his reform programme in order to
modernise the Republic and sustain sovereignty and independence. When it comes to
Peace in the World, it is safe to say that Atat rk avoided adventurist policies toward the
neighbouring regions.285 At the same time, Atat rk was seeking alliances in order to
secure a space for the new Republic to dwell on internal reconstruction and reforms.286 
In this sense, the Balkan Entente287 of 1934 and the Saadabad Pact288 of 1937 were
signed. Besides, the same reason forced the Republic to participate in the Kellogg-
284 For the non-involvement in religious meetings/ties principle of Kemalism see S. From
Kemalism to ism, the Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy, Unpublished PhD thesis,
(London: College University of London, 2001), p. 305.
285 O. Sander, and Peace, The Significance of Turkish Yearbook of
International Relations, Vol. XX, 1980-1981, pp. 245-263 (259).
286 O. Sander, and p. 259.
287 Balkan Entente was a mutual-defense agreement between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania,
intended to guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence against attack by
another Balkan state such as Bulgaria or Albania. For more information see: R. J. Kerner and H. N.
Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935: A Study in the Recent History of
the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples, (Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2010); B. Jelavich, History of
Balkans: Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
288 Saadabad Pact was a treaty signed by Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq on July 8, 1937, in the
Saadabad Palace, outside Tehran. Under the pact, the parties pledged themselves to respect the
inviolability of their common borders, to refrain from acts of aggression, not to interfere in one
internal affairs. For more information on Saadabad Pact, see: Soysal, Sadabad Studies on




              
               
            
   
 
              
             
             
              
                
              
               
               
              
               
     
 
 
                                                          
                
                  
                   
                
                
            
    
               
                
                   
                 
               
              
             
                 
                   
                 
    
            
        
Briand Pact289 of 1928 attempting to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy.
By this Pact and the membership of League of Nations290, Turkey was aiming to secure
its relationships with the neighbouring countries and trying to prevent any aggressive
attitude toward itself.
This policy continued to be applied for Turkey s foreign affairs after Atat rk s death in
1938. A good example of that policy was Turkey s Second World War experience.
Although Turkey had signed a tripartite alliance with Britain and France in October
1939, it remained a de facto neutral throughout the war. Turkey s stance during the
Second World War is held up as an example of how a relatively small and militarily
backward country could follow an independent path at a time of global struggle.291 This
policy was a natural outcome of Atat rk s legacy as well as the leaders of Turkey s
direct experiences of World War I. However, along with the end of World War II,
Turkey experienced a shift in its foreign policy course as there was no multi-polar
global system. From now on, the USA and the USSR were the superpowers and Turkey
had to choose its side.
289 Kellogg-Briand Pact, also called Pact of Paris, signed on 27 August 1928, was a multilateral
agreement attempting to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy. It was the most grandiose of a
series of peacekeeping efforts after World War I. As a result of the secretary of state, Frank B.
proposal, nearly all the nations of the world eventually subscribed to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, agreeing to
renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to settle all international disputes by peaceful
means. For further information on Kellogg-Briand Pact, see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available
from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/314413/Kellogg-Briand-Pact>, [Accessed on
31/08/2013]; P. S., Key Themes of the Twentieth Century, (Celtenham: Stanley Thornes, 1996), p. 43.
290 League of Nations was an organization for international cooperation established at the initiative of the
victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War I. During the war influential groups in the USA and
Britain had urged the creation of such a body, and the President of USA Woodrow Wilson strongly
favoured the idea as a means of preventing another destructive world conflict. A league covenant,
embodying the principles of collective security (joint action by League members against an aggressor),
arbitration of international disputes, reduction of armaments, and open diplomacy, was formulated and
subscribed to by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). The League ceased its activities during
World War II. In 1946 it was replaced by the United Nations (UN), which inherited many of its purposes
and methods and much of its structure. For further information on the League of Nations, see: Britannica
Online Encyclopaedia, Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405820/League-of-
Nations>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]; P. Sauvain, Key Themes of p. 40.




        
 
                
               
                  
              
   
 
               
             
           
                 
              
               
               
  
 
               
               
             
                
              
               
                
        
 
                                                          
               
               
                 
            
     
                 
             
             
4.3. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War
The period of the Cold War, between 1945 and the late 1980s, had a bipolar global
system. By and large, the struggle between the USA and the USSR dominated this era.
It is safe to say that in this struggle Turkey chose the USA s side. In this sense, Turkish
foreign policy during the Cold War can be identified primarily by its relationship with
the USA.
The beginning of the Cold War was the starting of a new era concerning the
relationships between Turkey and the USA. This era resulted in the expansion of
American-Turkish military cooperation against the Soviet Union threat along with the
booming of financial aid. It is possible to call the 1950s and the early 1960s a golden
age regarding relations between the two states. In this regard, Turkey got the first
substantial aid as part of the Marshall Plan292 which was signed by Harry S. Truman,
33rd President of the United States to help the recovery of the European countries in
January 1947.
Turkey was one of the states which the USA needed in order to accomplish the
containment of the Soviet Union. That is why Turkey was in the frontline of America s
battle against communist expansion in this era and that necessitated Turkey and the
USA to share a central interest in this battle. This interest also gave rise to Turkey s
integration into NATO on February 18th, 1952. Also, Turkey became a full member of
the Council of Europe on August 9, 1949. To some extent, Turkey s participation in the
Korean War and support for America with 4,500 soldiers as a mark of goodwill was a
game changer regarding Turkey s stance towards America.293 
292 Marshall Plan (April 1948 - December 1951) was a USA-sponsored program designed to rehabilitate
the economies of the European countries in order to create stable conditions in which democratic
institutions could survive. It would help them recover from the damage war had done to their economies.
For further information on Marshall Plan, see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, Available from
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405820/League-of-Nation>, [Accessed on 31/08/2013]; P.
Sauvain, Key Themes of p. 147; N. Mills, Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and
Coming of Age As a Superpower, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).




                
            
              
             
                 
              
                
               
                
                
      
 
               
               
              
                 
               
               
              
   
 
              
              
            
           
           
 
                                                          
                
   
                
               
               
     
As a matter of fact, since the establishment in 1923 up until 1945, Turkey had had
friendly relationships with the Soviet Union just like the relationships with France,
Great Britain, and Germany. However, 1945 was a turning point and after that the
Soviets were perceived as the principal threat toward Turkey in the Turkish public
opinion until the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. During this era, several crises left
their mark on the Turkish foreign policy making process. The Cuban missile crisis of
1962 was one of them. In this crisis, the USA withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey; in
return the Soviet Union got its missiles out of Cuba. Although these two super powers
saved the world from a nuclear war by the withdrawal of the missiles, this crisis also
caused a wave of indignation in Turkey, who accused the USA of selling out one of its
allies to serve its own interests.
Another crisis was the Cyprus dispute. It had two phases; 1964 and 1974. While Turkey
was on the verge of intervening in Cyprus due to the Greek Cypriots violence against
the Turkish Cypriots294, on 6 June 1964 the then Turkish Prime Minister smet n n 
received a letter from the then President of the USA Lyndon Johnson.295 It was a kind of
humiliating letter in which Johnson warned Turkey not to use weapons bought from the
USA in case of any intervention attempt toward the island; if the Soviet Union supports
the Greek Cypriots as a consequence of this intervention, Turkey would not have the
USA s backing.
From the Turkish perspective, this crisis was highly significant as Cyprus was of value
to Turkey due to its cultural ties and the island s strategic location. Bearing this
importance in mind, the Greek Cypriots vicious violence against the Turkish Cypriots,
who constituted 18 percent of the island s population, also aroused public
indignation.296 This incident has never been forgotten by the Turkish people.
294 In the island the Greek Cypriots demanded enosis (union) with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots
demanded taksim (partition).
295 O. F. State of US-Turkey Relations: A Turkish in The Evolution of US-
Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, ed. by F. G. Burwell (2008), 29 - 42.
296 D. Brinkley, Cyprus Question: Dean Acheson as Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,




              
             
             
              
              
                
              
            
                 
               
             
             
            
           
         
 
            
              
              
          
              
           
            
     
 
                                                          
               
     
             
    
                  
              
    
              
    
While Turkey was experiencing such a crisis, the Johnson Letter was one of the
breaking points in Turkish Foreign Policy.297 Since then, Turkey has preferred to pursue
a multilateral foreign policy instead of unilateral action with the USA. The first
indication of this policy course was the then Prime Minister smet n n s reaction to
the letter: If conditions change and events make a new order necessary, Turkey will
certainly find its place in this new global order .298 It might be said that this policy
course was invigorated by the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The situation in the island was
deteriorating because of the Greek Cypriots rising anger towards the Turkish Cypriots.
This is why Turkey intervened in the island two times on 20 July 1974 and on 14
August 1974 in order to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriots. From Turkey s and
the Turkish Cypriots perspective, it was a peace operation in conformity with the
Treaty of Guarantee.299 On the other hand, from Greece s and the Greek Cypriots 
perspective, Turkey illegally invaded the island and violated the Treaty. Following the
intervention, on 13 February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot Leaders announced the
establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.300 
Seemingly, the intervention soothed the violence on the island. However, more serious
problems were on the horizon for Turkey. This unapproved intervention gave rise to an
arms embargo which was imposed by the USA against Turkey from 1975 to 1978.
Although the Turkish-American alliance and Turkey s American driven foreign policy
in this era remained robust, these 1964 and 1974 crises fostered Turkish sentiments of
betrayal and abandonment. Yet, Turkish decision-makers and the Turkish public have
always had major reservations and suspicions about the USA s intentions and interests
in Turkey and its neighbourhood.
297 P. Robins, Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US
Mediterranean Politics, 12, 17-38 (23).
Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Brookings Institute, Available from
<http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/1116turkey_taspinar.aspx>, [Accessed on 23/02/2010].
299 It was signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960 between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, United
Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland. For further information see: D. Brinkley, Cyprus
1989, pp. 5-18.






            
         
             
           
           
          
              
             
              
           
  
 
              
          
               
           
             
            
             
              
             
          
              
           
   
 
              
               
                                                          
              
                 
              
            
    
During this era, Turkey's application to the European Union has been another
significant foreign policy development. Turkey s relations with European countries,
such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, date back before the 19th century.
Although Turkey s Europeanisation and Modernisation processes started in the late 19th 
century, official relations with the European Union were established with Turkey s
application for associate membership of the European Economic Community in
September 1959. There were also several agreements signed by Turkey in order to fulfil
Turkey s rapprochements with the West, such as the Council of Europe (Turkey joined
on 9 August 1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Turkey joined in 1952), and
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (Turkey is one of the
founding members).
After Turkey s application in 1959, four years later on 12 September 1963 Turkey and
the European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement creating an
association between the sides and it came into effect on 1 December 1964. The Ankara
agreement foresees an eventual membership once the conditions for membership have
been met.301 Therefore, Turkey and the EU have continued talks approximately for half
a century. Despite having such deep-rooted relations, many Europeans do not see
Turkey as a European state. From their perspective, Turkey has had different cultural
and religious traditions, and a different way of thinking; namely, Turkey is an important
Other 302 for the majority of Europeans. Under these conditions, as they have remained
sceptical about Turkey s membership, this identity crisis and several unfulfilled
conditions have kept Turkey at the European Union s doorstep for such a long time.
And this uncompleted membership process prevented Turkey from pursuing a fully
independent foreign policy.
In this environment, in a general manner Turkey has benefitted from being at the
crossroads of West and East. The existence of the Soviet threat towards the West put
301 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Foreign Policy p. 46.
302 For more information on identity and otherness, see the extensive analysis provided in I. B. Neumann,
Uses of the other: The in European Identity Formation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1999); W. Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations, (Cambridge:




                
               
              
                
   
 
        
 
               
              
             
           
            
             
           
              
                
            
                 
      
 
              
              
             
           
              
              
      
 
                                                          
        
        
forward Turkey as an indispensable ally for the USA. As Turkey chose a place in the
western world, it had to orient its foreign policy unconditionally to the USA despite the
ups and downs that come with any relationship. However, the dissolution of the USSR
badly affected Turkey s role as an ally for the USA and launched a new era, called
New World Order .
4.4. New World Order' and Turkish Foreign Policy
The bipolar global system ended with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union at the
end of 1991. Since this time the USA has been the world s sole superpower.
Nonetheless, it was hard to define the new order as simply unipolar. Although
economically the USA was still the world s most powerful state, fast-growing
economies in Asia were shifting the main locus of global economic power. 303 
Politically, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and being seen as the sole superpower
bolstered American self-confidence and caused the disastrous invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan. While it was highlighting the powerhouse image of the USA, at the same
time it caused an obvious hatred toward the USA in the third world, especially in some
Muslim countries. Although culturally the image of the USA has experienced some
similarities with its political image, it is safe to say that it has been robust across the
world during the post-Cold War era.
While the elimination of the communist threat was bolstering the USA s image, some of
the middle powers, like Turkey, benefited from this environment in a limited way with
their roles being questioned. For Turkey, the start of accession negotiations with the
European Union was priority. However, it highlighted the application of democratic
norms neglected during the Cold War era when the USA needed Turkey for the
containment of the Soviet Union. Turkey still faced many problems as in previous eras,
even if its character had changed.304 
303 William Hale, Turkish Foreign p. 4.




              
               
                
             
              
              
           
               
                
             
              
           
          
 
               
            
             
             
           
              
             
                
               
               
              
              
             
             
                                                          
            
              
               
             
During the post-Cold war era, Turkey s relations with the states in Central Asia and
Middle East were the main determinants of its relations with the USA, the EU, and
Russia. Since 1945, Turkey has been one of the reliable and strategic allies of the USA,
although the contradictions with the USA appear blatant during this time period. The
Soviet Union and the communist threat were the main reasons for this alliance. When
the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, it became obvious that Turkey s
role had been terminated. However, the 1990-1991 Gulf War revolutionised the
relationship between Turkey and the USA. During the war, Turkey opted to give its full
support to the USA. In this context, Turkey shut off Iraqi oil exports from Kirkuk to
Yumurtal k, opened its military bases for use by coalition forces, and Turkish forces
were placed on the border to oppose an Iraqi ground attack. 305 It is widely
acknowledged that by this cooperation, Turkey consolidated its partnership with the
USA even if there have been several ups and downs.
Despite Turkey getting its relations with the USA back on track, the conflicts in the
Balkans offered an opportunity for Turkey to prove itself regarding making independent
foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey s stance during the conflicts in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo can be perceived as an important phase. The conflicts in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999) were based on ethnicity.
The international public opinion was that these conflicts had to be halted before getting
worse and spreading to neighbouring regions. But the main question was who should
fulfil this duty? During the conflicts, the EU was poorly equipped and did not have the
ability to intervene in the conflicts and end them. Instead, NATO and the USA emerged
as the peacemakers. Throughout both wars, Turkey put a lot of effort in encouraging the
Western world to take necessary measures in order to end the bloodshed. In addition,
Turkey played an active role to make the international community aware of what was
happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.306 Turkey dealt with the conflicts in
the Balkans intimately because of its historical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties with
305 N. K. Post-Cold War US-Turkey 2005, p. 128.
306 B. - Foreign Policy toward the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia: A
Search for Reconstruction of State Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International




              
               
       
 
              
               
               
              
              
                  
              
           
                
               
              
                
                
             
              
          
              
             
 
 
              
                
                 
               
              
             
                                                          
         
the local community. In fact, Turkey has had confidence to build strong relations with
the kinship states after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emerging five Turkic
states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The late 1980s and the early 1990s deeply changed the power relations of the
international system. As a result of this change, Turkic states in Central Asia and the
Caucasus came into prominence as an area of interest for Turkey since it has ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and the Caucasus. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has developed a discourse The Great Turkish
World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China . By this discourse the aim was to
create a new sphere of influence in Central Asia and establish road, energy and
communications links with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Turkey s initial
attempt was to play a big brother role for the newly independent Turkic states and this
attempt was also supported by the USA to fill the power vacuum with the Turkish
Model instead of radical Islam. On the other hand, there were two obstacles before
Turkey s aim. The first one was that other regional powers such as Russia and Iran were
not keen to see the USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus through Turkey. The second
obstacle was that the post-Soviet Turkic states had just explored the multipolarity within
the international system and did not want to be dependent upon any single regional
power. 307 Under these conditions, Turkey managed to establish only limited
relationships with the Turkic states in the 1990s and this failure forced Turkey to
enhance its relations with the EU. However, it was a long-lasting painful process,
admittedly.
Whereas Turkey broadened its own foreign policy horizons in this era, it faced some
democratisation problems on the road to becoming a member of the EU. Yet, when it is
compared to its own neighbours in the region such as Iraq, Syria and Iran, Turkey had a
working democracy even if in need of improvement. Turkey was aware of being a part
of the European Union was indispensable as it needed to maintain its strong westward
orientation and continue its internal modernisation in order to become a regional power




              
              
                
             
           
              
 
             
             
            
           
           
              
           
               
          
              
                 
               
              
             
            
            
             
            
             
                                                          
              
       
     
                 
       
                    
                
 
while building functioning ties with its neighbours.308 In this sense, despite the fact that
the global political system has changed, Turkey has tried to keep its foreign policy
course on track. In this bipolar system, it would not be logical to expect Turkey to
develop policies in contrast to the USA s demands. That is why although Turkey
developed relatively independent foreign policies towards Russia, Central Asia and the
Middle East, it can be claimed that the framework was drawn by the USA.
In addition to this change in the international system, the domestic changes in Turkey
were another cause which triggered the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and it
started during the Turgut zal era. The internal dimension of neo-Ottomanism309 of
Turgut zal was envisioning a comprehensive transformation of the self-conception and
self-perception of Turkish society, while the external dimension was foreseeing to re-
define the regional and international place of Turkey. Turkey as a secular and Muslim
populated country was envisaged to be exemplifying the successful integration of
Islamic and Western cultures; thus this was thought to be a promising character for the
possible integration of Turkey within Europe (the West). Turkey s membership
application to the European Union (it was the European Community at that time) in
1987 can be considered as a step to put into words this possibility. During the Cold War
Turkey was the wing country of the Western Block and Turkey s reaction to the Gulf
War right after the Cold War did not deviate from this standing. Now Turkey
commenced with structuring its relations with the USA within the conceptual frame of
strategic partnership. The Kemalist status quoism came into being in Turkey s relations
with the Muslim world, the former Ottoman territories, and Turkic states. Re-instituting
relations with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Libya which had long been neglected and
participating in the 1984 Casablanca Islamic Summit were turning points from the non-
involvement in religious ties and principles of Kemalism310 .311 The formation of a more
308 K. Barysch, Turkey combine EU accession and regional Centre for European
Reform Policy Brief, January 2010, Available from
<http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_barysch_turkey_25jan10 
-232.pdf> , [Accessed on 02/01/2012].
309 The term was first articulated by Cengiz journalist and special adviser to the then Turkish
President Turgut between 1991 and 1993.
310 Kemalism was formulated as a state ideology in the 1930s. It was a set of ideas and reforms which




            
           
     
 
             
               
            
             
             
            
           
          
               
           
                                                                                                                                                                          
             
            
              
              
              
             
            
   
         
                
    
             
             
                
                
               
            
                
           
              
           
        
               
        
              
         
active and multi-dimensional foreign policy towards Central Asia and the Balkans was
concomitantly stimulated by zal. This foreign policy understanding will be widely
presented in the following chapter.
In 1996, Turgut zal s neo-Ottomanist activism was replaced by the Islamic activism of
Necmettin Erbakan. It might be considered as again an era in which the leader defines
the rhetoric. Erbakan s foreign policy motivation similar to neo-Ottomanism was
ascribing Turkey a leading position among Muslim countries. Erbakan was in favour of
alternating dependency to the West via establishing institutions similar to those in the
West in order to provide the Muslim countries with relevant instruments for
development and advancement. Erbakan was proposing Islamic versions of the United
Nations, NATO, and Customs Union.312 The establishment of Developing-8 (D-8)313 
was an attempt to fulfil these ideals.314 At first glance there seems a deviation from
Kemalist foreign policy tradition315, however, as Robins argues Erbakan s policies were
Kemalism is comprised of six pillars (or the so-called six arrows): Republicanism, Nationalism,
Populism, Etatism, Secularism, and Revolutionism. For further information see: Y. olak,
vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Middle Eastern Studies, 42
(4), 2006, 587-602; O. D. Poststructuralist Approach to Ideology and Foreign Policy:
Kemalism in the Turkish Foreign Policy Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 1-276; T.
Principles of Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1980-1981, pp. 19-44; S. Ciddi,
in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and (New
York: Routledge, 2009).
311 S. From Kemalism to p. 305.
312 H. D. Bilgin, Foreign Policy Orientation of Turke Pro-Islamist Parties, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No.
3 (2008), pp. 407-421.
313 (D-8) is an arrangement for development cooperation among Bangladesh, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Following the ce on Cooperation for
on October 22, 1996, and after a series of preparatory meetings, the establishment of D-8
was announced officially by the Summit of Heads of State/Government in Istanbul, on June 15, 1997
(Istanbul Declaration). The objectives of D-8 are to improve developing positions in the world
economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-
making at the international level, and provide better standards of living. For further information on D-8,
see: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_d-8_.en.mfa; H. Foreign Policy in a Changing Strategic
and Regional Environment: Foreign Policy Issues in the 55th Government Program under Mesut ,
Informationen Zur Sicherheitspolitik: Die und Europa, Nr. 5, February 1998
Wien. Seiten, pp. 20-33; P. Robins,
Foreign Policy under Survival, Summer 1997; Bal, Foreign Policy in the
Post-Cold War Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004.
314 Islamist foreign policy understanding will be widely presented in the following chapter.




              
                 
           
             
           
    
 
        
 
             
             
            
             
              
               
                 
                
             
           
            
                                                          
        
        
                
                 
                 
                 
                 
              
              
   
               
               
                 
          
                  
                
  
on opening to the Islamic world rather than a striving to reorient Turkish foreign
policy.316 In fact, Turkey s relations with Israel and the USA were at a peak in terms of
trade and the military during Erbakan s rule. Moreover, Turkey maintained commitment
to the customs union with the European Union during this period. These reveal
Erbakan s adherence to the traditional Republican foreign policy317 with an opening
towards the Islamic world.
4.5. A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy
As mentioned before, the New Republic led by Mustafa Kemal Atat rk, embraced the
Western life and reforms. However, it cannot be claimed that the transformation ended
up a complete success. During this transformation, Turkey was mainly affected by
France style governance reforms and cultural life. The most crucial thing was the
elimination of Islam as Turkey s state religion from the constitution and the adoption of
laicite.318 The reason to say that laicite was a turning point for Turkey s domestic and
foreign affairs is that after this point Turkey, in a manner, declared that it no longer had
strong ties with the Islamic countries and its face had been turned toward the West. To
some extent, in the first two decades of the Republic, this situation s inconvenient
outcomes (closure of the Progressive Republican Party319 and the Liberal Republican
Party320, and a plot to assassinate321 Mustafa Kemal Atat rk) were handled somehow.
316 P. Robins, Turkish Foreign p. 83.
317 P. Robins, Turkish Foreign p. 84-87.
318 For further information on adoption of laicite please see: A. and E.
(eds), Founder of a Modern State, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981); Historical
Roots of in A. Kuru and A. Stepan (eds.), Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012) pp. 32-56; A. Kuru and A. Stephan, as an
and a , in A. Kuru and A. Stepan (eds.) Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 95-121: S. and Foreign Policy: New
Elections, Troubling Policy Focus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2007,
1-32, (p. 7).
319 The Progressive Republican Party was found in 17 November 1924 by Mustafa original
companions in the War of Independence: Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Rauf, Refet, Adnan, and Bekir Sami
Kunduh. It was banned on 5 June 1925. For further information see: A. Mango, The Biography
of the founder of Modern Turkey, (London: John Murray, 1999).
320 The Liberal Republican Party was found in 12 August 1930 and closed on 17 November 1930. The





             
              
 
                
             
                
            
             
            
          
             
           
                                                                                                                                                                          
                  
                  
                
           
                    
               
               
                
                   
                 
               
                  
              
                 
                 
              
            
                   
                
         
              
          
              
             
               
          
        
      
However, since the death of Atat rk there have been three coups322 and one post-
modern coup323 based on the debates of secularism and Islam , in a general sense.
On this basis, and as will be argued in the following chapter, there have been several
ideologies in competition with each other to dominate Turkish political life since late
1800s. In this new era, the former chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister and
now the minister of foreign affairs, and an international relations student, Ahmet
Davuto lu is known for being the intellectual originator of the new324 Turkish foreign
policy. He formulates a new foreign policy understanding by getting inspired of Neo-
Ottomanism, Pan-Turkism, and other ideologies which offer potential new foreign
policy tracks to conduct. In his seminal book, Stratejik Derinlik (The Strategic Depth325 ,
2001), Davuto lu underscores the legacies and continuities cognitively present in the
321 In the summer of 1926, a plot to assassinate the President Mustafa Kemal was uncovered. This
failed plot was used to eliminate all potential rivals of and his party. For further information see:
E. J. Zurcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's
Turkey, (London: IB Tauris, 2010); A. Mango, Ataturk: The 1999.
322 Three coups have been carried out by Turkish Military. First was a coup staged by a group of
Turkish army officers, against the democratically elected government of the Democratic Party on May 27,
1960. This coup was concluded with the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Fatih R Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan on Imral Island on September
16, 1961. The second one was the 1971 Turkish coup carried out on 12 March. Known as the
"coup by memorandum", which the military delivered in lieu of sending out tanks, as it had done
previously, it came amid worsening domestic strife. Third was the 12 September 1980 Turkish coup
headed by Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren. For the next three years the Turkish
Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council, before democracy was restored.
323 This postmodern coup was the 1997 military memorandum in Turkey which led to the stepping down
of the coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party on February 28, 1997. Instead
of dissolving the parliament or withdrawing the constitution, the Turkish Military pressured Erbakan to
step down. For this reason, the events were labelled a "postmodern coup".
324 Some scholars do not believe that his approaches (also foreign policy) are new at all except the
rhetoric and contour. See N. B. Criss, Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments,
UNSI Discussion Papers, No. 23 (2010), p. 10.
325 This is known as Strategic Depth Doctrine. See A. Stratejik Derinlik:
Konumu (Strategic Depth: International Position),
2003); A. Foreign Policy 2008, pp.77-96; Z. and
Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP
Turkish Studies, 10 (2009), 7-24; A. Merkez (Turkey Should be a
Pivotal/Central Country), Daily Radikal, February 26, 2004 Available from
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=107581> [Accessed on 07/12/2009]; A. Murinson,




            
          
              
           
             
              
            
           
             
          
             
         
 
            
            
               
            
               
         
          
              
            
          
           
             
                                                          
       
       
       
          
              
               
               
     
          
social and psychological fabric of Turkish society 326 and of communities in the
neighbouring zones of Turkey. To him Turkey needs a multi-dimensional
transformation and in this sense the society should be equipped with a deep knowledge
and awareness of history; with re-remembrance of historical memories, and with re-
imagination of the past civilisation of the country.327 To him, Turkey must remember,
re-interpret, and re-imagine its history and geography in order to see the depth that
strategically provides Turkey with relevant instruments to shape the future of its
civilisation and to accomplish its historical responsibility towards the former elements
of its civilisation.328 By this means, he re-describes and pinpoints the geo-cultural and
geo-political position of Turkey within the new international conjuncture; and
reconciles the historical depth and geographical depth of Turkey with the Turkish state
identity which were dissolved by the Kemalist etatism.
According to Davuto lu, Turkey is geographically located in the centre of many
geopolitical areas of influence329 and of responsibility330 while it is historically located
at the epicentre of [historical] events .331 At this juncture, the origins of the idea of
having influence on and responsibility towards the surrounding regions lie in the
historical depth of Turkey (This is the first pillar of the strategic depth doctrine). As
opposed to Eurocentric post-nation interventionism (or neo-colonialism) and Western
new world order expansionism (or neo-imperialism), Davuto lu calls for Turkey-centric
regional and international activism which is a search for a legitimate ground to perform
the so-called responsibility. In the geographical depth pillar of the strategic depth
doctrine, Davuto lu draws attention to geographical continuity which is a re-
interpretation of geography that generates an understanding to reintegrate Turkey with
the neighbouring zone through the historical legacies of the cities. In this scope,
326 A. Stratejik p. 63.
327 A. Stratejik p. 65.
328 A. Stratejik pp. 8-10.
329 A. Foreign Policy 2008, p. 78.
330 A. Turkish Vision of Regional and Global Order: Theoretical Background and Practical
Implementation, Keynote Lecture at the Conference on Foreign Policy in a Changing World at
the University of Oxford May 1, 2010, transcripted and published by Political Reflection Magazine, Vol.
1, No.2 (2010a), p. 41.




         
            
            
              
             
             
            
                   
         
           
          
 
            
             
          
           
                
                 
           
              
           
            
            
                                                          
         
          
                  
                 
       
             
     
              
           
          
reintegration with neighbouring counties requires reintegrating Batumi (Georgia) and
Trabzon, Mosul (Iraq) and Diyarbak r, Arbil (Iraq) and Mardin, Aleppo (Syria) and
Gaziantep, Skopje (Macedonia) or Salonika (Greece) and Edirne. This is because these
cities were never alienated and segregated from each other in their history332 thus the
borders were drawn against the geographical continuity within the region. That is why
some of those cities lost their historical hinterlands and their cultural and economic
prevailing positions after the foundation of independent states; Edirne the former capital
city of the Ottoman Empire is a good example of this as it is only a small town in
contemporary Turkey. 333 Politically speaking, Davuto lu s move from strict high
politics to societal and cultural politics heralds alternative reconciliations; such as
Turkey s use of Batumi airport334 as a domestic airport.
In a geopolitical sense, on the other hand, discovering Turkey s historical and
geographical depth altogether represents a shift in the consideration of Turkey s place in
international conjuncture. This is more a self-designated consideration, where well-built
evidence of the multi-dimensional and pro-active diplomacy capability of Turkey is
discussed. With this, Turkey is no longer a wing country335 or a bridge between the East
and the West. Turkey, as a central country, enjoys a broad area of influence and has the
capability to simultaneously manoeuvre in several regions. To Davuto lu, Turkey plays
a central country role through its ambition to develop a universal vision336 and through
its participation into or initiation of regional and universal crisis-management, peace
building, mediation, and pre-emptive action activities.337 This, to sum up, means that
Davuto lu assumes the availability of the immediate environs (at least) for Turkey s
332 A. Turkish Vision of pp. 42-43.
333 A. Turkish Vision of (2010a), pp. 42-43.
334 Many people who are living in Artvin province of Turkey which is located in the North-eastern of
Turkey use the Batumi Airport as the nearest Turkish airport is approximately 250 km away. In contrast,
Artvin to Batumi is around 100 km.
335 A. Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, May, 20. Available from
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,2&hi 
decomments=yes>, (2010b), [Accessed on 04/02/2012].
336 Here alters his strategic depth paradigm and broadens its scope beyond
surrounding regions. B. Aras, Era in (2009a), p. 5.




          
         
 
            
          
           
         
 
            
  
        
        
            
         




              
             
            
            
             
           
                                                          
                 
                   
                   
                 
                  
   
          
      
involvement through the instruments of remembering past relations, unfolding cultural
and civilizational affinities, and the exploring of opportunities .338 
The new Turkish Foreign Policy s re-imagination of history and geography has been
crowned with the introduction of new principles and instruments/mechanisms. Turkey s
conduct of and involvement in multi-dimensional foreign policy became possible only
through those tools. These are delineated in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Principles and Mechanisms of the new Turkish Foreign Policy
PRINCIPLES MECHANISMS
1. Democracy 1. Integrated foreign policy approach
2. Zero problems with neighbours 2. Pro-active Diplomacy
3. New rhetoric / Assertive style 3. Having presence on the ground
4. Multi-dimensional foreign policy 4. All-inclusive, equidistance policy
5. Rhythmic diplomacy 5. Total Performance
Democracy is the first principle of the new Turkish foreign policy since Davuto lu has
340 Instated many times that Turkey s most important soft power339 is its democracy . 
accordance with the AKP s primary aim of enhancing the democracy and democratic
culture at home, consolidating stability and democracy abroad is regarded by Davuto lu
as the sole cohesive methodological approach to world politics.341 In line with the
democratic enhancement, Turkey s threat considerations at home and abroad have been
338 B. Aras, The Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Vol.11, No.3 (2009b), p. 130.
339 The concept of soft power was first presented by Joseph Nye during the 1980s. According to Nye, soft
power is the ability of getting others to want the outcomes that you want co-opts people rather than
coerces them. In other words, attraction and persuasion are the main means for getting what you want.
For further information see: J. S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004).
340 A. Foreign Policy (2008), p. 80.




             
            
            
              
             
         
            
          
             
              
          
             
          
              
             
         
           
            
          
            
                  
             
             
              
            
      
 
                                                          
              
       
          
       
              
  
revised; a more self-confident Turkey has emerged as the S vres Syndrome342 has been
cured as argued by Davuto lu. Thus, old designations of historical enemies have
altered: Syria, Greece, or Armenia have been politically re-identified (and designated to
be future friends) in the scope of the principle of zero-problems with neighbours.343 To
stimulate this, economic relations have strived to be established and maintained in the
scope of economic interdependency and integration. Furthermore, free trade
agreements, visa-free travelling, or use of Batumi airport as a domestic port
demonstrates how the zero-problem principle operates and tunes the diplomacy. 344 
Through the new rhetoric and assertive style Turkey envisions more effective use of
soft power, a foreign policy operating on the ground, new roles in the international
arena like mediating, and involvement beyond the immediate environs. Turkish
diplomatic missions in the Arab spring or the Turkish involvements in Africa exemplify
this vision.345 The multi-dimensional foreign policy principle denotes Turkey s close
relations and partnership with great powers such as the USA or the European Union
along with its intense involvement in regional politics. This supposedly gives Turkey a
simultaneous international and multi-regional identity. Finally, the rhythmic diplomacy
refers to Turkey s active involvement in international organizations and in international
initiations. Turkey plays an active role in NATO (Afghanistan and Kosovo missions),
the UN (non-permanent member in Security Council), OSCE (Minsk Group),
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC was chaired by a Turkish Diplomat between
2004 and 2014) and is a member of the G20. When we consider that due to the recent
global financial crisis the importance of the G20 increased, Turkey s importance did so
too. Additionally, Turkey maintains observer status in the African Union, is in strategic
dialogue with the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council, is one of the dialogue
partners of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and has had close relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).346 
342 The perception of being surrounded by enemies willing to break Turkey apart.
343 A. Speech, December 23, 2011.
344 A. Tu Foreign Policy 2008, p. 80.
345 A. Speech, December 23, 2011.





           
           
         
              
             
         
              
             
              
            
               
              
           
            
               
            
               
             
              
             
            
               
         
             
              
                                                          
         
         
                  
                 
                
               
              
            
         
The instruments and mechanisms Turkey utilizes to pursue aforementioned new foreign
policy principles start with an integrated foreign policy approach. Through this
mechanism Turkey disregards mono-dimensional and static priority based foreign
policy and rather employs an integrated foreign policy that brings various issues to the
same scene allowing Turkey to deal with all of them simultaneously.347 The second
mechanism is pro-active diplomacy through which the rhythmic diplomacy, zero-
problem, or assertive style principles can be utilized. In this mechanism Turkey uses all
possible international tools and contacts every single actor on an issue. Turkey forms
both bilateral and multilateral relations to deal with an issue in order to secure
maximum cooperation.348 In the third mechanism, Turkey always has presence on the
ground which means if there is a dispute or conflict Turkey closely monitors the crisis,
later on gets involved in the process and tries to mediate parties. Turkey s diplomatic
initiatives towards Libya during the revolution or its initiation during the Georgia-
Russia War349 (2008) were upheld under this mechanism as independent activities. In
fact we can include the Trilateral Balkan Summit held in Istanbul in 2011 to reconcile
Serbia and Bosnia as part of this mechanism. The fourth mechanism is all-inclusive-
equidistance policy whereby to settle a dispute Turkey should be at equal distance to all
parties to assure the parties on the constructive intention of Turkey.350 Indeed, this
mechanism seems the least fulfilled and has mostly failed as seen in the Iran-Israel
relations. The final mechanism is total performance. Along with the having presence on
the ground mechanism, the total performance highlights the need for public diplomacy
measures. Through the coherent use of soft power and of other relevant actors such as
NGOs, business communities, think-tank organizations, and state institutions, Turkey
aims to permanently settle disputes, to maximize cooperation at a societal and economic
level, and to mobilize target society for the cause of Turkey. Through this mechanism
347 B. Aras, The (2009b), pp. 132-3.
348 B. Aras, The (2009b), p. 134.
349 An armed conflict in August 2008 between Georgia and Russia. The war began with an operation by
Georgia, which hoped to seize territory that had been outside its control since the early 1990s. Initially
successful, one day later Russia deployed units of the Russian 58th Army and launched airstrikes against
Georgian forces in South Ossetia. Moreover, Russia's army retook the area and pushed deeper into
Georgian territory, stopping just short of the capital, Tbilisi. A preliminary ceasefire agreement was
signed on 15 August by Georgia and by Russia on 16 August.




          
           
            
            
    
 
                  
               
              
              
             
             
             
             
              
               
                
                
              
                                                          
           
                  
            
                  
                
                  
      
               
          
              
             
   
          
     
      
            
    
business organizations, civil society, intellectuals, think-tanks, and other actors now
provide input into the foreign policymaking process . 351 Since the foreign policy
making was strictly confined to statecraft and political elite before, particularly the
security policies, this novel degree of involvement makes the foreign policy an
extension of domestic politics.352 
In this sense, it is clear that there has been a change or shift in Turkish foreign policy
making process since 2002. However, it cannot be claimed that it is solely because of
the mind-sets of the incumbent AKP government leaders. There have been a number of
developments since the zal era. Some of them are the decline of USA s soft power
compared to the 1990s 353 , the rise of the EU, Russia and China, Arab-Israeli
rapprochement in the early 1990s, 9/11 and the rise of international terrorism. These
developments have deeply affected the Turkish foreign policy course in order to devote
more attention to regional relations at the expense of American interests.354 This change
generated a great deal of concern among intellectuals and politicians and made them ask
who is losing Turkey? 355 As a matter of fact, Turkey s alliance with the USA during
the Cold War was left behind. The collapse of the USSR had changed the power politics
and Turkey needed to rely on the new power politics. This way of thinking was adopted
and applied to Turkish foreign policy first by Turgut zal and then former foreign
351 B. Aras, Era in (2009a), p. 9.
352 B. Aras, and K. R. Polat, Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61 No. 4 (2007), pp. 475.
353 For further information on imperialism and its decline see: V. K. Fouskas and B. The
Fall of the US Empire, Global Fault-Lines and the Shifting Imperial Order, (London: Pluto Press, 2012);
V. K. Fouskas and B. The New American Imperialism: War on Terror and Blood for Oil,
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005).
354 N. Danforth, and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From to the
Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7 No: 3, pp. 83-95 (91).
355 B. Zand, The Anatolian Tiger: How the West Is Losing Turkey, Available from
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-anatolian-tiger-how-the-west-is-losing-turkey-a-
700626.html>, [Accessed on 11/08/2013]; N. Danforth, How the West Lost Turkey, Available from
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how_the_west_lost_turkey> [Accessed on
11/08/2013]; D. Bandow, Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe, Available from
<http://spectator.org/archives/2010/06/14/who-lost-turkey-not-europe>, [Accessed on 11/08/2013]; M.
Steyn, Who lost Turkey?, Available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/4/who-lost-
turkey/>, [Accessed on 11/08/2013]; T. L. Friedman, Who Lost Turkey?, Available from




           
               
             
              
             
             
                 
              
                
          
 
              
              
             
                
        
          
     
 
   
 
             
             
             
               
               
                                                          
              
               
            
               
     
                
    
            
Minister smail Cem and now the incumbent Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davuto lu. All of them have emphasised the need that Turkey should not carry on by
rejecting its Ottoman past. In contrast to zal and Cem, Davuto lu transformed this
way of thinking into the Strategic Depth understanding and aimed to lead the AKP
Government to improve its relations not only with the Islamist countries but also non-
Islamist countries regardless of whether they were the former territories of the Ottoman
Empire. In this sense, it is safe to say that Turkey is trying to balance its strategic
relationships rather than prioritize relations with the USA and NATO in the AKP era.
That is why it is clear that the AKP s foreign policy cannot solely be identified with
Neo-Ottomanism. It is much broader than that in many ways.
The transformation of Turkey as a Western-oriented state has a long history and has
been challenging. Although Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe on 9
August 1949 and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) on 18 February 1952 and
since then has struggled to prove that it belongs to the Western world and display its
Europeanness356, several ideologies such as Neo-Ottomanism357, Neo-Islamism358, and
Neo-Eurasianism359 have gradually been produced by rightist/leftist parties and activists
in Turkey behind the scenes.
4.6. Conclusion
Throughout the Republic of Turkey s history, its position in the international order has
been questioned, frequently. In particular, its relationships with the West have been a
significant issue. For instance, many commentators in the West have asked the question
of who lost Turkey? By doing so, they assumed that Turkey has always belonged to
America or the West. However, that discourse was erroneous. While it was a fact during
356 Nicholas Danforth paraphrases NATO membership as centuries of being seen as
at the the Turkish army took on the role of defending
southeastern N. Danforth, and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign p.87.
357 For further information on the evolution of the ideology from Ottomanism to Neo-Ottomanism see
section 5.2.1. Neo-Ottomanism: Endless
358 For further information on evolution from to please see the section 5.2.2.
Islamism and




            
                
              
            
 
 
            
          
             
           
             
               
     
 
                
               
             
             
            
             










                                                          
        
the Atat rk era when Turkey chose to favour non-involvement and impartiality, it was
also an issue during the post-Cold War era when Turkey was in search of new alliances
after the dissolution of the USSR. It might be claimed that the incumbent AKP
Government has carried on this pragmatism in the Turkish foreign policy making
process.
In this context, regarding the AKP s foreign policy understanding, it might be
considered that Davuto lu s zero problems with neighbours rhetoric has been
dominated by a highly securitised approach. As a matter of fact, this rhetoric
demonstrates continuity with Atat rk s non-alignment in order to create a fertile
environment to secure a space for the continuation of Turkey s development as Turkey
has been a state under threat from other powers and internal ethnic rebellions during the
19th and 20th centuries.360 
As for the AKP era, the new activism in Turkish foreign policy making itself might be
considered as the main threat, as it requires getting involved in several issues in the
region, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Iran nuclear crisis, internal conflict in Syria,
etc. This activism and comprehensiveness have, to some extent, been new in Turkish
foreign policy. However, it cannot be claimed that this activism and comprehensiveness
have succeeded completely, in terms of becoming an influential external actor in the
neighbouring regions and having zero problems with neighbours .










              
        
                
           
             
           
         
          
             
               
             
        
  
             
            
              
           
             
            
              
            
         
               
           
             
            
CHAPTER V
DIVERSE DISCOURSES OF EURASIANISM IN TURKEY
5.1. Introduction
Turkey has always had a fertile environment and circles for debates of secularism and
Islam ; Pan-Turkism and Pan/Neo Ottomanism , etc. These debates and
confrontations can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the fact that the
newly established Turkish Republic s main official direction was toward the West,
these debates still exist today. For instance, while the Democratic Party (1946-1960) to
Justice Party (1961-1980) line and National Salvation Party (1972-1980) to Welfare
Party (1983-1998) line had pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches respectively,
centre-left Republican People s Party (CHP), by and large, embraced a Western-
oriented approach after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the early
2000s, even if it seems that CHP (the main opposition party) has recently lost its
enthusiasm toward the Western world and radiated mixed signals on whether it will
continue to support Turkey s Westernist foreign policy discourse.
As a consequence of these debates and confrontations, it should be mentioned that
Russian Eurasianism has had some reflections in Turkish society. In particular, the
conditions of the post-Cold War era and the recent activism in Turkish foreign policy
have brought the Eurasianism debates back on the agenda. Nowadays, various
perceptions of this thought can be observed in contemporary Turkish politics. In this
context, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the discourses of Turkish
Eurasianism. Specifically, the first part of this chapter focuses on four of the main
ideologies which have been dominant in Turkey regarding shaping the discourses of
Turkish Eurasianism since the late 1980s: Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism
and Pan-Turanianism. It is significant to analyse these ideologies as they are four of the
main determinants of Turkish domestic and foreign policy courses. Besides, these
ideologies have played a vital role during the penetration attempts of Aleksandr Dugin s




            
              
          
 
        
 
     
 
              
              
          
                
                
            
              
               
     
 
          
                
              
          
              
             
             
              
              
   
                                                          
                
               
              
         
was these ideologies which moulded and added perspectives to the discourses of
Turkish Eurasianism. In this sense, the latter part of the chapter will present an
overview of the discourses of Eurasianism in contemporary Turkish politics.
5.2. Roots of Diversity of Eurasianism in Turkey
5.2.1. Neo-Ottomanism: Endless Passion
The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was one of the largest and longest lasting Empires in
history. Soon after its establishment, it emerged as the major power in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Empire reached its height under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-
1566). During this era, 15 million people were living in the Empire from Algeria in the
West to Azerbaijan in the East; from Ukraine in the North to Yemen in the South.
However, the Ottomans gradually started to lose their strength with the Karlowitz
Treaty (1699).361 This event marked the beginning of the long decline of the Ottoman
Empire. Yet, it took more than two hundred years to replace the Ottoman Empire with
the Republic of Turkey.
During these 200 years, Ottoman politicians and intellectuals relentlessly endeavoured
to save the Empire by coming up with potential solutions. Many argued that one of the
reasons why the Empire was in decline was the failure of adopting the technical
developments of the West. Therefore, adopting new military technologies, reforming
Ottoman diplomacy, education and the judicial system would get the Empire back in the
race. Therefore, during the reigns of Selim III (1761-1808) and Mahmut II (1785-1839),
many legal, military, and educational reforms were implemented in order to catch up
with Western powers. Nevertheless, these reforms did not halt the decline of the Empire
and they destroyed the traditional order, but never replaced them with a new and
workable one .362 
361 Karlowitz Treaty was signed on 26 January 1699 in order to conclude the Austro-Ottoman War (1683-
1697) in which the Ottoman side had been defeated at the Battle of Zenta.
362 Y. -ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-




              
             
              
              
              
               
            
                
               
                
 
 
               
               
             
          
        
 
           
               
             
                
              
             
            
              
                                                          
               
                
         
         
          
Another reason for the decline was the idea of nationalism that the French revolution
spread. As the Ottoman Empire was a multicultural empire, all communities needed to
live in coherence. To sustain it, the Ottoman Empire developed a unique system called
millet. The main feature of this system was the division of the communities according
to their religion and a system based on the relationship between members within such
communities, as well as other religious groups and with the state .363 In this sense, local
religious leaders were responsible for the civil behaviour of their own communities.364 
The millet system had given a great deal of power to communities; such as setting their
own laws and collecting and distributing their own taxes. While this system was one of
the reasons for almost five centuries of Ottoman reign, it also paved the way for its
decline.
The effects of nationalist ideas easily permeated through the Empire with the help of the
millet system. The first effect of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire was the
1821 Greek rebellion. Also, Balkan nationalism, which was fostered in the churches, led
to further fragmentation. Among other national churches a Bulgarian exarchate
(1864) emerged, distinct from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.365 
Under these conditions, Ottoman intelligentsia produced several ideologies to save the
Empire and to help shape the political orientation of it. Ottomanism was one of those
ideologies. It first appeared during the First Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire
in the first half of the 1800s. According to the Ottoman elite, the Empire needs a
panacea in order to counter the nationalist feelings awakening in its own borders. By
Ottomanism, they aimed to give an overall identity to the communities which formed
the Ottoman Empire.366 Ottomanism was an attempt by the Ottoman government to
use one single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality
363 C. Marcinkowski, The Islamic World and the West, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 114.
364 S. Mardin, Islam and in C. Caldarola, Religion and Societies: Asia and the
Middle East, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1982).
365 S. Mardin, Islam and p. 175.




             
 
 
               
             
          
           
              
 
 
               
            
             
              
            
              
         
 
            
           
            
             
              
            
           
     
 
                                                          
                 
               
         
             
             
               
              
   
         
            
       
and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and
language .367 
In other words, the motive was to create an Ottoman nation and make all communities
perceive themselves as Ottoman; in one sense forming a melting-pot. By this, the
Empire would sustain Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Albanian separatists 
loyalties. 368 However, these expectations did not come true and the ideology of
Ottomanism was replaced by the rising Turkish nationalist ideas at the beginning of the
1900s.
After a long time, first neo-Ottomanist traces were seen during the Turgut zal era. By
and large, zal s Ottomanism referred to a multicultural state369 which embraces the
relative tolerance of Ottoman Islam as sources of pluralism and openness for domestic
social and political life .370 As a matter of fact, in some way zal s Neo-Ottomanism
was a counteraction to Kemalist foreign policy understanding. By that time, although
Kemalist discourse had abandoned the Ottoman legacy, zal initiated a new era to take
the Ottoman Empire as an example. In Ta p nar s words;
zal s approach was to have Turkey rediscover its imperial legacy and seek
a new national consensus where the multiple identities of Turkey can
coexist. It reminds Turks that they once had a great multinational empire
that ruled the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of Central
Europe. Such emphasis on the Ottoman legacy is not part of a plan to
Islamize Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. Rather, it is an attempt to
balance and broaden the horizons of Kemalism and its over-obsession with
Turkey s Western identity and trajectory.371 
367 K. H. Karpat, Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman, and
in K. H. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p.6.
368 Y.
,
vs. Kemalism: pp. 587-602.
369 S. (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Journal of
Administrative Sciences, (2003), 161-202; S. , Period in Turkish Foreign Policy:
USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol. 2 (2009); S. Foreign
Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi- Journal of International Affairs,
54 (2000), 169-182.
370 N. F. Onar, -Ottomanism, 2009, p. 10.
Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Carnegie





               
              
                
            
           
           
               
           
            
               
           
               
                
           
        
             
              
            
            
            
                
               
               
 
 
                                                          
         
         
         
             
   
          
             
   
This Neo-Ottomanist approach was dominant during the zal era in order to open up a
new foreign policy understanding for Turkey. As it is not possible to implement a
policy in spite of society s sensitivities, zal did not pursue such an ideology and put it
into practice against the mainstream ideology of the Republic of Turkey, Kemalism .
That is why since Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism have commonalities even though
they are differentiated in some contexts, zal wisely emphasised those commonalities
which were appreciated by the majority of the Turkish society - such as relations with
the Western world. Yet, in contrast to Kemalism s isolationist foreign policy, Neo-
Ottomanism or in La iner s words zalism concentrates on an active foreign policy
based on not only former Ottoman territories, but also other territories in the world.
Although Neo-Ottomanism was subject to much discussion and criticism, by this
emphasis on the relations with the West it was welcomed in general. Moreover, it paved
the way for Turkey s bridge role. His vision was of using the economy to remember the
historical or cultural ties employed here through common market proposals.372 Turkey s
relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan in the Caucasus and Central Asia and later with Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo
and Albania in the Balkans were reconstituted through this vision. Indeed this was a
mutually constituted relationship as the relations were not held solely with Turkey s
initiation; those countries were seeking assistance from Turkey as well.373 Despite the
expansion, Turgut zal s foreign policy did not deviate from the traditional Kemalist
approach since his conduct was loyal to Western orientation.374 In this sense, it is safe to
say that Neo-Ottomanism got its strength from the relations with the West as well. That
is why zal attached great importance to the relations with the European Union and the
USA.375 
372 S. , From Kemalism to p. 308.
373 S. , From Kemalism to pp. 308-9.
374 S. , From Kemalism to p. 332.
375 For further discussion about Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism see: F. -Ottomanism: a
Available from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=neo-ottomanism-a-
strategem-2008-09-27>, [Accessed on 01/07/2011]; N. Fisher, -Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and





               
              
             
             
              
              
              
                
           
              
            
  
 
           
         
          
 
          
           
          
         
          
         
        
            
         
          
 
 
             
           
                                                          
       
             
     
       
              
        
On the one hand, in line with zal s neo-Ottomanism approach, in spite of not officially
being proclaimed, there is an inclination among some experts in Turkey to call the
AKP s foreign policy a neo-Ottoman strategy 376. On the other hand, there are some
experts who criticise this denomination as well. For instance, Soner a aptay objects to
the naming of this strategy as Neo-Ottomanism , as according to him, a closer look
reveals that during the AKP era, Turkey was asserting itself exclusively in the Muslim
Middle East, while ignoring other areas of the Ottoman realm.377 In spite of these
criticisms, what is plain is that the AKP s foreign policy has been built on the current
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davuto lu s thoughts which are called mainly
strategic depth which was presented in the previous chapter. In addition, his way of
thinking s relations with Eurasianism will be scrutinised in the following sections of
this chapter.
When it comes to Neo-Ottomanism s comparison to Eurasianism, to some extent Neo-
Ottomanism -similar to Eurasianism- reflects the Westernists and Pan-Islamists
approaches at the same time. Ta p nar accentuates this point further;
Neo-Ottomanism embraces a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an
effective and engaged regional actor, trying to solve regional and global
problems. Since the concept of neo-Ottomanism may evoke an imperial
agenda, one important point needs clarification: Turkey, in this neo-
Ottoman paradigm, does not pursue a neo-imperialist policy aimed at
resurrecting the Ottoman Empire. Instead of imperial nostalgia, neo-
Ottomanism is essentially about projecting Turkey s soft power a
bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a
democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force. Like
French Gaullism, it seeks Turkish grandeur and influence in foreign
policy.378 
On the other hand, Eurasianism is identified with the East and its underdeveloped
institutions are despised by opponents379; although Neo-Ottomanism is praised in some
376 O. p. 14.
377 S. Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of -Ottomanism Available from
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1270> [Accessed on 30/11/2009].
378 O. p. 3.
379 A. Bilici, Hayale Rus (Russian Sabotage the Ergenekonist I.




                
             
            
           
           
            
              
             
                
 
 
     
 
                  
                  
         
              
           
              
             
            
            
            
              
 
                                                          
           
 
             
   
               
            
           
        
circles in Turkey because of pursuing aims related to the East. To clarify, the West is
associated with democracy and development in the minds of many people in Turkey,
while the East is associated with backwardness and underdevelopment. In addition, the
division between Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism stems from the perception of those
ideologies among Turkish society. Hence, whereas Neo-Ottomanism is accepted as a
rightful quest, Eurasianism is considered a shift from the traditional Turkish foreign
policy.380 As a matter of fact some believe that while a Neo-Ottomanist Turkey can
bring democracy and prosperity to the Ottoman Empire s former territories and can play
a leadership role, in any kind of Eurasianist dream Turkey would stay in the shadow of
Russia.
5.2.2. Islamism Pan and Neo 
Although Pan-Islamism in the sense of a union of all Muslims is in fact as old as Islam
itself, as an ideology it came out in the late 1800s.381 One of the champions of it was
Jamaleddin Afghani (Sayyid Jamal al-Din Muhammad b. Safdar al-Afghani, 1838-
1897) in order to unite all Muslims under an Islamic state to withstand Western
encroachments. According to Afghani, Muslim societies were weak due to corrupted
rulers and various divided sects. And this weakness was the main reason why Western
civilisation had become superior. That is why Muslim solidarity was essential in order
to challenge the Western imperialism and maintain the freedom of Muslims in
Afghani s way of thinking.382 In this form, Pan-Islamism is a counter-hegemonic vision
like Asian and African nationalism but it is different from Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism,
etc. as it excludes ethnicity as an essential condition towards founding an Islamic state.
380 S. K -Ottoman Project S. return of
381 A. Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924), (Leiden: Brill,
1997). p. 23.
382 Further information on Pan-Islamist approach see: S. Ali, Pan Movements in the Third
World Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Islamism, Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., [pref. 1976], p. 196;
Z. Khan, Jamal-ud-Din reflections on Western Imperialism An Pakistan




               
            
            
           
             
               
         
 
            
               
               
             
                
              
             
           
 
             
              
              
          
 
                
             
           
              
              
                                                          
          
                
           
            
     
          
          
              
     
In the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid II was the first and the last sultan to adopt Pan-
Islamism during his reign between 1876 and 1909 against Western intervention in
Ottoman affairs. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire was enacted after
Abdulhamid s accession to the throne and clearly reflects a Pan-Islamic tendency.
According to the constitution: The Ottoman Sultanate, as the exalted Caliphs of Islam,
belongs to the eldest member of the house of Osman His Excellency the Padi ah as
Caliph, is the protector of the religion of Islam... 383 
Abdulhamid s Pan-Islamist approach might be regarded as an effort to save the
Ottoman Empire and its societal unity while some experts argue that it was adopted to
sustain unification of all Muslims all over the world.384 As a matter of fact, both
arguments can be taken as the core elements of Abdulhamid s Pan-Islamist approach as
he believed that It was Islam that kept the different groups of the Empire like the
members of one family because the social structure and the politics of our Empire is
based upon religion .385 Moreover, he was a fervent supporter of the unification of
Muslims all around the world and through Abdulhamid s own words:
as long as the union of Islam continues, England, France, Russia, and Holland
can be counted on my fingertips, because in the Muslim lands now under their
domination even one word of the Caliph would be enough for starting a jehad
against them which would be a catastrophe for the Christians. 386 
In addition to this debate, it was a fact that the European colonial advancement (such as
occupation of Tunisia and Egypt) during the late 1800s and emergence of Pan
nationalist thoughts (such as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism) posed a threat toward
the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire387 as the Empire was a multinational state
and the idea of Nationalism was one of the powerful motives behind the nationalist
383 Quoted in A. Pan-Islamism: Indian p. 40.
384 For this debate see: M. Islamc Do u u, Ankara: Lotus 2003; S. Mardin,
yy'da ve Devleti: Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete, (Istanbul:
1985); N. Berkes, T rkiye'de ma, (Istanbul: Kredi 2002); Y. -
ideologies in the Ottoman
385 Quoted in A. Pan-Islamism: Indian p. 47.
386 Quoted in A. Pan-Islamism: Indian p. 50.
387 A. Rauf, -Islamism and the North West Frontier Province of British India (1897-




             
            
                
               
              
             
           
               
    
 
          
              
           
              
             
               
             
             
              
  
 
           
            
            
          
           
 
          
            
                                                          
               
  
            
uprisings against the Ottoman Empire - such as the 1821 Greek uprising, 1876
Bulgarian uprising, etc. On the other hand, since the European colonial advancement
and the decline of the Ottoman Empire occurred at the same time, the Empire lost a
majority of its territories. It might be said that in this climate, adopting Pan-Islamism as
an official ideology and applying that into the Empire s political life to prevent further
separation is a more rational choice instead of pursuing idealistic purposes for the
unification of all Muslims. However, Abdulhamid preferred to adopt both perspectives
together in order to save the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim World against, as Landau
stated, the foreign attacks .388 
On the other hand, although Pan-Islamism is a counter-hegemonic ideology, Pan-
Islamists had accepted that the West had technical superiority and during the revival of
the Muslim world that technological advancement could be adopted. The main
discourse was that the Western technology must be adopted but the imitation of the
West was out of question. In this context, many intellectuals made explicit statements.
One of them was Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936), a well-known figure at the time. He
expressed his approach on this matter as follows: "By imitating the religion, by
imitating the customary practices, the clothes, by imitating the way people greet each
other, in short by imitating every single thing, a real social community cannot emerge
and live."389 
Despite fruitless efforts, the Ottoman Empire collapsed without managing to unite
Muslim people under an Islamic state. Owing to Kemalist secularist understanding, the
Islamism and Ottomanism thoughts were mainly kept in the background until the
Turgut zal era. Pro-Ottomanist and pro-Islamist approaches mainly gained momentum
and started to be influential in Turkey during the zal era.
zal s Neo-Ottomanist approach was a synthesis of Turkism, Nationalism, and
Islamism. In this context, zal s main contribution was his attempt to integrate Turkish-
388 J. M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, Ideology and Organization, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994,
p. 9.




           
            
              
             
               
              
        
 
             
             
                
               
               
               
 
           
            
              
           
              
            
             
                                                          
              
    
                 
                
             
              
                 
               
             
                 
               
             
              
                  
                
               
   
Islamic Synthesis into the official state discourse.390 The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was
a strategy produced by a group of intellectuals, called Ayd nlar Oca (Intellectuals 
Hearth) and adopted by the military after the September 12, 1980 coup. By this
synthesis, the main aim was to integrate Islamists and Nationalists against radical leftist
ideologies in order to reduce their appeal and get rid of the influence of non-Turkish
strands of Islamic thinking. By this, the integrity of the Turkish nation-state would be
provided and counter revolutionary sentiments would be eliminated.391 
Although zal was a pious Muslim, he generally eschewed secularist aspects of the
state. While he supported the Turkish version of Islam, zal emphasised the differences
of it from the Iranian version of Islam and Wahhabism, the dominant form of Islam in
Saudi Arabia. The reason for this emphasis was that the Turkish version of Islam is
more tolerant and liberal than the other versions. From the perspective of zal, that is
the prerequisite to establish a link between Muslims and the rest of the world.392 
I have, I hope, demonstrated that Turkey has never abandoned secularism.
In this context one can refer to Ghaz l 's distinction between faith and
reason. The Turk is aware that faith, in itself, does not affect secularism, nor
does it prevent him from being rational, provided that their respective
realms are not encroached. In life today there is no difference in this respect
between the Christian European and the Muslim Turk. Thus a synthesis has
been achieved between the West and Islam, a synthesis which has put an
390 G. Jenkins, Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), p. 149.
391 For further information on Turkish-Islamic Synthesis see A. Rabasa and F. S. Larrabee, The Rise of
; C. Turkey: Islam and Laicism between the Interest of the State, Politics and Society,
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Report No. 78; G. Nationalism and
Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of -Islamic in Modern Turkish Political
The Muslim World, Vol. 89, Issue 3-4, pp. 350-376; B. Toprak, as State Ideology in
a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic in M. Wagstaff (ed.), Aspects of Religion in Secular
Turkey, (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional
Paper Series, 1990), No. 40, pp. 10-15; A. Lapidot, Activism in Turkey since the 1980 Military
in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, 1997, Special Issue on Radicalism in
the Greater Middle edited by B. Maddy-Weitzman and E. Inbar, pp. 62-74.
392 For further discussion on Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Islamist approach see: S.
Kemalism to 2001; G. G. Kona, Rise and the Fall of Political Islam in , The
paper presented in the International Conference on Islam in the Middle Israel - Ben





             
          
         
           
       
 
             
              
              
             
               
                
              
             
             
              
                 
               
            
            
             
            
              
                
           
           
            
           
                                                          
                 
   
         
                
end to the identity crisis of the Turk French and Germans have separate
cultures, but both constitute Western civilization, so would Turks while
stressing and vitalizing their Turkish nationalism the universal humanism
created by secularized Islam, together with the concept of the brotherhood
of mankind, a product of Turkish Sufism.393 
The next revival of Islamism occurred during the late 1990s when Refah Partisi
(Welfare Party) won 21.4 percent of the vote. The December 1995 elections saw that
RP was the biggest party while ANAP (Motherland Party) and DYP (True Path Party)
were the opposition parties. However, that percentage was not enough to form the
Government. That is why ANAP and DYP formed a coalition, though it lasted only 3
months. After that, RP and DYP agreed to form a government on 28 June 1996. Thus,
Necmettin Erbakan, who was the leader of RP, became the first Islamist prime minister
of Turkey. During the RP and DYP coalition, Islamist discourse was dominant in
Turkey s foreign policy. Once Erbakan became Prime Minister, he started to visit many
Muslim states such as Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia etc. In particular, the first official
visit to Iran instead of the USA was a clear message of how the new Turkish foreign
policy was going to be formalised. During almost two years in office Erbakan did not
conduct an official visit to any Western country.394 Moreover, Erbakan s salient distrust
towards the European Union, the USA, and Israel discouraged the government from
embarking on high level relations. The distrust was mutual; the USA also was
suspicious about the fundamentalism of Erbakan and considered Erbakan s rule as a
threat to their interests.395 The next step was establishing an Islamic organisation which
could be an alternative to the EU. For that reason, on 15 June 1997 in Istanbul,
Developing Eight (D-8) was formed by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. D-8 s objectives are sequenced as follows: improve
member states position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities
in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at international level, and
393 T. in Europe and Europe in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brother,
1991, p. 296-297.
394 H. D. Bilgin, Foreign Policy p. 411.




             
             
           
 
             
            
            
            
         
           
              
            
             
                  
             
  
 
             
             
              
    
 
    
 
              
               
          
                                                          
       
    
        
        
           
      
improve standards of living. 396 This initiative is still functioning but it lacks some
essential aspects in order to become an alternative organisation to the EU, with
problems that include geographical disparity and differences in political priorities.
The RP s counter discourse on Turkish foreign policy was not long-lasting. The then
coalition resigned because of the February 28 Post-modern coup .397 On 28 February
1997 during the National Security Council meeting Turkish Military Leadership gave a
memorandum and forced the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to sign that
memorandum consisting of several decisions to protect secularism against
reactionaryism . Although Erbakan signed that memorandum, he was forced to resign.
Since there was no dissolving of the parliament and with brutal action against Turkey s
political institutions and figures, such an intervention by the Turkish military leadership
was called a Post-modern coup . Even though the Islamist discourse lost its influence
after the RP era, it is still effective in Turkey as the offshoot of RP, and the AKP
(Justice and Development Party) has become stronger than ever but with more modest
discourses.
In this sense, Islamism and Ottomanism have been two of the most significant
ideologies which shape the political and social life in Turkey along with Pan-Turkism
and Pan-Turanianism. It is safe to say that while all these ideologies underpin the
Eurasianist discourses in Turkey.
5.2.3. Pan-Turkism: Red Apple
Pan-Turkism emerged in the late 19th century among the Turks in the Russian empire
and it was a sample of diaspora nationalism. It had the reflective motive towards the
aggressive politics of the Russian government, like Russification and Christianisation
396 Developing Eight Countries (D8), Available from
<http://cesran.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=223&Itemid=241& 
lang=en>, [Accessed on 16/07/2011].
397 C. "Post-modern darbe"..., Daily Sabah, Available from
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/06/28/y12.html>, [Accessed on 16/07/2011]; S. Vertigans, Roots
and Resurgence in Turkey: Understanding and Explaining the Muslim , (Connecticut:




               
                
               
             
               
              
                 
                
        
 
               
             
              
            
            
          
           
       
 
           
            
           
            
             
            
             
                                                          
               
           
             
               
    
           
               
policies.398 Pan-Turkism aims to unite all people of Turkic origin on an ethnic basis. At
the end of the 19th century, more than 13 million Turkic people (consisting of 11 percent
of the whole population of the empire) were living in the Russian Empire. And 85
percent of this Turkic population were Muslim.399 By Pan-Turkism, it is intended that
this 11 percent would be separated from the Russian Empire after destroying it. Then, a
solid Turkic union would be established by means of merging with the Ottoman Turks
on a vast land which includes the territory of the Russian Empire and the majority of the
territory of the Ottoman Empire. For all of these reasons, this school of thought can be
considered as one of the irredentist movements.
In a manner, the word pan-Turkism is used in the sense of pan-Turanianism, and vice
versa during the early 20th century. To clarify the difference between these two
thoughts, it is meaningful to say that whereas pan-Turkism aspired to unite all Turkic
peoples, pan-Turanianism was aimed at the unification of Turkic peoples with the
Finno-Ugric peoples. The eminent theorists of the movement were the Crimean Tatar
Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914), the Tatar intellectual Yusuf Ak ura (1876-1935), the
Azeri Turk Ahmet Agayev (1869-1939), the Azeri Ali H seyinzade (1864-1941), and
Ziya G kalp (1876-1924).400 
Ismail Gasprinsky was disseminating his ideas through his newspaper Terc man and
advocating the idea of unity in language, ideas, and deeds . Although Ismail
Gasprinsky synthesised Turkism and Islam, he was a fervent advocator of
Westernisation.401 This was a precaution to prevent being left behind the developed
West. Another prominent figure, Yusuf Ak ura, is known for his work Tarz-
Siyaset (Three Kinds of Policies) which was published in the Cairo-based journal
Turk . In this paper, Ak ura examines Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. And it was
398 S. Wiederkehr, as a reaction to Pan- in Russia between East and West:
Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, ed. by D. Shlapentokh, (Leiden: Brill, 2007b);
399 J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: from Irredentism to Cooperation, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1995), p. 7; S. A. Zenkovsy, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960), p. 9.
400 S. Wiederkehr, as a J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism....




             
              
            
              
               
             
             
             
 
 
             
            
             
               
               
                  
          
 
                                                          
              
               
                 
           
                   
       
             
        
the Pan-Turkism which is supported at the expense of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism by
Yusuf Ak ura as he believed that Turkism was the sole concept capable of sustaining
the T rk millet (Turkish Nation). 402 This way of understanding gained acceptance and
Ak ura s work has been regarded as the manifesto of the pan-Turkists.403 As for Ziya
G kalp, he was in favour of Turkish nationalism with his articles in the journal T rk
Yurdu . He also supported the vision that the Ottomans should pursue more open
foreign policy and not be imprisoned in their territory. The developed Western world s
science and technology would guide the Ottomans to reach the level of contemporary
civilisations.
The most important criticism which is directed against pan-Turkism is related to the
racist specification of its main justification. Landau, Finkel and Sirman emphasise that
the supporters of pan-Turkism have headed toward the use of racist undertones since
World War II.404 For instance, the cover of Bozkurt405 might be an obvious example of
this. In this specific cover, the claimed extent of the Turkic ethnic homeland is shown
and the meaning of the slogan at the top is Turkish race is above all others , while the
bozkurt, i.e. the steppe wolf, is symbolised below the title.406 
402 T. Atabaki, Oneself, Rejecting the Other: Pan-Turkism and Iranian in Identity
Politics in Central Asia and The Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth
Century, ed. By W. Van Schendel and E. J. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 69.
403 T. Atabaki, Oneself, Rejecting the 2001, p. 69.
404 J. M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974); A. Finkel and N. Sirman,
Turkish State, Turkish Society, (London: Routledge, 1990).
405 Bozkurt was a Pan-Turk journal which was published between 1939 and 1942.
406 J. M. Landau, Pan- , 1995, p. 3.
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Figure 5.1. The Cover of Bozkurt
Pan-Turkism can be counted as one of the long-lived nationalist movements. During the
late Ottoman era, the early Turkish Republican era, the 1960s, and after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkism was at the peak of its power. In 
particular, the Turkic world witnessed a significant revival of Pan-Turkism during the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union, the most powerful
multinational state of the 20th century collapsed, five new Turkic-Central Asian states
emerged: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic.
The population of these states was more than 50 million. Along with Turkey, these
Turkic states have been called 1 nation with 6 states ever since. It is also often argued




               
           
            
            
                
              
       
 
            
               
            
           
       
            
             
            
         
          
            
      
 
           
                
               
              
             
              
               
                                                          
               
  
  
and best established Turkic-nation in the world. What is more, Turkey is the core state
of Pan-Turkic movements in the post-1990s. For instance, Mahir Ya c lar s statement,
Leader of Kosovo Turkish Democratic Party and former Minister of Environment for
Kosovo, has a confirmatory attribute regarding this issue. On October 2010, Ya c lar
stated that The main target of the forum is to improve our values, expand our national
values and make them international... The Turkish Republic is the mainland for us at
the World Turkic Forum in Istanbul.407 
Since the dissolution, a myriad of activity to bring Turkic-speaking countries together
has been organised at both state and individual level in the Turkic world; this includes
the annual Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congress of the Turkic States and
Communities, the annual Eurasian Economic Summit, the World Turkic Forum, the
Summit of Turkish-speaking countries' leaders, Turkish-speaking countries
Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA). While some of them have been held since 1993
such as the Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congress of the Turkic States and
Communities, some have started as recently as 2008 such as the Turkic-speaking
countries Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA). However, all these initiatives are
consequences of endeavours to rediscover their linguistic and cultural affinities.
Through these initiatives activists are in search of promoting closer cultural, economic,
and political ties between Turkic-speaking countries.
Although Turkey takes the initiative, there are several obstacles toward accomplishing
such a comprehensive aim. First of all, despite the fact that some of the Turkic countries
have a vast amount of proven oil reserves, it cannot be claimed that they are
economically powerful states, yet. Having said that, it does not mean that Turkey does
not have economic relations with these states. Apart from enhancing the cultural ties,
Turkey places a lot of importance on economic relations with the Turkic states. Since
the 1990s Turkey has provided 1.2 billion dollars credit to these countries in order to







           
             
               
                 
              
             
               
            
            
 
           
 
                                                          
               
            
         
          
 
   
  
0 
make them attractive investment areas for Turkish businessmen. 408 The volume of
Turkey s trade with Turkic states was approximately 1 billion dollars during the 1990s.
However, the volume has increased since 2002 when AKP came to power in Turkey. As
seen in figure 5.2, there is a steep increase in the trade volume between 2002 and 2010,
compared to the 1990s. Until recently, the trade balance was in favour of Turkey.
However, with the start of importing natural gas and oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan the balance has changed in favour of the Turkic states. After all these
developments, unless there is at least an economically powerful state among the Turkic
states, it is highly unlikely the ideals of Pan-Turkism will be accomplished.





1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey's Import Turkey's Export 
408 M. S. Yapar and R. Uctu, Cumhuriyetleri Ekonomik dan Bir
m (The Relationships with the Turkic States: An Economic Sel uk niversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstit s Dergisi, No. 12 (2004), pp. 59-74.






                
               
            
            
            
               
               
                
            
           
                 
    
 
             
                 
             
            
         
         
       
 
             
                
             
           
                                                          
               
               
              
            
    
           
   
 
The second reason is that some of these states are not even close to sustaining their
internal security. For instance, Kyrgyzstan is one of the states that has not managed to
strengthen its own internal and external security. Religious extremism and illegal drug
trafficking are still strong drawbacks for Kyrgyzstan. 410 The final reason is the
leadership issue among these Turkic-countries. This issue has come to prominence since
Turkey tried to play a Big Brother role instead of Russia following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is well-known that this role was not welcomed by the
post-Soviet Turkic states. In this regard, in the case of forming a Union and being a
leader state, there are several candidates apart from Turkey such as Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.411 These three drawbacks are the answers to why Pan-
Turkism is a distant goal and as long as these drawbacks remain, it seems this aim will
stay unrealised.
As for a brief comparison of Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism, there are certain differences
between them. First of all, it is true that one of the motives of the founders of
Eurasianism was to build a counter view against Pan-Turkism. It was a timely
opportunity for Russian emigrants to build an ideology against separatist thoughts of
Pan-Turkism. Another disparity between Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism is the open-
closed nationalism dichotomy. Similar to Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism is closed 
nationalism while Eurasianism is unequivocally open nationalism.
Concerning the characterisation of a potential Union, Pan-Turkists pay ethnic roots a lot
of importance. As can be understood from the name of it, there is no alternative to
establish a Turkic Union which is composed of only Turkic origin people. Whereas
Turkists intellectuals emphasise the one-sided link between the Turkic origin people,
410 For further information about the security issue of Kyrgyzstan see K. Santhanam (Ed.), Eurasian
Security Matters, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2010); H. Peimani, Conflict and Security in
Central Asia and the Caucasus, (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009); S. J. Blank (Ed.),
Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia, Available from
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1063.pdf> [Accessed on 18/02/2014].






           
          
 
                
             
                
                
                 
 
           
 
             
              
           
              
             
             
             
              
    
  
            
             
              
                 
                 
               
                                                          
                
 
          
         
               
      
Eurasianists are more comprehensive. And in a potential Eurasian Union, people s
common culture and historical destiny are deterministic instead of ethnic.
The last comparison is on the philosophy of territory. So far, the territory of a potential
Eurasian Union has been clarified. However, the territory of the potential Turkic Union
is composed of lands where Turkish speaking people live. On the one hand, this is a
vast area to unite. On the other hand, lands of Turkic speaking people are spread from
the Balkans to Siberia and not all of these lands have a land border with each other.
5.2.4. Pan-Turanianism: An Ideology from the Balkans to the Yellow Sea
Pan-Turanianism can be understood as a movement for the political unification of all
speakers of Turanian Languages. The term is often used in the same way as Pan-
Turkism, but it is a more comprehensive nationalist movement compared to Pan-
Turkism. Pan-Turanianism aims at not merely the unity of all Turkic peoples, but also
the unification of the Ural-Altaic Race. According to Arnakis, this race embraces; the
Ottoman Turks of Istanbul and Anatolia, the Turcoman peoples of Central Asia and
Persia, the Tatars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary, the
Finns of Finland the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes of Siberia and even the
distant Mongols and Manchus .412 
As for the word Turan, adequate information can be gathered from Ferdowsi s413 
Shahnameh.414 This epic gives information about the word Turan which was the name
given to northeast Iran. According to this epic, King Fereydun had three sons, Silim,
Tur, and Irij. The King divided the world up for his sons. Asia Minor was given to
Silim, Iran to Irij, and the eastern part of the world (Turan) to Tur415. However, in the
contemporary world, the word Turan is used for Central Asia.
412 G. G. Arnakis, An Aspect of Turkish Balkan Studies, 1 (1960), 19-32, (p.
19).
413 An Iranian poet, who lived between 940 1020.
414 An epic poem written by Ferdowsi between 977-1010.
415 O. G. zg denli, a rk-Iran Tarihi Ara rmalar (The Research of History of Turk-Iran in




             
             
           
             
                
             
 
              
               
         
  
            
           
           
         
      
 
              
               
             
             
                
               
              
             
           
       
 
                                                          
                 
                 
              
   
 
      
Pan-Turanianism is an ambiguous concept so much so that everyone interprets it in
different ways. For example, Ladis K. D. Kristof evaluates the movement as anti-Slav.
According to Kristof Its immediate purpose was to check and counter-balance Pan-
Slav expansionism in the Balkans by forging an alliance with the Pan-Turkic movement
and establishing ties with all the Finno-Ugric peoples of the north from the Baltic to the
Urals. Thus the Slavs were to be taken from behind and hemmed in .416 
Another interpretation is made by Kaveh Farrokh. From his perspective, it was a racist,
anti-Slav movement and aimed to establish a Turkic super state, but for the benefit of
Britain. In this context, Farrokh points out that;
Simply put, pan-Turanianism is an ideology that aims at creating a Turkic
super state stretching from the Balkans in Europe, eastwards across Turkey,
Iran (Persia), the Caucasus, Central Asia up to and including northwest
China...Pan-Turanianism perhaps one of the last racialist movements that
417 first began in the nineteenth century . 
To sum up, pan-Turanianism is an idea to unite all speakers of Turanian languages
under the Turan state. But, it might be considered as a utopia. Even comparing other
pan-nationalisms, it is unequivocal that all of them might be more promising than pan-
Turanianism. Yet, several activities have been held in alleged Turanian lands (see figure
5.2) in order to gather Turanian people. One of the biggest events, is held in Hungary
since 2008, is the Turanian Convention. It is a tribal convention and attracts more than
100.000 people every year.418 By doing so, conveners aim to raise awareness and keep
their own traditions alive. People from Turkey also show great interest in this
Convention while they undertake other initiatives, such as an institution Turanian
Research Association and a journal called Turan .
416 L. K. D. Kristof, Russian Image of Russia: An Applied Study in Geopolitical in
Essays in Political Geography, ed. by Charles A. Fisher, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1967), p. 364.
417 K. Farrokh, Pan-Turanianism takes aim at Azerbaijan: A geopolitical agenda, 2005 Available from
<http://www.rozanehmagazine.com/NoveDec05/Azerbaijan-Text[nopict].pdf> [Accessed on
15/03/2009].
418 For more information see, http://kurultaj.hu/english/
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When it comes to the outcomes of the brief comparison of Pan-Turanianism with
Eurasianism are similar to the outcomes which can be obtained from the comparison of
Pan-Turkism with Eurasianism. The first variable is a theoretical approach. From this
perspective, it could be alleged that Pan-Turanianism is also an ideology that emerged
to balance the Pan-Slavist vision. The second variable is the open-closed nationalism
dichotomy. Pan-Turanianism is a closed nationalism, while Eurasianism is an open 
nationalism. Pan-Turanianism emphasises the Turanid race that included the Uralic and
Altaic speaking peoples more generally. However, Eurasianism does not address any
specific race, and what is more, common culture and history are highlighted.
Figure 5.3. Alleged Turanian Lands419 
Concerning the characterisation of a potential Turan State/Union, it is clear who are
entitled to be its citizens - speakers of Ural-Altaic languages. Again, regarding the
characterisation it is not possible to claim that there is a constraint in the Eurasianist
vision. The fourth and final comparison is on the philosophy of territory. The territory
of a potential Turanian State/Union is composed of lands where speakers of Ural-Altaic
languages live. Pan-Turanianism shares the same trait with Pan-Turkism on this issue.
Turanian Lands, Turanian People, Available from





     
 
             
              
             
             
            
            
           
           
            
                 
    
 
         
            
              
              
               
             
            
               
           
                
           
                
             
         
 
            
           
            
5.3. Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism
As noted earlier, Eurasianism was a way of thinking, an ideology or geopolitical
thought to save the Russian Empire from collapse and create a propitious sphere in
order to include all Eurasian nations. This version of Russian Eurasianism or Classical
Eurasianism had various discourses and having those discourses was one of the reasons
why Russian Eurasianism faded away around the 1930s. Having many participants and
eminent founders who were dwelling in different countries of Europe and various
discourses caused the disappearance of Eurasianism until Gumilev s efforts to put
together Neo-Eurasianism. As explored in Chapter 3, Gumilev s followers A. Panarin
and A. Dugin made an enormous contribution to Neo-Eurasianism during the 1990s.
However, Panarin s death gave rise to a loss of influence and left A. Dugin as the sole
ideologist of Neo-Eurasianism.
Whereas Classical Eurasianism could not penetrate into Turkish society, Neo-
Eurasianism has been perceived in various different ways in Turkish intelligentsia. It
might be considered that there are two reasons for why Neo-Eurasianism has found a
better acceptance than Classical Eurasianism. The first one is that Turkey has been a
convenient sphere for ideologies as it is believed that Turkey has had a glorious history
regarding the Turkic ethnic roots and its facilitative role for new and stimulating
ideologies. Besides, Turkey has started to embrace a new way of understanding
throughout this glorious history. That has been one of the catalysts which has created an
appropriate environment for eastern-oriented ideologies. The second reason is that the
effect of the perception The only friend of a Turk is a Turk on the Turkish identity-
building process generated a tendency among some nationalist circles to become
conscious against any threat by anyone seen as an enemy of Turkey. That is why these
circles are in support of sustaining the balance of power rhetoric, especially against
the Western world by promoting ideologies such as Neo-Eurasianism.
Three aspects, Islam, Ottoman history, and Turkishness have played key roles and
moulded the Turkish identity despite the efforts on exalting Turkishness (the




           
            
          
              
    
 
            
            
             
            
              
            
              
           











                                                          
                
               
              
               
              
              
             
           
           
western Civilization 420 ) and degrading the Islam and Ottoman history during the
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. That is why in contemporary Turkey,
Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism are popular ideologies for building, in
their own capacity, a new Turkey which can be influential in the international arena,
even a regional power.
In terms of the Turkish intelligentsia meeting with Russian Eurasianism, it occurred
through Gumilev and Dugin s works. In particular, Dugin s initial thoughts which aim
to exclude Turkey from a prospective Eurasian Union were not welcomed in Turkey
and caused Turkish intellectual circles to perceive Russian Eurasianism as a Russian
imperialist ideology even if Dugin revised his approach to Turkey later. Most of the
discourses of Eurasianism, therefore, are built on the aforementioned ideologies, such as
Islamism, Turkism, etc. In the light of this information, in a general manner, the
discourses of Turkish Eurasianism can be classified into three separate divisions421:
Nationalist Eurasianism, Multiculturalist Eurasianism, and Westernist Eurasianism.
420 For further information on the early efforts on exalting Turkish identity, see: M. Ergin,
Encounters in the Social Sciences and Humanities: Western Scholars in History of the
Human Sciences, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 105-130; R. Kasaba, Certainties and Modern
in S. and R. Kasaba (eds) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 15 36; A. Paradox of Turkish
Nationalism and the Construction of Official in S. Kedourie (ed.) Turkey: Identity, Democracy,
Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 177 93; A. Akman, Nationalism: Statism and
National Identity in Nationalities Papers Vol. 32, 2004, pp. 23 51.




         
  










     




   
 
   
        
  
 
   
   




   
    
   
  
 
    
  
 
   
  
    
   

















Table 5.1 Typology of the Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism
TURKISH EURASIANISM
Nationalist Eurasianism Multiculturalist Eurasianism Westernist Eurasianism
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5.3.1. Nationalist Eurasianism
The first discourse is Nationalist Eurasianism which is in favour of turning Turkey s
face to the East and making alliances with countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria,
Russia, and so on. It is worth mentioning that according to the Nationalist Eurasianists,
the alliances with those countries should not be at the level of establishing a union with
all of them. A prospective union can be founded only with Turkic states and Iran since
the Nationalist Eurasianists perceive that Iran is a Turkic state.
As can be understood through the name of this division, intellectuals who are classified
within this group have nationalist ideals, thoughts, and approaches based on pan-
Turkism, pan-Turanianism, Islamism, and Ottomanism ideologies. Besides, they have
some untraditional recommendations regarding Turkey s foreign policy. What the
supporters of this discourse share is that they all have high expectations from the
alliances with Eurasian states such as Iran, Kazakhstan, etc. While they face towards
Eurasia, they perceive Eurasianism on the basis of Turkish identity. The main driving
force behind this approach is to exalt anti-imperialism and establish a Eurasian Union
with or without Russia s participation in order to halt the USA s imperialism. In an
interview with an academic who did not want to reveal her identity, this issue has been
argued as follows: Eurasianism is the only way out for Turkey against the Western
Imperialism. But I am not claiming that everything is from the West is bad. Their
technology can be transformed but I am against the imperialism. 422 Another bureaucrat
shares similar thoughts and state that Turkey is destined to lose its identity as long as
building strategic partnership with the Western world. Eurasia is Turkey s faith. 423 
According to supporters of this discourse, especially for An l e en, in the region first
and foremost Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Syria should establish a Union; he names
this Union n Asya Birli i (Western Asia Union). After that, this Union can be
expanded toward Central Asia. Although having expansionist ideas in the direction of
inner Asia in a peaceful way, e en avoids any kind of Union with Russia. The reason
422 Personal interview with an anonymous interviewee, 20 March 2010, Ankara, Turkey.




              
                 
              
            
             
            
 
            
          
                
              
               
         
           
               
             
  
                                                          
              
             
              
    
              
             
         
  
               
      
          
       
              
       
          
      
           
         
        
          
      
            
 
is that Russia has been an imperialist state throughout the whole of world history.
Hence, he alleges that it should be borne in mind that this Union ought to be established
without Russia or any other imperialist state. Herein, to prevent the emergence of any
doubt, concerning Turkish, Iranian and Syrian identities, e en claims that both Iran
and Syria are Turkish-origin states. Due to this, a Western Asia Union between
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Syria can be initiated with ease.424 
ener mezsoy, in his articles in weekly journal T rksolu and quarterly journal
leri425, emphasises that Russian Eurasianism, which consists of a Russia-China-India
axis, has no thesis to perform. On account of being aimless, mezsoy claims that it is
an abstract concept. That is why to make it concrete Russia needs Germany. According
to him, when it is looked at from this perspective, there is no Turkish-Russian Alliance
in the foreseeable future 426 . mezsoy s thoughts are positioned around anti-
imperialism, but his understanding, concerning being anti-imperialist, is not only about
opposing the USA or the EU, but also to oppose Russia. In this sense, Russian
Eurasianism is an imperialist idea to resuscitate and consolidate the USSR and its
expansionism policy.427 
424 Roundtable Discussion Report, and Eurasianism in New World 27th October 2004,
www.aysam.gen.tr; A. Turkiye ve Avrasya (Turkey and Eurasia), (Fark Ankara, 2006);
A. B Plan : Merkezi Devletler Birli i (Turkey Second Plan: Central States Union),
(Fark Ankara, 2007).
425 These two journals (T rksolu and Ileri) describe themselves as Kemalist, Nationalist, and Socialist.
426 S. Jeostratejisi (Russian Eurasianism or Geostrategy?),
Turksolu, Vol. 51, 2004, Available from <http://www.turksolu.org/51/usumezsoy51.htm> [Accessed on
19/08/2009].
427 S. Tarz Siyaset ve Sultan (Three Forms of Politics and Sultan
Galievism), Available from <http://www.ileri2000.org/32-33/usumezsoy32.htm> [Accessed on
19/08/2009]; S. ve Avrasyac l (Imperialism and Eurasianism), Available
from <http://www.millimucadele.org/220/usumezsoy220.htm> [Accessed on 19/08/2009]; S.
Projesi Asya- Asya (Western Asia or Inner Asia Union
Against GMEI), Available from <http://www.ileri2000.org/30/usumezsoy30.htm> [Accessed on
19/08/2009]; S. ve (Bolshevism, Eurasianism and
Nationalism), Available from <http://www.turksolu.org/221/usumezsoy221.htm> [Accessed on
19/08/2009]; S. anlamak bilmek (To Understand
Eurasianism, The Crimea needs to be known), Available from
<http://www.turksolu.org/58/usumezsoy58.htm> [Accessed on 19/08/2009]; S.
ve ulusal (Petroleum Shock and National Strategy), Available from
<http://www.millimucadele.org/111/usumezsoy111.htm> [Accessed on 19/08/2009]; S.




           
            
             
               
            
            
 
 
              
             
           
            
            
          
  
 
               
              
            
            
              
            
            
                                                                                                                                                                          
       
              
          
    
     
            
             
               
               
                 
                 
                
 
As previously mentioned, this division s chief argument is that Turkish Eurasianism
should be perceived and improved without any imperialist power and all Eurasian
Union projects, which Turkey will be included in, should be constituted without any
interference from Russia, the USA, or the EU. On this, mezsoy is in favour of
establishing a Eurasian Union between Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian countries.
This Union should not identify any differences between Tajiks, Turks, Kurds or
Tatars.428 
While some of them are claiming that a prospective union should be without Russia s
participation, others who have ambition to develop a partnership with Russia are Arslan
Bulut (columnist in Daily Yeni a , author, and researcher), Professor zcan Yeni eri,
Professor mit zda , Nam k Kemal Zeybek (author, former Minister, and the Leader
of the Democratic Party), Ali K lebi (Acting President of National Security Strategies
Research Centre), Suat lhan (Retired Lieutenant General), and Assistant Professor
hsan omak.
Arslan Bulut is known as a fervent Kemalist-Nationalist and he lays bare his thoughts in
his column in the Daily Yeni a . Regarding Russia s role in a prospective Union, Bulut
has some doubts.429 According to him, there are two different Eurasianist ideologies
within the present international relations realm. One of them is American Eurasianism
and the other is Russian Eurasianism. On the one hand, American Eurasianism was first
mentioned in Brzezinski s book The Grand Chessboard and has been extended and
endured through The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI).430 On the other hand,
<http://www.ileri2000.org/21/usumezsoy21.htm> [Accessed on 19/08/2009]; S.
Temel Ordu ve (Three Pillars of Turkish Left-wing:
Ataturk, Army, and United Struggle), Ileri, Vol. 23, Available from
<http://www.ileri2000.org/23/usumezsoy23.htm> [Accessed on 19/08/2009].
428 S.
429 A. Bulut, Sorosculuk ve (Eurasianism, Sorosism, and Ergenekon) Daily
, 10 February 2009; A. Bulut, ve ABD-Rusya tahterevalli
(A Seesaw Policy Between USA and Russia by Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan), Daily
, 17 February 2009; A. Bulut, 33 ve (Turkism
and Turkish Union According to when he was 33 years old), Daily a , 4 April 2008.
430 GMEI is a political term coined by the Bush administration to expand political rights and political




             
        
 
                
           
                
               
               
 
             
               
              
              
             
             
              
            
           
            
              
              
            
           
                                                                                                                                                                          
            
        
              
                
              
            
     
            
              
     
           
      
Russian Eurasianism is represented by Alexandr Dugin and this sect is backed by
mystic Russian Governance and its historical background.
Bulut is one of the proponents of a Turkish Union to prevent Turkey becoming a puppet
between American and Russian Eurasianism. From his perspective, Turkey should first
have a vision for a Turkish Union, and then the existence of Turkish Eurasianism can be
considered. However, in any case, to do this, while Russia shows utter respect to this
Union, Turkey should also be respected in a prospective Slavic Union.431 
In this sense, former minister Nam k Kemal Zeybek sets forth two different institutions
regarding the Eurasian Union. The first type of Union will be the Eurasian Union and
will encompass all Turkic states, even Tajikistan. This should be founded on the basis
of Turkish identity. Second will be a Eurasian Partnership and in this respect, Russia
should be an ally within this Partnership. Moreover, this Partnership should reach and
embrace the deepest parts of Asia.432 Likewise, zcan Yeni eri makes a statement that
the concept of Eurasia should embrace all nations, cultures and religions in the region
and generate opportunities for these cultures, nations and religions to collaborate. This
depends on promoting the relationship between Turkey and Russia. Although Turkey
and Russia have prejudgements and misunderstandings with each other, they both have
significant potential in the region by being a superpower or hegemon. Yeni eri backs a
Eurasian Union which can be shaped by Eurasian states like Turkey, Iran, Syria, and
Turkic States except Russia. He believes that first and foremost, Russia should
eliminate its ambitions which are against the interests of Turkey.433 
Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover various Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Georgia, Greece and Cyprus are sometimes also included.
431 Roundtable Discussion Report, and Eurasianism in New World 2004; A. Bulut,
yolu (The Way out for Russia is Turkish Union!), Daily , 02
December 2008; A. Bulut, Seferi (The Global Crusade), (Istanbul: Bilgi Yay 2005);
And a personal interview with Arslan Bulut, 10 March 2010, Turkey.
432 Roundtable Discussion Report, 2004.
433 Roundtable Discussion Report, 2004; , ve Stratejiler
ve (Eurasianism and Turkey on the Centre of Clash and Overlap Strategies),
Available from <http://www.aysam.gen.tr/asyaavrupa/?newsid_in=197&catalogid_in=44> [Accessed on
08/08/2009]; Yeni eri, Stratejik (Strategic Foresights for Turkey!),




            
              
             
          
             
             
        
   
 
            
           
             
             
              
              
 
 
   
 
          
            
            
               
              
              
             
                                                          
               
             
        
             
       
             
  
    
Another intellectual, Ali K lebi, claims that before establishing a Union, Turkey should
integrate with Azerbaijan. Then, this Union can be a centre of attraction for Uzbeks,
Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Persians, and Turkmens. To reach this aim, K lebi puts forward that
Turkey should develop the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) which was
created in 1985 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Although Edmund Herzig calls this
organisation to some extent, useless 434, K lebi champions that the ECO can sustain an
integration regarding cultural, economic, educational, and industrial relationships
between the members.435 
While K lebi points out that Turkish Eurasianism is an alternative regionalism idea
which may plan Turkey s future foreign policy direction, omak emphasises the
content of Turkish Eurasianism which has brought together anti-EU groups and he adds
that it cannot be imagined that these groups would coexist under normal conditions.436 
This Eurasianist ideology has been promoted as an option for Turkish foreign policy by
these anti-EU groups as it is considered historical fact and a geopolitical necessity by
them.
5.3.2. Multiculturalist Eurasianism
The second discourse is Multiculturalist Eurasianism. This discourse s understanding of
Eurasianism is more extensive compared to other discourses. The basic impetus of
Multiculturalist Eurasianism s advocators is to assemble all people who live in Eurasian
space under the same roof. Besides, there is a clear propensity among them to establish
a Eurasian Union between Russia, Turkey, Turkic States, Iran, and even India as an
alternative to the West (the EU, the USA). Some of the most important representatives
of Multiculturalist Eurasianism are author and poet, Attila lhan; Leader of the Turkish
434 E. Herzig, Iran and Central International Affairs, 80 (2004), 503-517 (p. 513).
435 A. (The forgotten Option: Turkish Eurasianism),
Available from <http://www.tusam.net/makaleler.asp?id=137> [Accessed on 16/02/2009]; A.
Merkezi Devletler mi? (The Union of Central States? Expanded
Eurasianism?), Available from <http://www.tusam.net/makaleler.asp?id=216> [Accessed on 16/02/2009].
(On Eurasianism in USAK Stratejik
Available from <http://www.usakgundem.com/haber/102/t%C3%BCrkiye%E2%80%99de-avrasyacilik-





           
 
 
          
            
              
                
             
              
            
             
              
         
 
           
                
              
           
              
            
              
             
              
             
              
                                                          
                
    
             
        
              
     
        
Workers Party, Do u Perin ek, and historian and political scientist, Dr. Mehmet
Perin ek.
Attila lhan (1925-2005) was, according to some 437 , Progenitor of Turkish
Eurasianism and his articles and books have sparked considerable discussions about the
concept from the far-leftists to the far-rightists. His stance has been confirmed by the
interviewees that I met during the field study. One of the questions was who do you
think can be named a genuine Eurasianist in Turkey? Without exception all the
interviewees gave Attila lhan s name as the genuine Eurasianist in Turkey. lhan was a
socialist, Kemalist, and anti-imperialist writer, columnist, and poet. All these sides of
him can be found in his writings. Concerning Turkish Eurasianism, his main opinion
was to establish a Eurasian Union between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The reason for
doing this is to become independent from the USA.438 
From his anti-imperialist thoughts, during the last two centuries Western Imperialism s
biggest aim has been to prevent a unification of the three biggest nations in Asia: Turks,
Slavs, Arabs in order to colonise their lands and impose the culture on indigenous
people.439 According to lhan, Turkey has significant geopolitical importance and can
play an efficient role in Eurasia and take measures against the Western Imperialism. In
addition to this role, as Turkey s historical background and dynamic economic system
suffice, many states which are located in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia have
nowadays turned their attention to Turkey. Moreover, he claims that when BSEC (Black
Sea Economic Cooperation) and ECO are taken into account, Turkey s rise in the 21st 
century can be seen from the horizon.440 Briefly, lhan, by his Eurasianist discourse,
argues that a Eurasian Union which is unified by Eurasian countries has great potential
437 in his paper - 2004, 207-238 (p. 212)] names Attila Ilhan as a
Progenitor of Turkish Eurasianism.
438 A. , Sultan Galiyef: (Sultan Galiyev: The Ghost Haunting
Eurasia), (Istanbul: 2000), p. 173.
439 A. Tehdit (mi) (Is Turkey threatening the Europe?), Daily
Cumhuriyet, 28 November 2003.




                
              
         
 
               
             
         
           
               
              
              
             
             
            
               
 
          
           
              
               
           
                                                          
                  
                
                 
               
               
   
            
   
        
 
              
              
            
 
              
     
to prevent all bad desires of the USA, the EU and Eastern Tigers 441 in terms of
capturing the Region s vast oil and natural gas resources. And this Union may emerge
as one of the biggest in the world.
Do u Perin ek, the leader of the Turkish Workers Party and a member of the Supreme
Council of Eurasian Movement, and his son, Mehmet Perin ek, are devout supporters of
Multiculturalist Eurasianism and its great strategic supremacy. Do u Perin ek s
counter-American thoughts are uncompromising. He perceives the USA as a state
which has a great aspiration to expand its imperialism across the world and to establish
a unipolar world system. In this regard, Perin ek argues that although there are many
states in Eurasia, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, and China are the main powerhouses in
the continent. And he follows that whereas these states have their own lesser
motherland, at the same time they have their bigger motherland, called Eurasia. By
Turkish Eurasianism, awareness of this bigger motherland discourse can be promoted in
order to unite and defend their lesser and bigger motherlands against the USA.442 
Perin ek s son, Mehmet Perin ek, follows his father s steps concerning Turkish
Eurasianism. According to him, Eurasianism defends a multipolar world system instead
of a unipolar system. Eurasian strategy is a civilisation programme against the falling of
the civilisation of the Atlantic. In this sense, Eurasia is the sole choice for Turkey
regarding its foreign policy direction. 443 In an interview conducted with Mehmet
441 It is a term used in reference to the highly developed economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan. Until mid-1997, the rapid growth of the East Asian economies was widely regarded
as a miracle. This growth had propelled Asia to such heightened importance in the world economy that
the next millennium was already anointed Pacific by some. For further information on
Eastern Tigers, see: T. Young, Re-Assessing the Health of the Asian Tigers, Graziadio Business Review,
Available from <http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/re-assessing-the-health-of-the-asian-tigers/>,
[Accessed on 02/04/2010]; The downward spiral of the Asian tigers, Available from
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/asian_economic_crises/72222.stm>, [Accessed on
02/04/2010]; Tigers adrift, Available from <http://www.economist.com/node/114999>, [Accessed on
02/04/2010].
442 D. , (Eurasia is Our Bigger Motherland), Eurasia Symposium in
Ankara, Turkey, (2004); D. , Avrasya ene i, Turkiye i in Politika (The Eurasian
Choice, Independent Foreign Policy for Turkey), (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1996); His website
www.doguperincek.com.
443 M. , Teori ve (Eurasianism: Its Theory and Practice in




               
                 
                
            
                  
                 
                
           
 
   
 
           
              
            
             
              
             
             
             
          
         
 
               
               
                
             
                 
               
     
                                                          
           
             
             
 
Perin ek before he went to jail, he drew the borders of the prospective Eurasian Union
more clearly and claimed that every country in the world apart from the USA might be a
member of the Union. According to him, a prospective Union must be built in order to
eliminate the imperialism of USA. Therefore, he, geographically, sees Latin America as
the left door of the Eurasian Union and North Africa as the south door of the Union. In
his thinking, this Union is the only way to save Turkey against the attacks of the USA.
That is why he thinks that the Union is not an alternative to Turkish foreign policy
understanding. Turkey has to be in this Union without a doubt.444 
5.3.3. Westernist Eurasianism
The third discourse is Western Eurasianism which supports Turkey s current foreign
policy course and along with it, agrees on increasing the relationships with countries of
the Eurasian continent. As a third division, the Westernist Eurasianism and thinkers,
under this group, have a tendency to strengthen the on-going relationships with Russia
along with the USA and the EU. Eurasianism and any kind of Eurasianist organisation
are perceived as a complimentary geopolitical strategy, not as an alternative. Some of
the supporters of this perception are Akkan S ver (President of the Marmara Groups
Strategic and Social Research Foundation), Prof. Erel Tellal, Prof. Nabi Avc (MP and
incumbent Minister of National Education), Sami G l (Former Minister), Hakan
Fidan (incumbent Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization/M T).
Erel Tellal, in a personal interview, stated that he is in favour of enduring the
relationships with both the West and the East and in a geographical sense, the term
Eurasia means for him both the west and the east of the Urals, namely it subsumes
Europe and Asia. In this respect, Turkey cannot have any Eurasian alternative against
the West, because the West and the East are located in the Eurasian region. As long as
Turkey has a relationship with the West, it should have a relationship with the East.
These policies cannot be separated.445 
444 Personal interview with Mehmet 11 March 2010, Turkey.
445 E. Tellal, Avrasya (Eurasian Alternative in Turkish Foreign




           
               
             
               
              
              
              
              
                
     
 
                
             
           
               




                 
             
              
            
            
          
               
            
              
                                                                                                                                                                          
               
             
                
       
Concerning Eurasia and Eurasianism, S ver s perception is that Eurasia also includes
both Europe and Asia and thus, it generates the biggest region of the world. Eurasia
could reach a brighter future , and all discriminations between the nations and people
who are settled in this region should be abolished.446 He explains his aims related to
Turkish Eurasianism in three phases. First of all, the wealth, the welfare, and the
development should be shared between the states which are located in the region. The
second phase states, where Turkish is the spoken language, should be united. And thus,
shared culture and thoughts can be transferred to the future generations. The third phase
is that Turkey s accession process to the EU is successful and then Turkey can be a
synthesizer between Europe and Asia.447 
As it is going to be seen in the following chapter, this discourse has been widely
accepted by the decision-makers since it is the softest version of Eurasianism comparing
to others, Nationalist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism discourses. It is highly believed
by Turkish public opinion that this discourse is the one which might enable Turkey to
formulate its own independent foreign policy course.
5.4. Conclusion
All in all, it can be said that Islam, the Ottoman heritage, and Nationalism are three of
the main impetuses which are influential to Turkey s domestic and foreign policy. In
this sense, in Turkey exogenous thoughts are analysed and perceived in the light of
those aforementioned impetuses. Therefore, they need to be examined closely in order
to determine the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism. In this respect, theoretically, as
Islam dismisses culture, language, ethnicity, geographical proximity etc. among its
followers, it has the potential to build a sense of shared identity. Since Ottoman times
Islam has, therefore, been perceived as a vital common denominator between the
subjects such as Turks, Kurds, etc. For that reason, Islam is influential in Turkish
1989-2006 Eurasian Trilogy II), ed. Mustafa (Ankara: Nobel 2007), pp. 13-33, (pp.
18); Personal interview with Prof. Dr. Erel Tellal, 31 January 2014, Ankara, Turkey.
446 A. Gelecek (The Future is Eurasia), Yeni Yayinlari, 2008), p. 17.




             
           
           
             
              
               
              
            
               
   
 
                  
         
             
             
              
        
 
        
    
 
   
   
   
   
   
















    
   
     
  
    
   
  
domestic and foreign policy courses. On the other hand, Ottomanist discourses can be
found in the majority of Turkish citizens, despite disparaging Kemalist discourses
towards the Ottoman history. Along with Islamist and Ottomanist discourses, Turkish
nationalism has also a dominant effect on Turkish society. In particular, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union the tendency for unification with the Turkic states which
emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia has always been kept alive by the rightist
parties. That is why ultra-right parties in Turkey have been in favour of forming Turkic-
nationalist discourse for a long time. In addition, despite the fact pan-Turanianism s
targets are highly unlikely, it has been a leverage to think/embrace of much wider area
similar to Eurasianism.
On the other hand, in the light of this knowledge, it might be said that there are three
main discourses of Turkish Eurasianism: Nationalist, Multiculturalist and Westernist.
The following table summarises the features of the three Eurasianist discourses. In line
with the discussion, this summary draws attention to the overlapping expectations of the
discourses despite the fact that they differ from each other regarding the meaning of
Eurasia and the sources of the discourses.
























A Eurasian Power for
a better future
A Eurasian Power for a
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These three discourses have similar perspectives regarding Turkey s role and
importance in the region. They all focus on the Turkic states facilitator role in order to
create an environment for Turkey to promote Turkish Eurasianism as it derives from
these kin states presence. However, when it comes to the content of the prospective
Eurasian Union, they have separate visions. That is based on their reservations about
Russia and the Western states. While some of the nationalists claim that Russia might
be one of the members of the Union (if necessary), some of the multiculturalists carry
the same reservation about the western world (except the USA).
Regarding Turkey s place in this Union, they all have different arguments. The most
ambitious one comes from the Nationalists as they see Turkey as the leader of the
Union. While the Multiculturalists argue that Turkey and Russia share the leadership,
the Westernists propose that Turkey might be one of the significant players through the
Union. Besides, there are several different sources in order to prepare the ground for a
prospective Union. Nationalists embrace many features contrary to Multiculturalist and
Westernist discourses such as Turkishness, Anti-imperialism, Patriotism, Pan-Turkism,
Islamism, and Ottomanism. Lastly, their expectations are generally considered to be the
same as they all claim such a Union for a better future for the benefit of Turkey. In
addition, only the Westernist discourse emphasises democracy while it argues that the
Eurasian continent is one of the most important regions for Turkey and it must be taken






      




            
               
            
             
              
             
               
              
           
          
             
                
                
       
 
                 
                
               
              
             
              
                                                          
            
   
                
  
         
CHAPTER VI
THREE PERIODS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DISCOURSES
6.1. Introduction
The preceding chapters have presented an overview of Turkey s foreign policy course
since the late Ottoman era. On this account, there is a wide consensus among the
students of international relations that Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and the
beginnings of 2000s may be roughly divided into four periods: an inter-war period
(1923-1945), Cold War era (1945-1980s), a period of new world order (1990s) and AK
Party era (2000s)448. These periods differ from each other. Generally speaking, until the
1980s, Kemalism had the upper hand and an ability to permeate and shape every level
of society; and it was publicly unchallenged. In political life, this resulted in the
emergence of a Kemalist civilian-military bureaucratic structure which did not allow
elected governments to fully implement their own foreign policy programmes. 449 
However, Turgut zal s rise changed this course and challenged Kemalism, as had not
been seen before. That was a turning point in terms of devising a new state ideology.
Since then, Turkey has been in a struggle and Eurasianism has been one of the notions
affecting the devising of this process.
In this regard, zal era comes into prominence as one of the periods of this chapter. The
next one is Cem era. He was the one who emphasised Turkey s Ottoman past and its
unique traits such as culture and geography and also tried to formulate a new foreign
policy understanding upon this mind-set. After zal era, it is the first time a multi-
dimensional foreign policy approach was observed in his period. In this era, Turkey
earned candidate status to the EU, expanded its influence in Central Asia through joint
448 T. and M. Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy, Available from
<http://www.thenewturkey.org/understanding-turkish-foreign-policy/new-turkey/82>, [Accessed on
02/05/2014]; W. Hale, Turkish Foreign ; F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Foreign Policy
2003.




           
                 
 
 
                
              
             
          
               
            
             
           
              
              
                
               
               
 
              
            
              
             
           
             
              
             
             
            
              
          
                                                          
          
          
security cooperation, improved its relations with Greece, Syria and Iran.450 This pro-
activism is the reason why the Cem era has been chosen as the second period of this
chapter.
The last period of this chapter is Davuto lu era as he is the incumbent Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, who has raised pro-activism to higher levels in
his term. Similar to zal and Cem, Davuto lu and AK Party foreign policy
understanding was multi-dimensional. While zal was stressing on building economic
relations with the countries in the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia and Cem
was pointing out that Turkey overlooked the importance of historical and cultural
elements in foreign policy making, Davuto lu has put efforts on both approaches to
broaden Turkey s foreign policy horizon and to integrate cultural and historical
dimensions to Turkish foreign policy making process.451 For instance, it is the first time
in the history Turkey has had embassies/consulates in almost every country in the world
during the AK Party era. In this context, while these three periods differ from each other
at the same time they differ from other periods of Turkish foreign policy since 1923.
This is the rationale behind why these three periods have been chosen for this chapter.
Therefore, this chapter first examines the causes of such a dramatic change of power
balance and related factors such as zal s personality and Turkey s economic opening
programmes. In the main part of this chapter, foreign policy approaches of the then
Prime Minister and President Turgut zal, the then Foreign Minister smail Cem, and
the incumbent Foreign Minister Professor Ahmet Davuto lu will be investigated. A
special emphasis will be put on whether the discourses of Eurasianism have been
applied or performed during these three periods of Turkish foreign policy. In doing so, a
number of indicators, which have been determined and chosen after in-depth analyses of
zal, Cem, and Davuto lu s speeches, mind-sets, and initiatives, will be used in order
to examine whether these three periods present any Eurasianist approaches explicitly or
implicitly. In this regard, this chapter will reveal the impact of Eurasianist ideology in
the Turkish foreign policy making on these three periods.
450 T. and M. Understanding Turkish Foreign
451 T. and M. Understanding Turkish Foreign
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6.2. Era: Westernist Eurasianism by using Nationalist and Religious
Appeals
zal452 Turgut
During the 1970s, because of the American arms embargo as a result of the Cyprus
Crisis, Turkey had partly been isolated from the international system. It had no solid
and reliable relations with the European Community (EC) and the USA. Besides, due to 
the bipolarity of the international system and Turkey s NATO membership Turkey did
not aim to build proper relations with the communist bloc states either.
While Turkey was experiencing such isolation, the 1980 military coup was carried out
by the Turkish military in the name of suppressing terrorism and anarchy which had
deteriorated badly and deepened the socio-political and economic crises faced by the
country. Although the American arms embargo was lifted on 26 September 1978,
Turkey s ordeal had not ended. The EC s reaction to the coup created another embargo
and the European Parliament suspended financial aid to Turkey on January 1982. In 
addition, the Western leaders kept harshly criticising the Generals who performed the
coup. And all these developments caused Turkey s isolation to last for a bit longer.
Bearing in mind these circumstances, Turkey had to make a choice in order to create a
viable environment. Thus, the Generals explored the Arab world as a new ally for
overcoming the political isolation and economic difficulties. Turkey s axis shift yielded
its result and its total exports to the Muslim world doubled in 1983.453 Furthermore,
Turkey s exports to the Western countries decreased significantly in the same period.454 
452 F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
453 M. B. Aykan, and the OIC, 1984- Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1993,
Vol. XXVII, pp. 106-107.
454 H. and M. Changes in Exports of an Emerging Economy: Case of 




              
             
            
              
                  
              
 
 
              
            
          
          
        
          
   
 
              
              
                
            
               
                
           
 
               
         
                                                                                                                                                                          
            
       
         
                
             
           
               
             
            
                
              
      
All in all, Turgut zal came to power amid such an isolated and economically
struggling condition. zal was a successful bureaucrat and manager and also was a
fervent supporter of democracy, liberalism, and freedom of rights. He was an open-
minded figure who believed that all people have something to say and they can
articulate that freely. zal s way of thinking was in a way a legacy of his years in the
USA for his postgraduate studies. Regarding zal s time in the USA, La iner points out
that
zal was an admirer of the United States. In his view, the United States
owed its success to its liberalism. zal further argued that the United
States and the Ottoman Empire were similar political structures: Both
allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their
religion, nationality, and economic preferences. From this perspective,
Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the
Kemalist state ideology.455 
zal s likeable personality in the eyes of the Turkish public and his rivals (Demirel,
Ecevit, T rke , and Erbakan) elimination from politics by the coup led him to become
the Prime Minister of Turkey by the 1983 elections. In a short time, he managed to
transform Turkey into a young tiger dubbed by Andrew Mango.456 This economic
success brought activism in foreign policy as well. Foreign policy was one of the issues
to which zal attached much importance. It is known that he even used to take actions
without consulting his Ministers of Foreign Affairs from time to time.457 
In addition to the isolation of Turkey in the international arena, the change in the
international balance of power had underscored Turkey s deteriorating conditions
Export Performance: A Decomposed Constant Market Shares Russian and East European
Finance and Trade, 36(4), July-August 2000, 80-90.
455 S. Kemalism to p. 289
456 A. Mango, From the Sultan to Ataturk: Turkey: The Peace Conferences of 1919-23 and Their
Aftermath (Makers of the Modern World), (London: Haus Publishing, 2010); A. Mango,
The World Today, 50(3), March 1994, pp. 60-61. p. 60.
457 M. Heper and M. Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish
Political Science Quarterly, 111 (3), (Autumn 1996); M. Ataman, Change:
Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International
Relations, 1 (1) (Spring 2002); D. Ekinci, between the Balkans and the Caucasus in the Post-
Cold War Era: or Player University Journal of Humanities and Social




                
              
            
             
                
 
               
             
    
 
   
 
             
              
             
          
              
            
              
              
              
           
             
            
 
 
                                                          
              
     
           
           
          
    
           
during the 1980s. Over the following years, the USA was one of the few allies of
Turkey despite the embargo crisis. Yet, Turkey was also losing its stand because of
Gorbachev s Presidency and the gradual thaw in the USA-Soviet Union relations. All
these developments undermined Turkey s position as a frontier state . Yet, zal did not
lose his faith in the West and carried out policies in order to integrate with it.
In this regard, three main dynamics have been chosen in order to analyse zal s foreign
policy implementations, as they had caused a remarkable change in the economic and
social structures of Turkey.
Ethnic groups
Turkey is called a mosaic of different identities including various religious, ethnic, and
linguistic groups.458 But among these minorities, it can be put forward that only ethnic
groups have a significant effect on the Turkish foreign policy making process. Alevis,
Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Assyrians are among the biggest religious minority
communities of Turkey. The size of the Armenians is between 50,000 and 93,000, while
Greeks comprise around 3,500. Also, one of the biggest religious groups Assyrians
consist of 25,000 people.459 When it comes to ethnic minorities, Kurds are the biggest
minority in Turkey. Although the size of the Kurdish community is controversial, it is
estimated that the Kurdish community numbers about 13 million or around 20 per cent
of Turkey s population.460 Another big minority group is Balkan immigrants. While
some allege that the number of immigrants between 1923 and 1995 was over
1,600,000 461 , others put the number of immigrants between 1876 and 1996 at
750,000.462 
458 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey, Occasional Papers No: 19, Stockholm:
Utrikespolitiska Instituet, 2011, p. 8.
459 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey..., p. 8-12.
460 N. Karimova and E. Deverell, Minorities in Turkey..., p. 13.
461 F. Olarak Gelenlerin Available from
<http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/yerlesim/doganayf/gocmen.pdf>, [Accessed on 13/02/2013].




             
             
              
              
           
             
            
            
              
               
               
             
                 
            
             
             
            
             
            
              
               
            
             
           
            
           
                                                          
                 
   
          
During the zal era, Turkey experienced a relatively more democratic period. Such a
restoration of democracy made ethnic groups self-confident and led them to partly join
the democratic system. The role of these ethnic groups was significant as there were
hundreds of thousands of them, thanks to the Ottoman Empire, as after its demise
Anatolia witnessed an incredible immigrant flow from the Balkans, Caucasus and
Russia. However, until zal those ethnic groups integration with the Turkish polity had
not taken place. zal s liberal reforms launched a renaissance for democratic rights.
Within this framework, ethnic groups have preferred to integrate with the system
voluntarily and they ruled out their own ethnic identities in the country s political scene.
This was not that painful for those groups since when Turkey granted those people with
citizenship they felt indebted to the regime and that led to their integration without their
ethnic identities. Along with the integration of ethnic groups, their influence over the
foreign policy started to grow rapidly. As a result of this, a new awareness was raised in
the Turkish foreign policy towards those countries from which the country s migrated
ethnic groups originally came. For instance, during the Bosnian War, the effect of
Bosnian Turks was unprecedented. During the War, there was huge pressure on the
government, led by the then Prime Minister S leyman Demirel, for taking unilateral
action or participating in peacekeeping missions. The pressure was not only from the
opposition but also from the Balkan immigrants. On the opposition side, Necmettin
Erbakan of the prominent Islamists was blaming Demirel for not getting involved in the
war and expressed S leyman Demirel is a fake S leyman, if he had been S leyman the
Magnificent, he would have forcibly gone to Bosnia-Herzegovina by now. 463 On the
immigrants side, their pressure on the government was another motive for taking action
against the aggressors. They were constantly criticising the government s foreign policy
and pushing the government to embrace a pro-active foreign policy towards the
Balkans. 464 In addition to Turkey s participation in peacekeeping missions in the
463 Quoted in Bal (Ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era, (Florida: BrownWalker Press,
2004), p. 203.





           
  
 
            
             
                
            
               
             
              
             
               
            
               
                
               
           
               
             
          
 
 
                                                          
                
               
               
 
               
           
                   
   
                  
                 
                
              
                 
         
Balkans, some immigrant associations provided aid to Bosnians fighting against the
Serbian paramilitaries.465 
Another ethnic minority group influencing Turkish foreign policy is the Kurds, who
constitute 20 per cent of Turkey s population. Without getting involved in the Kurdish
question of Turkey, it must be mentioned that the Kurdish ethnic group has been one of
the main determinants of Turkey s foreign policy towards the southern neighbours, such
as Syria, Iran, and Iraq. In particular Turkey s involvement in the Gulf War of 1990-91
and support for the allied coalition, the failure in ousting Saddam Hussein, the
unsuccessful Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, and the influx of tens of thousands of
Kurdish refugees into Turkey during March and April 1991 made the situation much
more complicated; the existence of a Kurdish ethnic group and the PKK466 in Turkey is
still affecting the foreign policy making process.467 For instance, according to Turkey,
Syria was the main provider of logistical and training support to the PKK. This issue
was used as a threat towards Turkey by Syria in balancing Turkey s use of water from
the Euphrates River. Syria was aiming to halt Turkey's plans to divert water from the
Euphrates for its massive irrigation development scheme called the Great Anatolian
Project, or GAP.468 In this sense, it is logical to claim that Turkey s foreign policy
course towards Syria, Iraq, and Iran has been highly influenced by Turkey s Kurdish
minorities, especially with the existence of the PKK terrorist organisation.
465 E. Bulut, ends, Balkans, Statesmen Lend Us Your The Trans-state and State in Links
between Turkey and the Ethnopolitics, 5 (3) (September 2006), pp. 309 326; D. U. Eralp,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Future Reflecting on the Seta Policy Brief, No: 46, August
2010.
466 The PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Party) has waged a guerrilla campaign
since 1984 to carve out an independent Kurdish state from Turkey.
467 S. and the Middle East in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3,
(1997), p. 46.
468 S. and the Middle (1997), p. 48; For more information about the Water issue
between Turkey and Syria see: P. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1991); J. Bulloch and A. Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London:
Gollancz, 1993); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria, and
Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs Vol. 1, No. 2 (June- August 1996), pp. 82-112; S. (Ed.),




     
 
             
              
           
             
       
 
               
              
                 
             
              
          
                
       
 
                 
              
            
               
             
              
             
           
                                                          
              
      
         
                
Globalisation of Turkish Economy
As mentioned, zal was a premier who focused on economic developments more than
any other leader since Mustafa Kemal Atat rk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey.
Turkey s economic conditions were deteriorating when zal came to power. Eralp,
T nay, and Ye ilada allege that during the 1970s Turkey experienced the worst political
and socioeconomic crises of its republican history.469 
And as it was pointed out, the coup Generals turned their face towards the Muslim
world due to the isolation by western states in order to overcome economic difficulties.
Yet, this exit strategy from crises was used as an opportunity by zal in order to create
a more viable economic environment. Due to zal s Westernist approach, in a short
time the EC became the most important export area for Turkish goods once again.470 
However, zal-led economic restructuring also benefited from global and regional
changes in this era such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, opening of the
economy, Islamic revolution in Iran, and etc.
The collapse of the Soviet Union came as a result of the rivalry with the USA. The
economic performance of the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in the late
1970s. Both were massively building up their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But
toward the end of the war, the Soviet nuclear stockpile surpassed the USA. In
addition to economic and nuclear growth, the USSR was also building new military
bases around the world.471 However, all these developments came with costs and soon it
was revealed that the growth was not sustainable. Besides, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan deteriorated the economic conditions of the Union. However, this rivalry
469 A. Eralp, M. and B. Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey,
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), p. 1..
470 S. Kemalism to p. 294.




             
     
 
            
          
              
             
             
              
              
             
            
   
 
               
          
            
               
            
           
            
              
               
                                                          
                    
        
              
                 
                
       
                
               
           
               
            
             
meant the end of of 472 and helped in the Turkish-American rapprochement
along with the following events.473 
As a response to the abovementioned problems, Mikhail solution was to
liberalise the Soviet Union through glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reform)
policies. However, it was witnessed that the response was not good enough to prevent
the disintegration of the Soviet Union.474 While the disintegration created a power and
ideological vacuum in the international system, it has indirect impact on Turkey through
successor states of the Soviet Union. Turkey has been keen to establish solid relations
with the post-USSR states. In particular, the relations with the Turkic states have always
had significant importance for Turkey due to sharing ethnic and linguistic ties with
them. However, Turkey was in no position to seize the opportunity, neither
economically nor politically.
During this frame of time, opening of the economy was one of the significant
global changes. China, the second-most powerful Communist state, was also
experiencing similar problems with the Soviet Union. Necessary measures were taken at
the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978
when Deng Xiaoping had emerged as the pre-eminent leader. 475 In this process,
consumption and light manufacturing were supported, market reforms were extended to
urban areas, agriculture was decollectivized and foreign capital and goods were allowed
to enter China. While it was preserving the Communist system, private sector in China
was as large as its public sector around the 1990s.476 Although Turkey did not have
472 An era between the late 1960s and late 1970s. It is characterised by a relative easing of the political
tensions between the USA and the USSR.
473 A. Eralp, M. and B. Political and , 1993, p. 3.
474 D. Holloway, New Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, (Winter 1989), pp. 66-81.
475 P. Bottelier, and the World Bank: How a Partnership Was Working Paper, Stanford
Center for International Development, No: 277, p.2.
476 For further information on economic transformation see: E. F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the
Transformation of China, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); L. Brandt and
T. G. Rawski, Great Economic Transformation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008); J.R. Barth, G. Caprio, and T. Phumiwasana, Transformation of China from an Emerging
Economy to a Global in Emerging Financial Markets: Challenging and




             
              
  
 
             
            
             
            
              
  
 
          
            
            
            
            
              
                
             
              
            
             
              
            
                                                          
                
             
 
               
           
 
          
               
              
woven relationships with China during these days, the opening of Chinese economy had
effects on Turkish economy as it had impact on the international system and global
world economy.
In addition to these two global significant changes, the Iranian Revolution in 1979
changed the regional equations. Turkey has had longstanding relations with Iran and
those relations might be characterised by highs and lows. Mutual suspicion and rivalry
have been two main features of the relations, so far. Economic, demographic,
geopolitical, and cultural conditions of both states can be put forward for these rivalry
and suspicion.477 
In 1979, revolutionary powers overthrew monarchy, Pahlavi dynasty and
established the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. Although Pahlavi dynasty had established strong ties with the Western world
and pursued pro-American foreign policy, the revolution was no longer enthusiastic to
continue its relationships with the Western countries. In this sense, Khomeini was
calling the USA as a nation with selfish motives.478 According to Khomeini the
problems of the East stem from those foreigners from the west, and from America at the
moment. All our problems come from 479 This change of Iran foreign policy
course and the Iran-Iraq war, which was sparked by Saddam invasion of Iran
to take advantage of the revolutionary chaos, caused an economic downturn. However,
these economic and political changes suited interests as the USA not only
challenged Iran on various issues in the region, it also supported Turkey and the
"Turkish model" as a secular, modern Muslim country against the Islamic regime.480 
477 B. Transitions and Stability in the Greater Middle paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in San Fransisco, California, March 26-29,
2008.
478 K. Wise, Revolution of 1979: The Downfall of American-Iranian Legacy, Vol. 11,
No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-11 (7), Available at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/legacy/vol11/iss1/2, [Accessed on
24.12.2014].
479 Quoted in K. Wise, Revolution of p.8.
480 N. A. and Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations Since the 1979 Islamic




             
           
              
               
             
             
             
              
               
       
 
             
           
             
            
                 
             
              
   
 
               
         
               
               
               
     
                                                          
            
              
              
       
             
              
            
 
Under these conditions in the global and regional context, Turkey was aiming to
transform its economy through zal s endeavours. Turkey s deep integration into the
world economy was one of the main drivers of zal s policy. He saw Turkey s
neighbours as markets for Turkish goods in the first place. In addition to his economic
benefit-centred foreign policy, zal was a supporter of enhancing political ties with the
neighbours too so that it would be much easier to consolidate an economic
relationship.481 Besides, as it is mentioned above, the global and regional changes also
helped Turkey to sustain its close relationships with the USA. Thus, Turkey managed to
get funds from international lending agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the
OECD to sustain its economic restructuring process.482 
Bearing this in mind, zal also aimed to introduce a multi-directional foreign policy
understanding. During his Premiership and Presidency, he managed to build good
relations with Turkey s neighbours as well as with the USA. The European Union
became one of Turkey s indispensable economic partners. zal also played a significant
role in the creation of the BSEC which came into existence as a promising model of a
multilateral economic initiative on 25 June 1992. This economic boom and zal s way
of thinking widened Turkey s horizons and opened the doors for Turkey to become a
regional power.483 
All in all, the 1980s were an era Turkey initiated a number of economic reforms,
embraced liberal market-based approach, achieved impressive economic expansion, and
to some extent got integrated into the world market under the leadership of the then
Prime Minister Turgut In this era, Turkish economy grew at an annual rate over
5% and the Turkish export volume increased from 2.910 million dollars in 1980 to 20
billion dollars in the 1990s.484 
481 N. Danforth, and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign p. 89.
482 A. Eralp, M. and B. Political and , 1993, p. 3.
483 S. Kemalism to p. 291; S. -American Relations: A
Politika, 33(1-2), 2008, p. 8.
484 S. , (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Journal of
Administrative Sciences Vol. 1 (2003), p. 182-185; S. , Kemalism to , the






        
 
               
             
              
             
    
 
              
               
                 
           
          
        
                
            
 
  
                
             
           
             
                
               
               
                                                          
                
                
          
  
                  
 
zal s Ideological Approach and Discourses of Eurasianism
zal was an open-minded leader who applied radical reforms in order to catch up with
the Western world during his era. In addition, he promised economic and social
innovation as he believed that the reason for Turkish backwardness was the lack of
liberalism and scientific thinking.485 zal promoted and created this way of thinking at
the expense of Kemalism.
zal was also against the traditional nationalist and statist way of leadership. As he
came from a conservative and religious family as well as from the periphery of the
Turkish society and spent his years in the USA, he was equipped with a unique set of
advantages to put together an effective ideology called zalism consisting of
Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism. And this zalism was described as an economy-
486 Inoriented, pragmatic, multi-dimensional, pro-active foreign policy understanding . 
this sense, to clarify zal s way of thinking and its relation to Eurasianism a set of
indicators will be compiled based on existing information in our discussions here.
Indicator 1
First of all, regarding the discourses of Eurasianism, it is safe to say that zal s Turkism
can be named Westernist Eurasianism . One of the results of the Soviet Union s
disintegration was the political independence of the five Turkic republics. Their
emergence created an expectation in Turkey and the West that all these Turcophone
states would build a union of Turkic states in which Turkey would play a big brother 
role. And zal wanted to take this opportunity. According to him, it was a historic
opportunity to become a regional power and also this chance cannot be thrown away as
485 H. Pope, question ideological foundations of the state: Kemalism has been undermined but no
new formula is in evidence that might replace The Independent, 21 July 1993, Available from
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/turks-question-ideological-foundations-of-the-state-
kemalism-has-been-undermined-but-no-new-formula-is-in-evidence-that-might-replace-it-writes-hugh-
pope-in-istanbul-1486153.html> [Accessed on 20/02/2013]; S. Kemalism to
p. 297.





                 
              
              
     
 
               
               
               
               
              
             
          
             
           
           
 
                
               
            
             
               
                 
           
             
             
                                                          
                 
         
              
          
            
                 
               
                
             
 
it presented itself for the first time in 400 years .487 This view was also promoted by the
USA and the European Communities. In those days, Turkey was presented as a model
for Turcophone states in order to keep these newly independent republics away from the
influence of Russia and Iran.
Apart from the West and Turkey, the leaders of those republics were also excited about
the new process and the Turkish model idea, as they were looking for political and
economic support in order to survive after a long lasting Soviet reign. However, in a
short time all sides realised that not only did Turkey have limited financial resources to
take Russia s place but also the newly independent republics were bound to Moscow in
more ways than initially envisaged. All in all, Turkey s opening towards Central Asia
and Transcaucasia ended in major disappointment. Although Turkey s fanciful notions
of ethnic solidarity policy had to be terminated, Turkey imagined building a more
explicit notion of self-interest policy.488 Yet, expanding its political, economic, social
and cultural ties with Turkic republics has remained Turkey s long-range goal.489 
In short, while zal claimed that there is a clear need to have Turcophone states getting
involved in founding a political structure of the union, he pointed out that this should
have been within the framework of integration and development. His Turkism was
based on cultural and economic unification rather than solely ethnic criteria. That is
why it can be alleged that his Turkism may be named Westernist Eurasianism as it
aimed to bring together this new entity and the West. This way of thinking is similar to
the rationale behind the establishment of the International Organisation of La
Francophonie (IOF)490. This organisation has been built on the French language in order
to create a linguistic zone whose members share a common language and humanist
487 D. Jung and W. Piccoli, at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East 
(London and New York: Zed book, 2001), p. 179.
488 P. Robins, Sentiment and Self Interest: Policy toward Azerbaijan and Central
Asian Middle East Journal, 47 (4), 593-610, pp. 610.
489 D. Jung and W. Piccoli, at the , p. 181.
490 The International Organisation of La Francophonie was created in 1970. Its mission is to embody the
active solidarity between its 77 member states and governments (57 members and 20 observers), which
together represent over one-third of the United member states and account for a population of





           
             
           
              
             
              
             
            
              
            
 
          
             
          
            
             
            
            
           
            
   
  
                
              
                 
                  
               
 
  
             
               
                                                          
        
    
        
    
values. However, interestingly it does not merely include French-speaking countries. It
has also members whose official language is not French, such as Greece, Bulgaria,
Armenia, and Romania. In particular, Greece s participation in this organisation is
worth examining. While Greece had been an associate member since 2004, it became a
full member on 28-29 November 2006 during the 11th IOF Summit Meeting in
Bucharest. This membership has been seen as a move to reinforce the plurality of
languages within the EU. Besides, according to an official from the Greek Permanent
Representation in Brussels, Greece safeguarded its own language by making room for
more languages to be spoken .491 Yet, the reason for participation is presented in the
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hellenic Republic as follows:
Greece s decision to join La Francophonie was made following the
assessment of the prospect of access to a significant forum based on a
common language (French) and an area of common principles and
solidarity, which is mainly aimed at promoting democracy, the rule of law,
respect for human rights, peace and security, as well as the protection of
cultural heritage and support for cultural and linguistic diversity. It is on
the preservation of these principles that the survival of nations and their
cultures is more or less dependent. Finally, the local cooperation of
representatives of IOF member states in various parts of the world is
deemed very useful.492 
This usefulness is the key point of zal s way of thinking about creating a union which
is based on cultural and economic integration. Turkishness might be one of the pillars
but it is not compulsory for being a member of this union. As long as each member
makes a contribution, it might be a member of the union. According to zal, it is one of
the best ways of having the upper hand over the relations with the Western World.
Indicator 2
Having said that, zal s Turkism was an ideology that was neither irredentist nor
isolationist. His main aim was to expand Turkey s influence in a new field to enhance
491 Greece joins international Francophone body, Available from <http://www.euractiv.com/future-
eu/greece-joins-international-franc-news-212804>, [Accessed on 26/02/2014].
492 Greece in International Organisations, Francophonie, Available from <http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-




             
                 
               
          
             
            
 
                
              
              
            
               
             
 
              
            
              
         
           
            
          
    
 
          
              
                
              
           
                                                          
              
                  
                
               
     
Turkey s strategic importance to the West and also to maintain the regional stability.493 
In this regard, even if it was not directly involved with the Turkic states, the BSEC was
a project which could present Turkey as a model for the ex-Soviet states and newly
independent republics. Besides, while this initiative could restore a peaceful co-
existence in the region by increasing trade and economic cooperation, zal s aim with
BSEC was that Turkey would consolidate its status as a regional leader.494 
In this regard, zal led the creation of the Council of Turkic Speaking States in 1992.
He attached great importance to these summits of Heads of Turkic Speaking states in
order to create a viable environment of free movement of people, goods, and services.
And also he believed that Turkic states could strengthen cooperation and coordination
with the EC by increasing the capacities of railway, road and air transportation in order
to transport natural resources of the Turkic states through the territory of Turkey.
Another initiative which zal played a leading role in was the creation of TURKSOY
(The International Organization of Turkic Culture). TURKSOY was founded on 12 July
1993 immediately after zal s death on 17 April 1993. In Alma-Ata, the Ministers of
Culture of five Turkic republics, namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan together with Turkey signed the agreement on the
Principles of Activities and Establishment of TURKSOY which is a cultural initiative
among Turkic speaking states similar to UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation).
Turkey s relations with the newly independent republics kept developing increasingly
during the post-Soviet era. As Turkey met the Central Asian republics during the zal s
term, a number of initiatives were launched and this first led communities to think that a
new era started regarding creating a Union among the Turkic republics despite the fact
that after a while that turned into disappointment. Nevertheless, Turkey s opening
493 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy p. 99.
494 S. Sayan, Effects of the BSEC on Regional Trade Agora without Frontiers, 10 (4), 2005,
334-347; S. Sayan and O. Zaim, Sea Economic Cooperation in L. Rittenberg (ed.) The
Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East, (Westport, CT:




              
            
              
           
               
                
              
             
            
 
 
             
                 
                
               
          
           
             
          
            
   
 
              
              
               
             
             
            
                                                          
      
            
               
            
towards the Turkic Republics might be considered as a success because of managing to
raise awareness of Turkishness, presence of Turkic Republics and a different foreign
policy course. This point is often raised by a number of intellectuals. For instance,
Arslan Bulut and Gamze G ng rm Kona 495 mentioned it during the interviews.
According to Bulut, while it was a great opportunity to build a Turkic Union, having
missed that was not the end of the world as the Turkic world has gained awareness. 496 
Kona makes a similar emphasis on Turkey s opening but she adds that the Central
Asian Republics needs to push themselves further in order to improve their own
economies, democracies, and etc. so that the prospective union would be worth
creating. 497 
Herein, zal s way of thinking, which might be called Westernist Eurasianism, was not
merely to create such a Union as an alternative to the West. In contrast, firstly it was
supported by the West itself. Secondly, it aimed to bring the East and the West together
so that Turkey would benefit from that. In this regard, apart from embarking upon new
initiatives that promote economic, cultural, social, and political cooperation, Turkey
also provided great diplomatic support for these republics. For instance, Turkey
managed to facilitate their entry into the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE, later renamed OSCE), the North Atlantic Coordination Council
(NACC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO).498 
zal approached the ideology of Turkism as a means to build cooperation among the
Turkic speaking states in order to help them to develop and overcome their economic,
social, and political problems. In sum, while he was trying to integrate all the Turkic
states with the world economy, zal also aimed to widen Turkey s foreign policy
horizon by establishing new organisations in not only Turcophone states but also all
regional states. This approach also strengthens the previous allegations that zal s way
495 Associate Professor of International Relations.
496 A personal interview with Arslan Bulut, 10 March 2010, Turkey.
497 A personal interview with Assoc. Prof. Gamze Kona, 12 March 2010, Turkey.




           
          
 
  
           
                
          
               
            
            
                
             
          
              
             
                
               
            
            
             










                                                          
                  
             
of understanding might be called Westernist Eurasianism which stressing on regional
cooperation in Eurasia while putting a special emphasis on Turkishness.
Indicator 3
Through zal s free market economy understanding, this third indicator would argue
that in a way zal tried to diversify the country s trade options. In this sense, his
approach could be described as Westernist Eurasianism . zal s worldview promoted
Turkey s neighbourhood as a new hinterland for the state. That is why; several steps had
been taken in order to enhance Turkey s relations with the neighbourhood countries
during the 1980s and the 1990s. zal expanded commercial and economic relations
with the Arab world. At the same time, the relations with Greece were on the upswing,
while Turkey initiated a rapprochement with Israel, Iran, and the European States. For
instance, long-lasting strained relations with Greece experienced an interim period
during the zal era. One of the most important developments occurred in 1988. The
then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut zal and the then Greek Prime Minister Andreas
Papandreou met in Davos and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline, to meet at
least once a year, and to visit each other s country. They also called for an
intensification of contact.499 As for the relations (economic) with the EU, Turkey s
embracement of an outward-oriented strategy on its relations with the European states
and the liberalisation of the Turkish economy yielded results. Turkey has achieved an
impressive transformation as seen in Figure 6.1.
499 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy pp. 73-74; A. Makovsky, New
Activism in Turkish Foreign SAIS Review, 19 (1), pp. 92-113 (93).
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Figure 6.1. EU-Turkish bilateral trade (US $ millions)500 
Another result of this outward-oriented strategy was improving relations with the Arab
world. The relations with Gulf States, as well as Libya, Iraq, and Iran were enhanced
during this era. In addition, while Turkey was attracting Arab capital, powerful holding
companies of Turkey were involving in commercial trade in the Middle East and North
Africa. In particular, Turkey s large-scale construction contracts in Libya, until
Gaddafi s death in 2011, and elsewhere date from this period.501 
zal s main motivation was not only being a candidate country to the EU by scaling up
its economic engagement with its neighbourhood, but also it was a strategy to diversify
Turkey s relations. In this context, his statement clarifies this important point: Turkey
cannot put all its opportunities in one basket... If we commit all the burden of our trade
to Europe, it will mean surrendering a great deal of our ability to control events to them.
We need to diversify .502 Within this framework, through his initiatives and mind-set, it 
500 S. and Y. Zahariadis, The Future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations: Deepening versus Widening,
EU-Turkey Working Papers 5, 2004, p. 4
501 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy p. 128.
502 Turgut Cumhur Turgut politika ve ekonomi stratejik
sempozyumun 5 1991, cited in J. 
Walker, of Empire: How Post-Imperial Successor States Shape Memor Unpublished PhD




             
              
              
                   
              
          
 
  
              
           
           
              
       
 
             
          
          
               
              
              
            
              
            
            
              
             
              
             
                                                          
              
         
           
           
is obvious that zal s way of thinking was overlapping with the Westernist Eurasianism
discourse. That is why, it would be logical to claim that the Westernist Eurasianism
discourse was one of the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy making process in
zal era. The reason for that is that the logic of that era can not be merely explained by
Neo-Ottomanism or Turkism. It is the only logical explanation for that is the Westernist
Eurasianism discourse even if zal did not declare that, explicitly.
Indicator 4
It has been already underlined that zal viewed foreign policy as a branch of
international trade relations .503 In this sense, apart from establishing organisations in
order to enhance regional states economic and political cooperation, the agreements
which were signed by zal himself are other indicators of his approach towards the
enhancement of regional stability and national influence.
During the era, a number of agreements were signed with neighbouring countries.
For instance, the Agreement on Exchange Commodities, the Convertible Currency
Protocol, and the Long-term Program: Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technological
Cooperation were signed with the Soviet Union between 1986 and 1990. As a result of
these agreements, the trade between Turkey and the Soviet Union was tripled from $411
million in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1990.504 Another agreement, signed with Russia, was
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Following that treaty, Turkey opened its
consulate in Baku, and the Soviet Union opened a consulate in Trabzon as well.505 
Besides, it is worth saying that during the leadership more international
agreements than any other leader in Turkish history were signed. 506 While these
agreements were aiming to provide high level of economic relations (as pointed out in
indicator three), they were also aiming to provide cultural and political relations with
the mentioned states. In addition, all these agreements, to some extent, prove that
was purely neither pan-Turkist nor neo-Ottomanist. Yet, it was clear that his thinking
503 P. Manoli, The Dynamics of Black Sea (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), p. 61.
504 M. Ataman, Change: p. 139.
505 P. Manoli, The Dynamics of Black Sea p. 60.




              
     
 
             
          
            
               
         
 
           
           
          
        
            
         
 
            
            
             
             
 
                
            
                
               
              
              





                                                          
                
        
              
     
was inspired by an Ottomanist and Turkist way of thinking. In addition, he was
emphasising importance adding that:
As a post-imperial country and society, we have been able to create a
cultural and political identity that transcends ethnic differences. I believe
that the most important element in the formation of this identity today,
just as it was in the imperial period, is Islam... Islam has been the cement
unifying the diverse ethnic groups belonging to this religion.507 
The sources of our national culture attained a complete synthesis in
Anatolia with the Seljuks and especially with the Ottomans. A mature
synthesis about as Islamic and Turkish components of the people s
culture complemented and strengthened each other. This synthesis
strengthened the spirit of the Ottoman Empire which was one of the
largest and most powerful empires in the civilized world.508 
All these notions, Ottomanism, Turkism, and Islamism can only be overarched by
Eurasianism; in zal s case by Westernist-Eurasianism. He was giving weight to the
Eurasian continent and believing that the cooperation of the states of the Eurasian
continent was significant not only for Turkey itself but also the regional states.
All in all, zal s way of foreign policy thinking can be defined by Eurasianism and its
ideological principles. He was aiming to enhance the relations among the neighbouring
states regardless of religion, sects, races, etc. He believed that this was the only way to
make Turkey a valuable asset for the Western world and also to create a Lebensraum 
for Turkey. In addition, enhancing the relations of the regional states with each other
was also another necessity for building stability in Eurasia and the world. This mind-set
could be explained by only the ideology of Eurasianism, in particular Westernist
Eurasianism.
507 Quoted from M. H. Yavuz "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-
Ottomanism" Critique, 12 (Spring 1998), pp. 19-41 (23).
508 Quoted from B. G. Seylan, et al., Turk-Islam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis File),




     
 
               
             
              
                
              
                
 
 
               
              
               
              
               
           
 
  
           
            
              
               
               
              
              
                                                          
         
               
                
                
      
    
                 
6.3. Cem Era: Westernist Eurasianism
smail Cem served as a Turkish Foreign Minister between 1997 and 2002. He was one
of Turkey s longest-serving foreign ministers. Cem was born into a rich Ottoman family
in 1940. His roots go back to Salonika (Greece), where Mustafa Kemal Atat rk was
born. Cem s family fled to Istanbul at the beginning of the 1900s. He was educated at
one of Turkey s top schools, Robert College; studied Law in Lausanne and politics in
Paris. And he became the youngest director of Turkish radio and television at the age of
34.509 
smail Cem was a relatively prolific author too. It is a well-known fact that serving
foreign ministers do not often publish books. In contrast to the tradition, smail Cem
wrote essays and books in order to explain his conduct of the business of diplomacy.510 
These publications have made it possible to analyse his term and his way of
understanding well and it could be argued that some notions of Eurasianism do exist in
smail Cem s thinking. To prove that some indicators are presented below:
Indicator 1
smail Cem believed that Turkey s traditional foreign policy had disregarded the
country s cultural roots. Thus, Turkey had been alienated from its Ottoman past.
According to Cem, the first clear break with the traditional [policy] took place in
1974 when B lent Ecevit did the inconceivable and came to the rescue of the Turkish
community in Cyprus His decision to do so was of the utmost importance. After years
of passivity, Turkey for the first time courageously rose above the positions and role
that had been assigned to her . 511 In addition, the late Turgut zal and S leyman
509 The Economist, Cem, a Turkish http://www.economist.com/node/328977,
Published on 3rd of February 2000, [Accessed on 08/03/2013]; O. Foreign Policy
(1997- SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, 23, May 2011, pp. 223-245.
510 A. Mango, Review: Turkey in the New Century by Perceptions: Journal of
International Affairs, 6 (4), Available from <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Andrew-
Mango-Book-Review.pdf>, [Accessed on 08/03/2013].




              
       
 
              
              
              
              
              
        
               
              
             
 
              
            
          
             
               
           
             
              
            
               
       
 
  
           
        
                                                          
                 
          
Demirel cultivated the friendship of both the newly forming countries in the region and
of those which were regaining their independence .512 
Cem believed that these developments were significant in order to add a historical and
cultural dimension to Turkish foreign policy. It was a clear fact that Turkey succeeded
the Ottoman Empire but at the same time it disregarded the cultural and political
inheritance of the Empire. From Cem s perspective, if Turkey wants to be a regional
power, it should embrace the Empire and base its foreign policy understanding on the
Ottoman Empire s multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-confessional experience. By doing
so it would be possible to widen the horizon of Turkey s foreign policy towards the
Middle East, Asia, and Europe altogether. It was therefore a clear indication that Cem
wanted Turkey to front its own Asian identity and blend in its Europeanness.
At first glance, it might be considered that Cem was neo-Ottomanist as he was
mentioning of embracing the Ottoman Empire. However, his emphasis was on the
Empire s multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. Unlike the mainstream approach, he was
not aiming to resuscitate the Ottoman Empire. Instead, he was offering a theoretical
approach to the practice of Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, it was significant for
him to formulate a foreign policy understanding which promotes pro-activism while
realising its own unique identity, culture, and geography. By doing so, Turkey s Asian
and European identities would be blended so as to broaden the horizon of Turkish
foreign policy. This way of understanding is utterly overlapped with the Westernist
Eurasianism discourse. In this vein, it might be alleged that Cem s this way of thinking
is based on Eurasianism, especially Westernist Eurasianism.
Indicator 2
Cem was against the dichotomies West-East, Islam-secularism, etc. He called these
dichotomies forced alternatives and considered them exaggerated contradictions.513 
512 Quoted in A. Mango, Review: Turkey in the New Century by p. 1.




              
             
 
             
             
           
             
           
             
            
            
      
 
             
             
              
                 
     
 
            
             
        
          
          
             
           
          
            
   
 
                                                          
                 
                
        
           
        
According to him, Turkey is already European and has been for centuries. She is
European, as well as being Asian: this is her privilege and her asset. 514 
In smail Cem s thinking, enhancing regional dialogue was necessary in order to pave
the way for long-term resolution of political problems.515 In the name of enhancing
regional dialogue, Turkey undertook several initiatives such as the creation of
Multinational Peacekeeping Force for the Balkans, a Naval Task Force for the Black
Sea, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, and contribution to International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In addition, the Joint Forum, held in Istanbul between
the European Union and the Organisation of Islamic Conference on 12-13 February
2002 was a significant move to deepen dialogue and reinforce understanding between
the nations of Eurasia and Africa.516 
This way of thinking shows how Cem attached great importance to regional cohesion
and Turkey s geographical stance. He kept pointing out that not only can Turkey s
European and Asian identity not be separated, but also Turkey should act together with
the regional states as it is one of the core and inseparable elements of this region. Cem
explains his thinking as follows:
It is worth noting that there are twenty-six countries with which we
have shared a common history, a common state and a common fate for
centuries. This background provides for strong economic relationships
and a unique platform for political cooperation. In this vast socio-
political geography, Turkey has the optimal conditions and the required
assets to become a provider of peace, stability and welfare, and to enjoy
the opportunities presented by the new Eurasian Order. By virtue of
her historical and cultural attributes and her privileged identity, European
as well as Asian, Turkey is firmly positioned to become the strategic
centre of Eurasia.517 
514 Quoted in A. Mango, Review: Turkey in the New Century by p. 2.
515 Cem, Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons for Turkey at the Beginning of a
Millennium Turkish Policy Quarterly, 1 (1), p. 3.
516 Yearbook of the United Nations, Edition 60, 2005, p. 782.




              
           
            
          
                 
              
                
              
               
                
               
              
      
 
  
            
               
               
             
   
 
             
             
       
            
            
 
            
            
          
             
         
         
            
This point of view also stresses Cem s Eurasianist inclinations. As it has been already
discussed in the previous chapter, while the Westernist Eurasianism discourse promotes
increasing the relations with countries of the Eurasian continent, according to the
discourse any Eurasianist organisation are perceived as a complimentary geopolitical
strategy. In this sense, Cem sees Turkey as the strategic centre of Eurasia as it shares a
common history, a common state and a common fate for centuries with 26 countries.
From his point of view, it is this trait from which Turkey benefits by providing peace,
stability and welfare in Eurasia. What might be confusing in this indicator is the
emphasis on the 26 countries that Turkey shares commonalities. Yet, it must be kept in
mind that the stress was not made for bringing the Ottoman Empire back. In contrast, it
is made to remind that Turkey has had such an inheritance which would make possible
for Turkey to formulate a foreign policy understanding in order to bring Asia and
Europe together and broaden Turkey s horizon.
Indicator 3
As mentioned, Cem was complaining about Turkey s alienation from its own historical
and cultural roots, especially from its Ottoman past. In addition, he believed that in the
aftermath of the Cold War Turkey should have pursued an active foreign policy as the
circumstances had changed. In this sense, smail Cem put forward his foreign policy
vision as follows:
There are two major objectives that drive our vision for the future. The
first goal is to make Turkey an integral part of the European integration
process. Historically, geographically and economically, Turkey is
already a European country. It is therefore quite natural that she should
become a full member of the European Union, sooner rather than later.
The second, but equally important goal is to transform Turkey into a
pivotal and prosperous country at the centre of the vast geography we
call Eurasia. Turkey already enjoys the most diversified industrial base,
has the best-trained and equipped army and is one of the few deep-rooted
democracies between the Balkans and Central Asia. The political,
economic and security initiatives Turkey has launched, which encompass




          
           
 
            
              
          
              
            
          
             
              
       
 
              
             
         
            
                 
               
            
              
                
                 
                
              
            
   
 
                                                          
        
        
                
         
    
stronger Turkey capable of creating a constantly growing zone of
stability and welfare around her is certainly in everyone s best interest.518 
While giving weight to Turkey s European identity Cem was thinking that when
Turkey becomes a member, the Union will be transformed into a truly multicultural and
multi-religious geography .519 Cem s way of understanding was towards keeping the
different identities of Turkey together. Thus, he believed that Turkey would be an asset
for the Western World. This statement emphasises how much importance he was
attaching to the enhancement of mutual understanding and Turkey s geostrategic
location in the Eurasian continent. By doing so, similar to Russian Eurasianists, Cem
was viewing Eurasia as a separate continent and giving weight to the necessity for
cooperation between the states of Eurasia.
On the one hand, contrary to Nationalist Eurasianism, in his way of thinking the
European identity of Turkey was given and irrevocable. On the other hand, while
multiculturalist Eurasianism sees Eurasianist foreign policy understanding as an
alternative to Turkey s Westernist approach, Cem kept pointing out that Turkey would
be an asset for the Western world as long as saving its own Asian identity and building
close relations with the countries in Asia. This point is significant as Cem kept bringing
forward that neo-Ottomanism or pan-Turkism would not be panacea for Turkey to
transform into a regional power. In his view, Turkey should not reformulate new foreign
policy course as an alternative to the EU as he clearly explained that becoming a full
member of the EU is one of the main objectives of Turkey. Yet, according to him the
creation of a stable Eurasia was crucial for the security of Europe and Turkey has the
necessary assets to make it possible.520 This expression puts obviously forth that he was
against any adventures for creating other unions through the ideas of neo-Ottomanism
and pan-Turkism.
Cem during the autumn session of the Western European
Union (W.E.U.) Assembly on 1 December 1998, Available from <http://www.defense-
aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/16325/speech-by-turkish-foreign-minister-ismail-cem-(paris,-dec.-
1).html>, [Accessed on 04/05/2014].
186
518 Cem, Foreign , p. 4.
519 Cem, Foreign , p. 4.




                
              
            
             
                
             
 
 
             
     
 
           
         
         
         
         
            
          
          
   
 
                
               
           
            
             
       
 
             
            
                                                          
                 
              
        
Indicator 4
In Cem s way of thinking, the future will be the states of Eurasia. He, therefore, kept
emphasising its significance in his several speeches. One of the speeches in the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey stresses that the international system keeps changing and
this change also puts forward Eurasia. Experts write books and make research on
Eurasia and they claim that the 21st century will be created in Eurasia. This will be
happening in the continent extending from the Atlantic to the Western border of
China. 521 
In another publication, Cem expresses similar ideas on the Eurasian reality and its
evolution and adds as follows:
The central stage of this millennium, many observers agree, will be
Eurasia, broadly defined as the geography stretching from Western
Europe to Western China. Given the trends in production,
communication and information technologies, Europe and Asia will form
an integrated whole, interlinked and interdependent. Both will gain
substantially by being part of the same entity. Furthermore, much of this
millennium's economic development will take place in Asia. The advent
of new energy resources and communication corridors bears witness to
this emerging reality.522 
In this statement, Cem first defines Eurasia as an entity and claims that Europe and Asia
both are part of the same entity. This way of thinking exactly overlaps with the
Classical Eurasianist ideology which claims that Eurasia represents an integral whole,
both geographically and anthropologically and also that Eurasia is a separate continent
in contrast to Europe and Asia. Secondly, Cem defines geographical borders of Eurasia
from his own point of view.
Cem always wanted Turkey to be confident on its foreign policy making process.
According to him, foreign policy was a mathematical equation of a country s
521 Speech by Cem in Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 20 December 1997, The Grand
National Assembly Archive of Minutes on December 20, 1997, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, p. 659.





               
              
            
                
             
                 
               
              
            
              
        
 
              
              
          
          
                
               
            
               
            
  
 
          
 
            
               
                 
                                                          
              
          
        
interests .523 On this basis, it would not be logical to talk about permanent friends or
enemies of states. And it is this logic which leads states to enhance mutual
understanding, respect and cooperation between each other. In doing so, Turkey would
be a world state and this feature would present Turkey as a model for the regional
states.524 Besides, this policy would also liberate Turkey from the bridge notion. Cem
argued that the bridge notion was a thing of the past in the 2000s: she is moving
away from being simply a transit corridor or a bridge over which Asia and Europe
trade with one another and move their goods . Instead, Turkey in the 2000s will
increasingly become a terminus and a destination country. In other words, Turkey's
basic function ceases to be that of transporting or delivering energy, raw materials, and
goods after receiving them from East and West .525 
To sum up, Cem presented his inclination on Eurasia more explicitly compared to zal.
And, he believed that Turkey should embrace its own Ottoman past and its multi-ethnic,
multi-culturalist, multi-confessional experience. In doing so, Turkey would pursue a
more Eurasianist foreign policy course, placing significant importance on regional
cohesion. Also, it was necessary for Turkey to become an asset to the Western World in
particular the European Union. In this regard, Cem could be perceived as the one who
considered Eurasia as the indispensable option for Turkey to become a significant
power. Therefore, Cem was one of the Eurasianists. His way of thinking can be named
Westernist Eurasianism but in his thinking Eurasia was more emphasised compared to
zal s mind-set.
6.4. Davuto lu Era: A Blend of Westernist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism
Following the November 2002 elections, Davuto lu was appointed as Chief Adviser to
the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large by the 58th Government of the Republic of
Turkey. He continued to serve in the 59th and 60th Governments. On 1 May 2009 he was
523 Cem, Turkey in the New Century, (Mersin: Rustem Bookshop, 2001), p. 4.
524 O. Foreign Policy (1997- p. 224.




               
 
 
           
              
             
            
            
              
            
            
 
 
          
          
          
        
 
               
               
                                                          
        
 
              
    
             
         
   
             
               
   
    
                
           
   
 
            
526 
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60th Government of the Republic of
Turkey.526 
Ahmet Davuto lu owes his reputation to his book Strategic Depth: Turkey s
International Position . Some allege that Davuto lu s book is one of the works that has
inspired the masses, and influenced small but powerful elites, and their mind-sets.527 In
his book Davuto lu claims that the consolidation of political and economic stability
would enable Turkey to play a peace-promoting role in neighbouring regions. His
strategic depth concept in order to help Turkey transition from being a peripheral actor
in world politics to a central one features two elements: geopolitical and historical-
cultural inheritance. These are the main components that differentiate Turkey from its
neighbours.528 
Davuto lu conceptualizes his strategic depth doctrine through four principles: A
secure neighborhood based on a common understanding of security, pro-active, high-
level political dialogue with all neighbors, fostering regional economic interdependence
and finally, promoting multi-cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony .529 
In the light of this way of thinking, Davuto lu has been repeatedly criticized for being
Neo-Ottomanist or Eurasianist, even if he has rejected the claims at every turn. Yet the
Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa> [Accessed on
10/12/2012]
527 For further information please see: C. lu, New Dept Available from
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=283825> [Accessed on 10/12/2012];
J. W. Walker, Foreign Policy 2009; K. depth: A
scholarly talk with the Turkish foreign Available from
<http://www.turkishreview.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223051>, [Accessed on
10/12/2012]; E. Ersoy, "Old Principles, New Practices: Explaining the AKP Foreign Policy" Turkish
Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 2009), pp. 115-127; H. Kanbolat, discover Ahmet
Available from <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/hasan-kanbolat_249391-italians-
discover-ahmet-davutoglu.html>, [Accessed on 10/12/2012].
528 B. Aras, Era in 2009; J. W. Walker, The Sources of Turkish
Grand Strategy and - in Available from
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR007/introduction.pdf>, [Accessed on
04/04/2012].




               
       
 
  
        
 
           
            
              
                
             
            
    
 
         
              
              
            
               
         
         
           
              
             
                
             
            
            
               
                                                          
        
   
 
         
 
   
signs of Eurasianism can be identified in his discourses and actions. In order to prove
this claim, five indicators are presented below:
Indicator 1
On 24 November 2009, Davuto lu stated that
Former US President Bill Clinton asked me why Turkey is actively
dealing with the regional problems; I answered, Draw a circle with a
diameter of 1000 km around Turkey and 20 states will fall into it. Then
draw one with a diameter of 3000 km and 70 states will fall within. If we
draw a similar circle around the US, how many states would fall into
that? In this sense, of course Turkey will continue dealing with the
problems of our neighbors. 530 
This discourse explicitly reflects Eurasianist thinking. From Panarin s perspective,
ethnic nationalism should be condemned as it is a product of Europe s pagan sentiment.
In this regard, states in Eurasia should deal with each other s problems regardless of
religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status etc. From this perspective, the
effects of this way of understanding can be observed during the AK Party era. For
instance, since 2002, Turkey s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and
humanitarian assistance have grown substantially. According to Global Humanitarian
Assistance Report 2013, ODA from Turkey has almost doubled between 2011 and
2012. This increase made Turkey the 15th largest government donor in 2012 (see figure
6.1). Furthermore, the increase of official humanitarian assistance to $1 billion in 2012
made Turkey the 4th largest donor in 2012 (see figure 6.2).531 It is worth mentioning that
unlike the previous periods, in this era Turkey s assistance has not solely concentrated
on the surrounding area. While Turkey has been continuing its assistance towards
Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries, the significant amount of assistance to
certain countries in Africa and South Asia has been given, as well (see figure 6.3).
530 Evet Yeni Available from
<http://www.haber7.com/haber/20091124/Ahmet-Davutoglu-Evet-yeni-Osmanliyiz.php> [Accessed on
10/12/2012].






         









   
Figure 6.2. Top 20 Government Contributors of International humanitarian
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Figure 6. 4. Top 10 Recipient of Turkey s Official Humanitarian Assistance, 2007-

















In line with the ideology of Eurasianism, in Davuto lu era Turkey has been seeking to
expand its sphere of influence through public diplomacy. The governmental institutions,
which conduct the public diplomacy, are the Turkish International Cooperation and
Development Agency (the principal body for administering aid), the Turkish Red
Crescent (K z lay) and Turkey s Disaster and Emergency Management Office (bodies
for humanitarian aid). These institutions provide, organise and distribute humanitarian
aid as an aspect of public diplomacy. It would not be wrong to claim that they have
become much more functional during the Davuto lu era. As it is seen in the figures
above, the amount of humanitarian aid during the Davuto lu era has been increasing
steadily. This might be considered as an extension of Eurasianism or as it is quoted




           
           
              
           
            
        
 
  
              
            
            
                
          
 
             
            
            
                
                
              
             
          
             
              
            
             
            
                                                          
          
          
                
   
 
In this sense, at first glance, Davuto lu s and Panarin s approaches overlap.
Condemnation of ethnic nationalism and dealing with each other s problems regardless
of religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status etc. are two of the main
deductions of Davuto lu and Panarin s way of understandings. Although this indicator
reveals whether Davuto lu pursues a Eurasianist foreign policy, there must be more
indicators as it is not solely sufficient.
Indicator 2
Yet, there are other factors that indicate that Davuto lu has embraced an element of
Eurasianist thinking. For instance, Davuto lu alleges that Turkey is a central country
with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. 532 
That is why in terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan,
Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country .533 
In this regard, Turkey is economically and politically relatively stable, making it a
viable international actor in the regions. In this context, while the incumbent
Government wants to exert political, economic, and cultural influence within the former
Ottoman lands, it also strives to open up a new horizon by improving its relations with
the states from the Yellow Sea to Latin America. An obvious example of this strive is
the transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Davuto lu era. As an
extension of his understanding, which considers that Turkey is a central country with
multiple identities, Turkey has opened new representations worldwide. While Turkey
had 39 missions abroad in 1924, in these days is represented by 222 missions
worldwide. Besides, the Turkish Foreign Service is consisting of 2183 diplomats at the
Ministry and its missions abroad despite the criticism about having such excessive
cadres.534 This criticism was raised by one of the anonymous interviewees during the
field research. She harshly criticised Davuto lu and AK Party s foreign policy and
532 A. Foreign Policy 2008, p. 78.
533 A. Foreign Policy 2008, p. 79.






            
                
  
 
             
               
         
               
              
      
 
        
 
 
               
              
                
                                                          
            
             
    
accused them of wasting public money by recruiting unnecessary personnel. We are
not like the USA. Turkey does not need to have representations in every country in the
world. 535 
Yet, Turkey s broadening relations with the countries worldwide is a sign of Eurasianist
way of thinking. On this account, Turkey s this opening needs to be more clarified by
informative figures about Turkey and neighbouring countries representations abroad
(see figure 6.4). According to the figure 6.4, Turkey has one of the largest global
networks of diplomatic missions when it is compared to similar size economies, such as
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel etc.






It is a fact that having more than 200 representations abroad requires a decent
economy. Turkey is known as the 17th biggest economy in the world.536 However, most
of the similar size economies do not have missions abroad as much as Turkey does. For
535 Personal interview with an anonymous interviewee, 19 February 2014, Ankara, Turkey.
536 Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), The CIA World Factbook, Available from
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryname=Turkey&countrycode=tu&regionCode=mde&rank=17# 




             
               
             
          
           
              
 
 
             
              
              
            
           
             
        
 
               
               
            
              
               
              
               
                 
             
 
 
                                                          
        
    
       
   
             
             
instance, while Brazil is the 8th biggest economy, it has 194 missions abroad. 537 
Furthermore, while India is the 4th biggest economy in the world, it has 164 missions
abroad.538 These figures explicitly show that as it is mentioned before, Turkey has
distinctive foreign policy understanding which is based on Turkey s geopolitical
centrality, having an enormous cultural and historical heritage and belongingness to
Eurasia that makes Turkey itself responsible for the whole region in Davuto lu s way of
thinking.
These kinds of goals and policies seem like a small-scale Eurasianist vision, especially
building relationships with both the Western and the Eastern world. In addition, it even
may be alleged that AKP s foreign policy stance in the post-2005 era represents the
transition from Western-oriented to Eastern-oriented, or as Ziya ni s calls it, soft
Euro-Asianism .539 Having said that, ni defines his soft Euro-Asianism approach as
foreign policy activism pursued with respect to all neighboring regions but with no
firm EU axis as was previously the case .540 
In this sense, this indicator substantiates that Turkey s axis is not shifting, it is just
getting wider. It would not be, therefore, logical to claim that Turkey is pursuing an
Eastern-oriented foreign policy, nowadays. As ni repeats, Turkey is striving to build
relations with all the neighbours around itself. Herein, it should be emphasised that the
new vision considers that it is Turkey s fate to deal with its neighbours problems as
Turkey is a central country. Therefore, from time to time Davuto lu is accused of
embracing an Eastern-oriented foreign policy, but it seems that it is not true because the
horizon has only been widened and the relations with the EU or the West cover just a
part of it not all of it as it used to be.
537 do Brasil no exterior, Available from <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/o-
brasil-no-exterior>, [Accessed on 10/05/2014].
538 Indian Missions abroad, Available from <http://www.mea.gov.in/indian-missions-abroad.htm>,
[Accessed on 10/05/2014].
539 Z. and S. Europeanization and Euro- 2009, p. 13.





          
              
              
              
          
          
     
 
            
            
   
 
          
           
             
             
              
           
               
           
           
            
            
             
 
 
             
             
             
              
              
             
                                                          
          
            
          
Indicator 3
While Eurasianists attribute importance to the geopolitical location of Russia,
Davuto lu also puts forward the uniqueness of Turkey and its position. According to N.
S. Trubetskoy, The territory of Russia ... constitutes a separate continent ... which in
contrast to Europe and Asia can be called Eurasia ... Eurasia represents an integral
whole, both geographically and anthropologically .541 This separate continent was a
self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of
the Russian Empire in 1914.542 
Similarly, by alleging that Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by
associating it with a single region, Davuto lu seeks to emphasize the geographical
significance of Turkey:
Turkey s geography gives it a specific central country status, which
differs from other central countries. For example, Germany is a central
country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. Russia is
another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far
from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far from Europe
and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal
place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is
also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country
with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a
defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which
only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an
ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the
West.543 
Obviously, this is a Turkish interpretation of Eurasianism, with a clear emphasis on
Turkey s centrality. In this framework, Davuto lu argues that Turkey is the glue which
brings together Europe and Asia just like Russia in the mind-set of Classical
Eurasianism during the 1920s and the 1930s. Therefore, Turkey is destined to play a
significant role in this region instead of pursuing a passive foreign policy course. As
was explained in previous chapters, this way of thinking influenced the current foreign
541 Quoted in S. Wiederkehr, a , 2007a, p.1.
542 C. J. Halperin, Vernadsky, Eurasianism, 1982, p. 481.




               
  
 
            
               
            
          
           
              
              
            
            
            
            
              
           
          
            
            
              
              
             
                  
             
               
            
  
 
                                                          
                 
    
    
policy course of Turkey and pro-activism is one of the names used to describe the
Davuto lu era.
Davuto lu s approach reveals itself in the recent developments, such as the relations
with Africa and initiatives the Southern Asia. By this indicator, it has been trying to
clarify that Davuto lu stresses Turkey s centrality again with a clear emphasis on
Turkey s responsibilities and identities derive from its distinctive geographical, cultural,
historical, and anthropological features. The recent developments are clear samples of
this way of understanding. For instance, Turkey s Africa opening can be considered as a
significant leverage of this policy. While Turkey have had a member observer status to
the African Union (AU) since 2005, the Africa-Turkey partnership was established by
signing the Istanbul Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation in 2008. Both
parties have aimed a stable, long-term partnership based on mutual interests and
equality and to enhance promotion of Africa-Turkey cooperation in specific areas of
interests by this partnership. While this opening towards Africa can be considered as an
extension of Davuto lu s way of interpretation of Eurasianism, Turkey s presence in
Afghanistan by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is another initiative
which confirms that Turkish foreign policy course has been formulated to be
economically and diplomatically more globally engaged by reaching out of the former
Ottoman territories. Regarding the presence in ISAF mission, for Turkey it is beyond a
NATO-led mission. It is a duty of being a Eurasian state. Erdo an s following statement
emphasizes this point NATO planned to complete its mission in Afghanistan by the
end of 2014, but it was not definite. It may happen after 2014. As Turkey, we think of
leaving Afghanistan after all countries leave. We would not leave our brothers alone
there unless Afghanistan wanted Turkey to. 544 It is a fact that the rationale behind these
policies can only be explained by Eurasianism, in particular with the Westernist
Eurasianism discourse.
en son terkedecek. Turkey will be the last to leave Afghanistan Haber 7, 22
May 2012, Available from <http://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/882620-afganistani-en-son-turkiye-






         
 
             
            
         
            
          
          
         
         
           
            
            
          
          
           
          
         
               
   
 
               
            
                 
             
              
           
          
            
              
           
           
 
                                                          
               
    
Indicator 4
In a speech on 4 February 2010, Davuto lu proclaimed:
Eurasia is passing a very critical threshold and a new vision is necessary
in evaluating the region. The first [step] is that uncertainties should be
removed and political dialogue should be heightened. Secondly, Eurasia
is the region where international economic politics takes shape; if it is
neglected, the EU, Chinese or Indian economic bases cannot interact
with one another Ankara favors activating dialogue channels on the
highest level and establishing permanent mechanisms as exemplified by
recent Turkish-Russian plans to establish a high-level strategic council 
We would like to see more political dialogue and more political
cooperation. No country can live isolated. There is a need for more
integration and more dialogue when there is a problem. We want to
spread our policy of zero problems and maximum cooperation with
neighbors to Eurasia We need to remove the barriers between us.
People should move freely. Currently Turkey and Russia are working on
lifting visa requirements for each other s citizens We want such an
approach in Eurasia based on self-confidence, political dialogue and
economic interaction. We see the fate of this region as our fate and as the
fate of humanity. 545 
This is the basis of what the Classical Eurasianists wanted to establish via a Eurasian
Union. According to them, Eurasianism provided a theoretical structure to prevent the
collapse of the Russian Empire. In the event of its collapse, the theory sought to build a
new nation encompassing the whole Eurasian people under a single Eurasian state. This
state would have a unique culture reflecting the characteristics of all the Turanian races
(The Turanian nations include, according to the Eurasians, the Finno-Ugric nations,
Samoyeds, Turks including Ottoman Turks, various Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkmen,
Kirgiz, Yakuts, Chuvash, a few extinct peoples such as Khazars, Polovtsy, Ugurians
and, finally, Mongols and Manchurians), instead of the Russian element. In this vein, as
Davuto lu points out, an increase in political dialogue, economic interdependence and
cultural interaction would constitute the primary phase of founding the Union.
545 FM calls for more political dialogue in Eurasia, Hurriyet Daily News, 02/04/2010, Available from
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=fm-calls-for-more-political-dialogue-




                
          
               
              
          
 
 
                
              
            
           
 
               
           
                
              
                
              
              
                   
             





              
               
              
             
             
                                                          
           
 
   
There is a need to embark on a new vision in order to have the Eurasia
region regain its historical importance If peace and welfare do not
reign in Eurasia, it is not possible to make peace and welfare reign in the
world, either. This region can export peace and welfare to the rest of the
world The western and eastern ends of Eurasia should be
546 reconnected 
The statement above, made by Davuto lu himself on 5 February 2010, is a call for a
Eurasian Union and it is an unquestionable indication of the element of Eurasianism in
his thinking, especially the Multiculturalist Eurasianism discourse. This call has been a
touchstone in terms of evaluating the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy.
Eventually, it can be seen that during the Davuto lu era the inclination on Eurasia and
influence of Eurasianism are gradually increasing. Unlike zal and Cem, Davuto lu
takes it forward and claims, to some extent, the EU and the Western world is obviously
necessary for Turkey but the Eastern world is much more important. In his thinking,
Turkey needs the EU but not as much as the EU needs Turkey. Furthermore, if Turkey
becomes a genuine player in Eurasia, it will definitely become an indispensable need for
the EU. For this purpose, Turkey should aim to spread cooperation to the Eurasian
continent and make peace and welfare reign in it. But, we do not know if it is a viable
project yet as the region is full of dictatorships, and undemocratic and underdeveloped
states. In addition, we do not know whether they want cooperation and peace in the
region.
6.5. Conclusion
Although Eurasianism was an ideology that first appeared in Russia during the 1920s, it
has had some reflections on Turkish foreign policy every now and then. While some of
those reflections have been clear to observe, some have not been clearly expressed. In
this chapter, three periods of Turkish foreign policy have been analysed and the
common conclusion is that the Eurasianism discourse in various forms has been widely







              
              
                 
      
 
           
            
              
          
             
            
               
           
                
              
             
               
            
             
 
 
                
              
               
               








applied to the periods. The discourse of Westernist Eurasianism is the one which has
been generally embraced by the leaders to shift the Turkish foreign policy course. The
reason for that is it is the most moderate and plausible discourse in terms of keeping the
relations good with the neighbouring countries.
Apart from the Westernist Eurasianism, other discourses have also been observed
although rarely. For instance, during the zal era, a Nationalist Eurasianism discourse
was sporadically used in order to create a viable and stable environment for Turkey
among the newly found Turcophone states. Besides, the Multiculturalist Eurasianism
was another means to building an economic powerhouse for Turkey. This discourse has
been particularly observed during the Ahmet Davuto lu era when he explicitly proposed
that the Eurasian Union should be found if humanity wants peace and welfare to reign
in the World. Furthermore, Davuto lu era presents both - Westernist and
Multiculturalist - discourses time to time. Yet, it might be logical to allege that none of
the discourses have been promoted as the state ideology during the periods. Instead, all
the discourses have been applied when needed. However, this chapter reveals that from
the zal era to the Davuto lu era how implications of the ideology of Eurasianism on
Turkish foreign policy have been evolved. Consequently, it might be observed that
during the Davuto lu era, the application of Eurasianism has reached to the highest
level.
To sum up, although there seem to have been a number of changes in the Turkish
foreign policy making over the last three decades, by focusing on these three periods
zal, Cem, Davuto lu - the discourse analysis shows that there seem to be many strong
signs for the Eurasianism to be one of the main informants of Turkish foreign policy










              
             
 
           
             
            
            
              
            
           
     
 
            
          
          
            
 
             
           
            
             
         
 
               
             
               




At the beginning of this thesis, three hypotheses were drawn on the Turkish foreign
policy making process as reasons for carrying out this research. These hypotheses were:
1. Recent developments have shown that Turkey has been experiencing foreign
policy activism since the 1990s. First the then Prime Minister and President of
the Republic of Turkey Turgut zal, after that the then Foreign Minister smail
Cem and then the incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto lu were the main
drivers behind this activism. In contrast to the early times of the Republic of
Turkey, during the last three decades, Turkey has attempted to build close
relationships with its neighbouring states and to get involved in every
controversial issue in the region.
2. Considering this activism, it has been claimed that Turkey s foreign policy
understanding has been influenced by diverse ideologies, which are alternatives
for Turkey s Western-oriented foreign policy course. In that case, the
Eurasianism ideology, which is one of them, is worth analysing in detail.
3. Along with the activism in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has launched an
opening towards the East, including Iran, Russia, Turkic States, etc. Moreover,
Turkey has broadened its foreign policy horizon and opened new embassies in
Africa and Latin America, as well. It is believed that the Eurasianist mind-set
might be effective in pursuing such a foreign policy.
Through the review of the literature and the investigation and analysis of the last three
decades of Turkish foreign policy, it became apparent that there are three different
versions of Eurasianism in Turkey and they have, to some extent, an impact on foreign




               
            
         
 
             
           
               
             
              
               
              
 
     
 
            
           
               
              
             
               
             
             
              
              
            
              
               
                
              
            
              
            
chapter in the form of a classification of the discourses of Eurasianism and their impact
on the Turkish foreign policy making by reviewing discourse interpretation in different
political periods since the end of the Cold War.
To achieve this aim, this chapter is divided into four sections. Following the
introduction, the next section summarises the previous six chapters, highlighting general
areas and the essential points from discourses explored in this thesis and their impact in
the contemporary Turkish foreign policy making. The third section of this chapter will
identify the realities of Turkish foreign policy and present a list of recommendations for
future foreign policy making in Turkey. The final section of this chapter will identify a
list of future research suggestions which can build upon the findings of this thesis.
7.2. General Summary and Conclusions
There is a close woven relationship between the Eurasianism ideology and Geopolitical
thinking of the 19th century. Therefore, the first conceptualisation chapter investigated
this relationship in the light of the main geopolitical concepts of this period. First, the
concept of Lebensraum was analysed in order to show the importance of space and
territory in the history of nations by focusing on Turkey s own lebensraum which
consisted of the immediate land basin the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus
, immediate maritime basin the Black, Eastern Mediterranean and Caspian seas and
the Gulf of Basra , and immediate continental basin Europe, Western Asia, North-
eastern Africa. The second concept was the Heartland thesis which is perceived as one
of the most influential geopolitical concepts that has been embraced by a number of
states throughout history such as Germany, Britain, the USA, etc. From Turkey s
perspective, the significance of the concept is that it presented Turkey as a central
state and emphasised Turkey s role in world politics. The last concept in this chapter is
the Rimland thesis, which focused on the role that the Rimland states play in order to
control the heartland and attached importance to sea and land power. In doing so,
Spykman replaced Turkey s geostrategic stance. According to him, Turkey was in the
Rimland area instead of being in the Pivot area (Heartland). This chapter ended by




              
               
        
 
            
          
          
             
            
              
              
                
              
              
           
                
            
             
 
 
            
              
           
             
             
          
 
             
            
              
             
            
politics of the 19th century. In particular, the Heartland thesis since it presented the
Pivot area as the core of Eurasia was the main rationale behind the Eurasianist ideology
which seeks the establishment of a Eurasian Union.
Having explored the context of the relationship between the Eurasianism ideology and
Geopolitical thinking of the 19th century, the following conceptualisation chapter
investigated the Eurasianism ideology theoretically and compared it with Pan-Slavism
in two categories. In the first category, the Eurasianism ideology and its forefathers
were examined. In this part, the chapter presented that the Eurasianism ideology
emerged in a cataclysmic era as a conclusion to seeking a historical, geopolitical, and
cultural identity along with other nationalist movements. The events of the early days of
the 1900s, such as World War I, the Revolution of 1905 and the Revolution of February
1917 were the main rationales behind the ideology. In this climate, the ideologists of
Eurasianism constructed a theory to build a new nation which covers all the Eurasian
people under a Eurasian state. Moreover, the chapter identified that Neo-Eurasianism,
which came out in the later times of the Soviet Union, is a slightly differentiated version
of Classical Eurasianism. Again the society of the Soviet Union was experiencing
disastrous times and the ideologists of the Neo-Eurasianism were attempting to save the
Union.
The second part of the Chapter compared the coeval ideology of Eurasianism, Pan-
Slavism as it is one of the most similar ideologies to Eurasianism regarding space,
territories, and societies. From this comparison, the chapter outlined two main
differences: (1) race and religion are not determinants of the Eurasianism ideology in
contrast to Pan-Slavism; (2) Eurasianism is more likely to be interpreted in different
ways by intellectuals and scholars than the ideology of Pan-Slavism.
Having analysed the emergence of the Eurasianism ideology in the Russian Empire and
the USSR respectively, the following chapter focused on a general framework of
Turkish foreign policy making since the late Ottoman era in order to familiarise the
reader with how Turkey s foreign policy course has been determined and influenced by




             
               
               
               
            
              
     
 
              
              
             
         
             
         
            
              
             
          
            
              
             
                
                 
            
          
            
             
              
            
              
               
             
different periods in this chapter: New Republic s Foreign Policy: Peace at home, peace
in the world (late Ottoman era - 1945), Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War
(1945 - 1990), New World Order and Turkish foreign policy (1990 - 2002), A New
Era in Turkish Foreign Policy (2002 and onwards). It was necessary to present the main
rationale behind foreign policy making in Turkey, especially during the last three
decades in this chapter. In this sense, the chapter provided a historical background to
analyse Turkish foreign policy understanding.
The first analysis chapter classified the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey. In the first
part of the chapter, the ideologies, which have been influential and have been perceived
as alternatives to Turkey s western identity since the Ottoman era, were examined. In
this regard, Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Turanianism are the
four ideologies which were dealt with. These four ideologies have been more dominant
among Turkey s intellectuals. While neo-Ottomanists have been anticipating a
multicultural state which embraces the relative tolerance of Ottoman Islam as sources
of pluralism and openness for domestic social and political life , Islamists have aimed at
uniting all Muslims under an Islamic state or a Union to withstand Western
encroachments. Furthermore, whereas pan-Turkism aspired to unite all Turkic peoples,
pan-Turanianism was aimed at the unification of Turkic peoples with the Finno-Ugric
peoples. This part of the chapter claimed that since these four ideologies have been
dominant during the last three decades of Turkey, they have had significant importance
as the roots of diversity in Eurasianism in Turkey. In this sense, a number of discourses
of Eurasianism in Turkey have been identified in this era. That is why the second part of
the chapter classified the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey in three different
categories: Nationalist, Multiculturalist, and Westernist Eurasianism. In fact, this part
proves that whereas Classical Eurasianism could not penetrate into Turkish society in
the early days of the 20th century, Neo-Eurasianism has been embraced by some
intellectual circles in different versions during the post-Cold war era. In this sense, the
nationalist discourse favours turning Turkey s face to the East and making alliances
with countries such as Iran, India, Pakistan, Syria, Russia, and so on. However, it
emphasises that a prospective Union should only be built by Turkic States. On the other




            
                 
            
              
   
 
             
              
             
               
             
            
               
               
            
             
             
           
              
             
               
             
            
            
             
          
        
          
             
       
                                                          
            
Eurasian continent, the Westernist discourse claims that Turkey is strong and perceived
as a strategic ally by the Western states as long as it has woven relationships with the
countries of Eurasia. Having explored the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey, this
chapter makes a solid contribution to the literature in terms of classifying the discourses
through up-to-date documents.
After explaining which discourses have been effective during the post-Cold war era, the
final analysis chapter focussed on the three periods of Turkish foreign policy and the
scope of application of the three Eurasianism discourses. This chapter covered the three
periods of Turkish foreign policy zal, Cem, and Davuto lu as during their tenures
Turkey has experienced a significant amount of activism. The then President of the
Republic of Turkey, Turgut zal was an influential figure regarding opening Turkey s
economy to the world and pursuing an active foreign policy during the crucial events in
its neighbouring area such as the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991. He was against
Turkey s isolation in the international arena and emphasised that Turkey should seize
the opportunity while the international balance of power was changing. Similar to zal,
the then Foreign Minister smail Cem was also attaching importance to the openness
and building interaction with the neighbouring states. Furthermore, he was against
Turkey s alienation from its Ottoman past. In this regard, Cem was a fervent supporter
of Turkey s attempts to build woven relationships with its neighbours. For instance, it
would not be wrong to claim that Turkey owes him for the good relationship with
Greece. Similar to zal and Cem, Davuto lu also claims that Turkey should benefit
from its historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire to become a central
state in world politics. Davuto lu s main contribution to Turkish foreign policy making
is his strategic depth doctrine which promotes A secure neighborhood based on a
common understanding of security, pro-active, high-level political dialogue with all
neighbors, fostering regional economic interdependence and finally, promoting multi-
cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony. 547 Based on this understanding, this
chapter claimed that a whiff of Eurasianism can be observed in Davuto lu s speeches
and actions by lining up five indicators.




               
 
 
            
    
            
     
            
            
     
         
        
 
          
 
 
               
            
           
               
   
 
             
               
            
                
            
 
         
                
              
          
To sum up briefly, some of the most important contributions of this thesis are as
follows:
A vast amount of Turkish literature on [Turkish] Eurasianism has been
contributed to English literature.
For the first time, an analytically holistic academic research on Turkish
Eurasianism has been carried out.
The categorisation of the discourses has made easier to understand Turkish
Eurasianism. In doing so, the perception of Turkish Eurasianism has been based
on accurate and timely knowledge.
Comparison of Turkish Eurasianism with Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism and
Pan-Islamism is likely to remove the conceptual confusion.
7.3. Realities and Recommendations for Future Foreign Policy Making in
Turkey
Turkey stands at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, the
Balkans, the Middle East, and even North Africa through the Mediterranean Sea.
Besides, Turkey has had a historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire,
which burdens Turkey with becoming a leading state in its own sphere of interest and
sphere of influence.
The geopolitical stand and perception makes Turkish society assume that Turkey is at
the centre of world politics and most of the developments in the region occur either
because of Turkey s influence or against Turkey. Although this mind-set is widespread
among other nations across the world, it has been one of the main rationales behind the
discourse of Turkish expansionism of creating a Turkish Union or Eurasian Union.
This expansionist approach overlaps with the Nationalist Eurasianism discourse.
Sanctifying the Turkishness and being at the centre of world politics are two of the main
features of this discourse. Moreover, the assumption that Turks are superior to the other




              
            
              
            
           
           
               
              
             
               
                
       
 
                
             
                
             
            
              
             
             
                                                          
                   
                  
                
               
                
            
    
  
                  
                 
                
               
                
              
    
understanding and the assumption that the Turk s only friend is another Turk are not
beneficial regarding Turkish foreign policy making so this rhetoric only works for
isolating Turkey in its neighbouring area. Assuming that all the countries in the region
are against Turkey prevents it from building woven relationships with the neighbouring
states. Moreover, the discourse of Nationalist Eurasianism favours the change in
Turkish foreign policy understanding since from this discourse s approach Eurasia is
perceived as Turkistan and it urges Turkey to realise its strength and put together a
new Turkish future for Turkic states. However, as of the Treaty of Lausanne548, it
cannot be claimed that Turkey has pursued any irredentist foreign policy course, except
the annexation of the province of Hatay549 in 1939 and the Cyprus operation of 1974.
That is why, by and large, the dominance of such logic over foreign policy making in
Turkey would create an axis shift effect.
The second reality is that despite the benefits of being at the crossroads of Asia and
Europe, clashing interests with Russia is the downside of such an important geopolitical
stand as both countries, Russia and Turkey, see the same region as their own sphere of
influence. The rivalry between the countries dates back to the late 1400s. Their
relationships were mostly strained and even antagonistic due to the power struggle
between both empires. One of the reasons for the struggle was the inclination of
broadening their borders to include European territories as well as Caucasian. And this
inclination has created several clashes between the two Empires since the late 1500s.
548 It is the final treaty which concluded World War I. It was signed by representatives of Republic of
Turkey on one side and by Britain, Italy, Japan, France, Greece, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes (Yugoslavia) on the other. The treaty was signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, on July 24, 1923,
after a seven-month conference. The treaty recognized the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey.
Turkey made no claim to its former Arab provinces and recognized British possession of Cyprus and
Italian possession of the Dodecanese. For further information see: Britannica Online Encyclopaedia,
Available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/332502/Treaty-of-Lausanne>, [Accessed
on 31/08/2013].
549 The Treaty of Ankara that was signed between Turkey and France on October 20, 1921 granted a
special status to the Sancak of Iskenderun (Hatay), which was in the Syrian territory under the French
mandate. But, the Turks remaining there would still be able to entertain their cultural rights. After 1936
when France decided to give Syria and Lebanon their independence, endeavour to annex Hatay
to the mainland on July 23, 1939 through democratic means was successful. For further information see:
M. and A. Global Security Watch Turkey: A Reference Handbook, (Westport:




              
                
               
              
            
          
        
 
            
                 
            
             
             
               
              
               
           
              
             
               
              
                
     
 
            
          
             
                                                          
             
              
            
            
 
            
Over the course of time, the relations transformed as the two Empires transformed as
well. Toward the end of the 19th century when Czar Nicholas I of Russia described the
Ottoman Empire as the sick man of Europe , the power of the Empire started to
decline significantly and in 1923, the Republic of Turkey emerged as the successor state
of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Russian Empire also transformed into the
Russian Provisional Government (1917-1922), then the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (1922-1991), and the Russian Federation (1991-present), respectively.
Despite the rising volume of economic relationships between the sides, the perception
of the other has not changed much in both states. For instance, the 1990s were an era
when the sides had difficulties on security issues, while economic relations were
improving. 550 The concern was the former Soviet States in which both sides had
influence. In terms of this concern, Turkey s approach was based on ethnical, linguistic,
and cultural ties with Turkic States of Central Asia and Caucasus. In this context, the
collapse of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to develop a discourse The Great Turkish
World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China . Along with this discourse,
Turkey envisioned expansive road, energy and communications links with the former
Soviet Central Asian Republics.551 Whereas Russia was in favour of the status quo in
Central Asia, Turkey was supporting a deep-rooted change in the former Soviet States
with the help of the USA. And this confrontation was the principal issue that caused
tension between both sides. This hidden rivalry remains intact as one of the sensitive
points of Turkish foreign policy up until now even if it has not caused any concrete
conflict among Russia and Turkey.
In light of this rivalry, regarding Russia s perception there are different approaches
among the discourses. While nationalist discourse embraces an antagonistic orientation,
multiculturalist and Westernist discourses handle the issue in a more pragmatic way. As
550 B. D. Sezer, The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic
Rubin, B. and K. (der.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional
Power, (London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2001); B. D. Sezer, -Russian Relations: The
Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnersh Turkish Studies, 1 (1),
59-82.




            
              
            
            
               
                
                
               
      
 
             
              
              
                  
               
                
               
              
      
 
               
            
              
           
            
           
            
           
          
                                                          
           
         
            
mentioned above, the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in their immediate regions
seems to be a geopolitical fait accompli.552 However, the two actors have managed to
reconcile the geopolitical rivalry so far. It seems that this reconciliation environment
will last as long as Turkey s new multi-dimensional perspective and Russia s openness
remain. The abandonment of a visa regime between Turkey and Russia as of 16 April
2011 is solid evidence that the two states are in favour of improving the relations as
much as they can. If improving the relationship with Russia is for the good of Turkey,
then it seems that it is logical to allow the Multiculturalist and Westernist discourses to
penetrate into Turkish foreign policy making.
Another reality is Turkey s confusing identity through the bridge theory. Due to its
geopolitical location between Europe and Asia, Turkey is called a bridge state with a
mediator role in any dispute or conflict as seen by several analysts and researchers.
However, it is a fact that Turkey is not perceived as a state which has the capacity and
capabilities to become a mediator between the West and the East since neither side see
it as neutral or in their interests. While the majority of Europeans do not think that
Turkey belongs to the European continent, the Eastern states do not see Turkey as one
of them, either. That is a significant issue when it comes to building woven
relationships with all the neighbouring countries.
Turkey is called a bridge state due to its geopolitical position between Europe and Asia
and also its historical-cultural inheritance from the Ottoman Empire. In this climate,
Turkey has experienced a number of problems when it comes to benefitting from this
location and inheritance. Nowadays, it is considered a model Muslim democracy 553 ,
while it has relatively strong relationships with the Western world, especially with
European countries. Turkey s relations with European countries, such as Great Britain,
France, and Germany, date back to before the 19th century. Although Turkey s
Europeanisation and Modernisation processes started in the late 19th century, official
relations with the European Union were established with Turkey s application for
552 H. Geopolitics and Turkish Foreign Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe
International Institute for Liberal Politics, Vienna (2009), p. 7.




           
            
              
            
         
 
              
          
               
           
             
            
             
             
              
            
         
 
           
         
            
           
 
             
              
               
               
            
               
                                                          
              
                 
           
               
      
       
associate membership of the European Economic Community in September 1959. There
were also several agreements signed by Turkey in order to fulfil Turkey s
rapprochements with the West, such as the Council of Europe (joined on 9 August
1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (joined in 1952), and Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (one of the founding members).
After Turkey s application in 1959, four years later on 12 September 1963 Turkey and
the European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement creating an
association between the sides and it came into effect on 1 December 1964. The Ankara
agreement foresaw an eventual membership once the conditions for membership had
been met.554 Therefore, Turkey and the EU have continued talks approximately for half
a century. Despite having such deep-rooted relations, many Europeans do not see
Turkey as a European state. From their perspective, Turkey has different cultural and
religious traditions, and a different way of thinking. Namely, Turkey is a significant
other555 for the majority of Europeans. That is why they have remained sceptical about
Turkey s membership, so far. For instance Pope Benedict XVI s statement is obvious
evidence for this way of thinking towards Turkey s otherness:
The roots that have formed Europe are those of Christianity. Turkey has
always represented another continent, in permanent contrast to Europe It
would be an error to equate the two continents Turkey is founded on
Islam Thus the entry of Turkey into the EU would be anti-historical.556 
Although there is such a debate over Turkey s identity among European countries, it
would not be wrong to claim that Turkey is an industrialised and developed country
with a stable economy and also better integrated into the world polity compared to other
Muslim countries. Moreover, people in Turkey are more secular than those in the rest of
the Muslim countries. In this sense, the backwardness among the Muslim countries,
believed to be a result of the imperial domination of the European powers, has caused
554 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Foreign Policy p. 46.
555 For more information on identity and otherness, see the extensive analysis provided in I. B. Neumann,
Uses of the other: , 1999; W. Bloom, Personal 1990.
556 J. Bencivenga, the New Old Comments on Entry into the European
Christian Science Monitor, Available from




           
            
            
               
 
                
            
              
              
               
              
               
            
              
           
             
 
             
            
              
             
           
             
                                                          
               
           
    
                   
        
 
                  
                
                 
                  
                  
hostility towards Western countries. 557 From this perspective, as long as Turkey
embraces western and liberal-democratic values, it drifts apart from the Muslim world.
Under these conditions, Turkey should pursue a balanced policy between its relations
with the West and its interest in the Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East.
The reality is that the region in which Turkey is located is not stable, secure, or
developed. In this sense, those unstable conditions make the region vulnerable regarding
making prudential plans. For instance, Turkey has a long border with Iran, one of the
rogue558 states in world politics. Although from time to time Turkey has built good
relationships with Iran, it would not be wrong to call them strained relations . Iran is
one of Turkey s largest neighbours and the border which both states share has not
changed since 1639 when the Treaty of Zuhab was signed by the Ottoman Empire and
Safavid Persia.559 Turkey has had longstanding relations with Iran and those relations
might be characterised by highs and lows. Mutual suspicion and rivalry have been two
main features so far. Economic, demographic, geopolitical, and cultural conditions of
both states can be put forward as reasons for this rivalry and suspicion.
At the dawn of the 20th century, both states were underdeveloped and agriculture-based.
However, economic, political and cultural reforms were implemented in the course of
time by both states for the purpose of progressing towards the level of contemporary
civilisations. In Iran, those developments were carried out until the Iran Revolution in
1979. With this event, revolutionary powers overthrew Iran s monarchy, the Pahlavi
dynasty, and established the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah
557 S. EU Impact on Relations with the Islamic World and Turkish
Islam, the Journal of Turkish Weekly, 22 June 2006, Available from
<http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2147/turkey-s-eu-membership-s-impact-on-relations-with-the-
islamic-world-and-turkish-islam.html>, [Accessed on 01/09/2013].
558 Noam Chomsky describes the Rogue state as a threat to its neighbors and to the entire World. N.
Chomsky, Rogue State, Available from <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199804--.htm> [Accessed on
30/08/2013].
559 The Safavid Dynasty was one of the significant ruling dynasties of Iran which ruled Iran between 1501
and 1722. During this era the Ottoman Empire and Safavids confronted several times. The Battle of
Chaldiran was one of them, occurring on August 1514 and ending in victory for the Ottoman Empire.
This battle was only the beginning. After more than 100 years the confrontation eased to some extent and




            
             
             
             
         
 
            
               
               
        
              
              
  
 
               
                
             
               
             
               
               
              
                 
               
             
             
  
 
            
                 
                                                          
         
Ruhollah Khomeini. Although the Pahlavi dynasty had established strong ties with the
Western world and pursued a pro-American foreign policy, the revolution was no longer
keen to continue its relationships with the Western countries. Iran s existence as a
significant neighbour in the region along with this foreign policy understanding is one
of the issues that Turkey should take into consideration.
In this regard, the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey have different approaches
towards Iran. On the one hand, Nationalist Eurasianism claims that Iran is a Turkic state
and it must be included in any attempt toward establishing a Eurasian Union. On the
other hand, Multiculturalist Eurasianism and Westernist Eurasianism, generally,
position in line with the Western countries attitude towards Iran. On account of this,
any issues related to Iran should be taken into consideration in Turkey regardless of
ideological position.
In this part, the last reality of Turkish foreign policy might be Turkey s attitude towards
its kin states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The relations with the Turkic states have
always had significant importance for Turkey due to sharing ethnic and linguistic ties
with these states. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been keen to
establish solid relations with the post-USSR states. Turkey s initial attempt was to play
a big brother role for the newly independent Turkic states and this attempt was also
supported by the USA in order to fill the power vacuum with the Turkish Model 
instead of radical Islam. On the other hand, there were two obstacles before Turkey s
aim. The first one was that other regional powers such as Russia and Iran were not keen
to see the USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus through Turkey. The second obstacle
was that the post-Soviet Turkic states had just explored the multipolarity within the
international system and did not want to be dependent upon any single regional
560 power.
Under these conditions, Turkey managed to establish only limited relationships with the
Turkic states. In fact, at the end of the 1990s Turkey s relations with some of the Turkic




             
                
             
              
              
              
           
               
 
 
          
           
       
          
  
             
      
           
     
 
               
            
             
           
               
    
 
              
              
               
            
                                                          
             
         
    
              
 
states could be described as close to breaking point . Uzbekistan, for instance, broke
off its ties with Turkey because of Islamic terrorist attacks on its own land and Turkey
was accused of harbouring the terrorists by Uzbek officials.561 However, the balance of
power changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since then, in the context of training the
Turkic states armies in the war against terrorism Turkey has promoted its relations with
these sceptical states. Recently, Turkey has signed a number of agreements in order to
provide them with necessary equipment, financial assistance and military education. In
this sense, after 9/11 Turkey has revised its policy towards these states on the following
principles:
a) Contributing to the consolidation of their state structuring
b) Preserving political and economic stability and promoting regional cooperation
c) Encouraging political and economic reforms
d) Assisting their integration with the international community and Euro-Atlantic
structures
e) Developing bilateral relations in all fields on the basis of equality, mutual
interest and respect for sovereignty.
f) Supporting the transportation of their energy resources to international markets
freely and through alternative routes.562 
In addition, Turkey has striven to enhance the cultural ties with the Turkic states since
they became independent. Many schools and universities have been opened by the
Turkish Ministry of National Education and private institutions in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Besides, Turkey initiated annual summits of Turkish speaking countries in
the mid-1990s and they are still being held even though these summits have not yielded
the expected results.
Apart from enhancing the cultural ties, Turkey pays a lot of importance to economic
relations with the Turkic states. Since the 1990s Turkey has provided 1.1 billion dollars
in credit to these countries in order to make them attractive investment areas for Turkish
businessmen.563 The volume of Turkey s trade with Turkic states was approximately 1
561 F. S. Larrabee and I. O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign p. 103.
Relations with Central Asian Republics, Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-
relations-with-central-asian-republics.en.mfa>, [Accessed on 10/04/2011].






             
                
              
               
            
   
 
                
             
             
               
             
            
              
                
               
             
      
 
                
               
              
             
            
         
       
 
                
              
             
             
               
billion dollars during the 1990s. However, the volume has increased since 2002 when
AKP came to power in Turkey. There has been a steep increase in the trade volume
between 2002 and 2010, compared to the 1990s. Until recently, the trade balance had
been in favour of Turkey. However, along with the start of importing natural gas and oil
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the balance has changed in favour of
the Turkic states.
After all, it might be appropriate to say that the relationships with the Turkic states are
vital for Turkey. Hence, Turkey was too enthusiastic to enhance these relations during
the 1990s. However, Turkey has eventually realised that it may only become possible
by establishing solid relations with both Russia and Iran. In this sense, it is necessary
for Turkey to approach the Caucasus and Central Asia from a holistic perspective.
Herein, Turkey s new foreign policy course has contributed to this understanding since
2002. Enhancing relations with Russia and Iran and reminding them that Turkey is no
longer a barrier but a bridge for them is the current foreign policy course pursued by
Turkey in order to access the Turkic states without causing any rivalry. In doing so,
emphasising its own democratic and liberal-market values is another policy to win the
hearts and minds of Turkic people.
As long as Turkey, Russia, and Iran have a similar sphere of influence and sphere of
interest the Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus will remain one of the
sensitive points of Turkish foreign policy. That is why Turkey should pursue a foreign
policy course by bearing that in mind and should eschew applying policies, which
create more rivalry in the region. In this context, Multiculturalist Eurasianism and
Westernist Eurasianism are more reasonable approaches compared to Nationalist
Eurasianism, which embraces a more racial manner.
In the final analysis, during the last decade Turkey has emerged as an active player in
the international arena. Before that it had had a limited foreign policy course and
horizon. This limitedness had existed since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.
Along with the then Prime Minister Turgut zal s entrepreneurship, the collapse of the




                
            
              
               
              
               
               
             
               
             
             
           
               
           
 
                
               
               
               
              
               
            
             
              
 
 
    
 
               
      
 
            
the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. Even though this sphere could not be created
thoroughly during the 1990s, the early 2000s have brought a rapid revitalisation.
However, policies in this sphere should be created delicately since the balance of power
is highly important in this region. As of 2002, Turkish Foreign Policy has experienced a
major change process or activism. By this activism, on the one hand Turkey keeps
improving its relations with the European Union and the USA, though there have been a
number of ups and downs. On the other hand, Turkey takes advantage of its geopolitical
position and attempts to improve its economic, political and cultural ties with the
Middle East, Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to become a middle
power. Furthermore, Turkey has endeavoured to open a new page with African and
Latin American states. In doing so, the economic relations have been the principal
means to establishing bilateral affairs with the aforementioned countries. From this
perspective, Turkey s trade with the EU, the USA, Iran, Russia and the Turkic states is
on the increase aside from the global economic crisis in 2009.
All in all Turkey, as a multiregional actor, is in search of transforming into a middle
power from a strong small power. That is why while Turkey is prioritising its own
relationship with the EU and the USA, it is constructing new relations with its own
near-neighbours as it is vital to becoming an indispensable member of the EU. In doing
so, the discourses of Eurasianism might be applied to foreign policy making. In this
regard, the Westernist discourse is the most reasonable one to bridge the West and the
East. However, while the Multiculturalist discourse is used to build and strengthen
cultural ties with people and nations of the Eurasian continent, Turkey might benefit
from Turkic state support in the international arena through the help of the Nationalist
discourse.
7.4. Future Research Suggestions
Based on the findings of this thesis, subsequent follow-up work will need to be pursued
since it seems necessary and promising.





            
             
              
           
 
         
 
            
            
             
    
 
         
 
              
                 
              
           
 
         
 
            
            
             
         
            
             




Future work could include the applications of discourses for selected cases. For
instance, Turkey s foreign policy towards the Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central
Asia deserves particular attention. In this sense, the impact of the discourses on the
relationships with the Turkic states would be analysed in depth.
The application of discourses to Turkey s failed relationships
While analysing how the discourses helped Turkey to build relationships with the
neighbouring countries, at the same time the discourses impact on Turkey s failed
attempts to normalize its relations with the countries, such as Armenia, Cyprus, etc.
deserve to be examined.
Widening the scope of the application of discourses
Having explored the application of the discourses in the last three decades of Turkish
foreign policy, there is now a need to widen the scope of the application of discourses to
the early times of the Republic of Turkey even if classical Eurasianism did not
completely penetrate into Turkish intellectual circles until the post-Cold war era.
Comparing the versions of Eurasianism in different countries
This research categorised the discourses of Eurasianism in Turkey. The research could
be continued by initiating a comparison of Turkish Eurasianism with other versions
such as Eurasianism in Kazakhstan, Eurasianism in Ukraine, and so on. For instance,
Ukrainian intellectual circles show similar characteristics to Turkish ones. Moreover,
Ukrainian foreign policy is, to some extent, shaped by both European and
Slavic/Eurasian identities, as well. That would help to show the differences between the






   
    
         
 
     
 
             
     
         
     
 
    
        
 
 




              
                
  
      
         
 
            
  
  
             
  
   
 





           





ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM
(Review feedback should be completed within 10 working days)
Name of applicant: Ozgur Tufekci
Faculty/School/Department:
[Business, Environment and Society] Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies
Research project title:
TURKISH EURASIANISM AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR TURKEY
Comments by the reviewer
1. Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal:
Approved.
2. Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form:
Approved.
3. Recommendation:
(Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions. If there any conditions,
the applicant will be required to resubmit his/her application and this will be sent to the
same reviewer).
X Approved - no conditions attached
Approved with minor conditions (no need to re-submit)
Conditional upon the following please use additional sheets if necessary (please
re-submit application)
Rejected for the following reason(s) please use other side if necessary
Not required
Name of reviewer: Anonymous
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ADD Kemalist Thought Association
ANAP Motherland Party
AU African Union
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CHP Republican People s Party
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCP Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform
DYP True Path Party
EC European Community
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization
EU European Union
GMEI the Greater Middle East Initiative
GNAT the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
IMF the International Monetary Fund
IOF the International Organisation of La Francophonie
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
NACC the North Atlantic Coordination Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBP National Bolshevik Party
ODA Official Development Assistance
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK Partiya Kaarkaren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)
RP Welfare Party
TURKSOY the International Organization of Turkic Culture
UK United Kingdom
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA United States of America




   
 
                 
               
       
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        































In this thesis, indigenous spelling of certain terms and proper names are utilized as they are used
in Turkish language. For those who are not familiar with the complexities of the Turkish
alphabet, the following pronunciation examples are given:
C is pronounced as j as in journey
is pronounced as ch as in child
G is pronounced as g as in goat
I is pronounced as e as in open
J is pronounced as j as in yell
is pronounced as u as in burn
is pronounced as e as in few
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